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Germany, to which school the Marine Corps posted me from 1956 to 1958,
provided my basic research ideas and material in German, English and
Russian. Because of the school's proximity to Munich, I was able to
Supplement my research with additional books and other papers from the
Institute for the study of the USSR .in that city.
In the years 1961-1963, while a naval attache in Finland, I
frequently used the facilities of the Universitets Biblioteket, library
of the University of Helsinki. This institution's Russian collection
is one of the non-Soviet world's most extensive, and is a lfmust" for
any definitive work concerning printed Russian media.
Finally, three visits to the USSR in the years 1957-1962 enabled
me to gain impressions and verify opinions which have been stated in
this thesis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A "national psychology"--popular attitudes within a country--
often has far-reaching political, economic and military implications
for other, even distant countries. When this national psychology is
favorable, other countries may benefit through increased trade, free
cultural exchange, and the knowledge that, as there is no imminent
danger to them, more money may be budgeted for non-military expendi-
tures, thus enriching and developing those lands. If the psychology
is unfavorablE), then trade will be limited, with repurcussions on the
domestic economies of all nations involved; fear of invasion or air
attack will cause military budgets to soar, thus hampering the develop-
ment of these countries.
In the words of Archibald MacLeish, writing in 1949 for the
Never in the history of the world was one people as completely
dominated, intellectually and morally, by another as the people
of the United States by the people of Russia in the four years
from 1946 through 1949. American foreign policy was a mirror
image of Russia~ foreign policy; whatever the Russians did, we
did in reverse.
In view of such events which have so influenced our lives in
recent years, it would seem, therefore, that it is desirable for any
nation to develop a favorable psychology toward another nation. States-
men throughout the years have devoted millions of words and countless
deeds to this end; however, it is all too clear that within a sovereign
nation it is the national government itself which holds the trump card.
If that national government is disposed to be friendly, its assistance
to another power in favorably propagandizing its own citizens can make
the task relatively simple. If, conversely, the national government is
inclined to be unfriendly or hostile, then the task of the first power
can be exceedingly difficult, even insurmountable.
In the world of 1968 it is an accepted fact that there are
national governments which vary greatly, with diverse views on the
relative freedom of information which the masses--the public--is to be
permitted. In the United States, we pride ourselves on freedom of the
press as one of the freedoms which constitute the foundation of our
progressive culture and represent a basic fairness to the individual.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, became shortly after its establish-
ment a dictatorship which based itself on certain ideological pr:i.nciples
which were repugnant to the Western world. It has operated within the
framework of these principles for fifty years, with minor digressions
and convolutions, but never a change in its ultimate goals.
These principles of communism, unacceptable to most of us, never-
theless constitute beliefs to which well over one-third of t he world's
population is oommitted by its governments, and which represent goals
which have consistently shaped the domestic and foreign policy of these
governments. As the influence of western thought was early deemed
dangerous to the citizens of the newly constituted Soviet Union, the
information flow was first cut off from other nations, then regulated
information fed back into the stream by the Soviet government. The next
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step, taken quickly thereafter, was a permanent campaign of "sovietization"
which, since 1917, has praised everything Soviet and villified the West.
That this could be waged at all is due to the nature of the government
itself, and the traditional characteristics of the Russian.
It is a simple matter to use the Soviets' own words to condemn
them of falsehood in the light of what we know about the actual rr~china-
tions of their government; yet, as obvious as the guilt of misrepresenta-
tion is to us, the fact remains that the Soviet people are not favored
with many-sided analysis of the news. For them there is but one inter-
pretation of every event: the official interpretation as handed down
from on high by the Politburo2 of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party to its Department of Agitation and Propaganda, and through the
press media to the citizen. Therefore, what is blatant misrepresentation
to us is too often accepted as complete truth by the Soviet man.
The attitudes of people in a democracy are, within limits,
ascertainable from a careful and scientific analysis of the press of
that country. If one were to apply the same researching methods to the
news media of a dictatorship such as the Soviet Union, the results would
be unrealistic and unproductive, if a similar picture was to be the goal.
As the Soviet government has a unique control over its people, it may
safely be assumed that any study of the Soviet press 'Would result in a
clear picture, therefore, not of those attitudes which the people of
Russia have, but of those attitudes ~hich the gover~~ ¥ishes to deve~Q£
within the confines of the USSR. That there may be advantages to having
such knowledge is obvious to any student of the Soviet Union, both as an
aid in analysis of past events and as a basis for predicting with some
accuracy future developments.
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The present study is an attempt to bring into focus one of the
many bases of Party power over Soviet citizens. It is no great revela-
tion that the Soviet government has long indulged in anti-American pro-
paganda, but the continuity, elaborateness and virulence of this "crusade
of hatred" demands further study. It is essential that such study be
undertaken parallel with an appraisal of Soviet-American relations
since 1917.
In outlining the chronological development of the anti-American
libel campaign, some space will be devoted to methodology, technology
and apparent purposes of the Soviet propagandists. Space limitations
preclude an elaborate study of Soviet propaganda as a whole; however,
the selected theme--graphic propaganda--includes within its scope
many aspects of the whole and thus is representative of the broader
subject.
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CHAPTER II
PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION
fropaganda ~nd the Soviet Heritag?
The ideological heritage of Marxism-Leninism serves as the basis
for the situation of prolonged internal tension and hostility to the out-
side world which has characterized Soviet life since the Revolution. The
Russians have Lenin to thank for the concept of the increasingly hostile
capitalist world; this concept has proved an invaluable foundation for
continuing to justify at home an indefinite postponement of social improve-
ments, a massive police system, and Russia's cultural and human isolation
from the Western world.
From the time of the Intervention, when many of Lenin's erstwhile
opponents rallied to his cause in the face of a foreign armed threat,
the Bolsheviks came to appreciate the practical po1itical value to them
of a hostile external world. Since the 1930's they have, moreover,
buttressed the ideological conception of capitalist encirclement with
memories of external hostility taken from pro-Bolshevik Russian history.
A critic in ~l~e~~t.urnaya frazetq even found anti-Americanism in
Pushkin's writings. That author described Europeans who visited the
United States:
They saw with astonishment democracy in its most disgusting
cynicism, in its cruel prejudice and intolerable tyranny .••
Greed and envy on the part of the voters, timidity and servility
on the part of the administrators ••• 1
•
Perhaps the only vital function of ideology in the Soviet state
is a rationale for the acceptance of a condition of internal siege
--necessary for the maintenance of the regime's domestic authority,
but explained to the Russian people in terms of the encircling world's
inexorable designs on the USSR.
The historic rise of the Soviet communist dictatorship to power
on a tide of exploitation of mass grievances early taught the Soviets
the value and power of propaganda as a weapon. The lesson was well ab-
sorbed, and has resulted in the past fifty years in a continuing campaign
to mobilize mass sentiment for the purpose of enrolling support for the
regime. This function has been taken always with great seriousness, and
it is interesting to note that, though the history of the Party is replete
with instances wherein policy was reversed or leadership abruptly changed,
the basic evaluation of the usefulness and indispensability of propaganda
has remained the same.
Lenin's conception of a vanguard of communists to lead the prole-
tariat presented the firmest basis for setting up a powerful propaganda
apparatus. Only in this way could success be assured. Through a complex
network of educational agitation and propaganda activities, and through
complete control of all media of mass communication, the Communist Party
leadership today relentlessly pursues its acknowledged objective of
winning doctrinal ascendancy over the minds of Soviet man. Party agita-
tion and propaganda insinuate themselves into every element of the Soviet
social structure, and with the total lack of competition they have attained
a large measure of success.
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Public opinion, being highly sensitive to deeds and events, is
generally determined, therefore, by events rather than words. The
function of the Soviet propaganda machine since its inception has been
to create an endless series of "event.s " which, when portrayed with fiery
descriptions and unflagging succession, have resulted in an unmistakable
definition of the nation or object selected. Generally speaking, this
has been the "West," with the United States since 1947 the leading con-
tender for the Soviet unpopularity contest.
The goals of the Soviet regime have been the stability of Soviet
Russia, the collapse of capitalism throughout the world, and the eventual
communization of the world. At no time in history has the regime wavered
from these aims, although at times its publicized foreign policy has de-
emphasized certain aspects of them. Such periods were the years of NEP
(New Economic Policy: 1921-1927) and the Second World War (1941-1945).
One of the main instruments used in world politics today is pro-
paganda. The tradition of the free press in the democracies sometimes
results in a lack of uniformity and accord which is confusing to analysts
in other nations; however, the total control exercised by the Soviet
government over all forms and aspects of propaganda has enabled it to
attain the most all-pervasive and most homogeneous system of opinion
control in history. This has been done by saturation propaganda and also
by denying all competition from sources with divergent points of view.
Some analysts maintain that public opinion, as we know it, does
not exist in the Soviet Union. This is undoubtedly true, if public
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opinion §& J:i.~ know ;it is considered; however, that even the Soviet
regime considers the importance of "what the people think" as a factor
in determining its domestic, and to a lesser degree, its foreign policy
is obvious. If nothing more, it is a curb on bald aggression. Thus,
the tremendous emphasis on the use of internal propaganda in the Soviet
Union. This maybe illustrated by a glance at the existing governmental
structure of the USSR, based on the Constitution of 1936. Admittedly,
the Supreme Soviet is but a rubber stamp for the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the Party, but why go through all this trouble merely to
soothe public opinion? In the words of Fa.insod:
Dictartorships ordinarily prefer not to reveal themselves in
all their stark nakedness. By assuming a constitutional disguise,
they clothe the realities of arbitrary power in the protective
garb of tradition and legitimacy. They pay Constitutionalism the
ultimate compliment of borrowing its facade to conceal. the authori-
tarian nature of their governing formula.2
The national elections in the USSR, though entirely lacking in any free
choice of candidates, serve a purpose also, according to the late Andrei
Vyshinsky, because they show "that the entire population of the land of
the Soviets are (sic) completely united in spirit.,,3
Article 125 of the 1936 Constitution safeguards freedom of speech,
press, assembly and of street processions and demonstrations. These
rights are, ho"Wever, prefaced with the proviso that they are to be exer-
cised only "in conformity with the interests of the working class, and in
order to strengthen the socialist system.,,4 In other words, they cannot
be utilized to challenge or criticize the primacy of the Party leadership.
It has been stated that, as the Soviet system of government allows
less scope for the pressure of public opinion to be felt, the result has
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been that the apprehensiveness of the Russian people has exercised no
marked influence on Soviet policy. This statement, taken at face value,
can be very misleading. ~urely the pressure of raw public opinioll as
such in the Soviet Union does not constitute the all-powerful lever on
policy that it does in the Un.ibed States; hoever, the seeming fear of
the P2t~~ ~on of the masses in the USSR has at times caused
marked changes to come about. Admittedly, there have been times when
public opinion was blatantly ignored, such as the time of collectiviza-
tion, but when Nazi Germany attacked Russia in 1941, much was done to
assuage public opinion. Within a few months, the entire thematic struc-
ture of Soviet propaganda had radically changed to suit the new needs.
The Soviet press through the years has been filled with "vindica-
tions" of actions which have shocked the entire world. That such justi-
fication is necessary is, in itself, an admission that no government can
operate long and successf'ully without some measure of public support. It
is also typical of the methods which the Communist Party has used in main-
taining its control over the thinking of the people. Every negative
quality represented in the Soviet system, every hardship, is justified
to the masses in some way.
The hardsh:ipsof the Soviet people are described as sacrif'ices
which are required for the building of a better socialist wor-Ld, After
all, the public is told, the lot of the masses elsewhere is much worse
than their own. Moral indignation and contempt for the decadence of
bourgeois civilization is stimulated by playing on the intrinsic pride
of the Russian individual; every opportunity is used to hack away at the
character of his "enemy": the Westerner. Parallel with this, emphasis
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is given continuously to symbolic expressions of the unity of the
Soviet people.
As an instrument of policy in the competition for political power,
propaganda has long been recognized as an effective weapon. When used
under circumstances in which barriers are constructed against the flow
of communications from opposing courses it is, of course, doubly effectual.
As with all mechanisms, the efficient use of propaganda requires certain
technical skills. The skills appropriate to propaganda are those which
can manipUlate a one-sided flow of symbols so as to modify the behavior
of a designated audience in ways favorable to the purpose which the pro-
pagandist serves.5 What has been a handy crutch for governments in the
past has become under the Soviets an adjunct to power, an indispensable
weapon of the weighty bureaucracy which governs the Soviet Union. As
Stalin declared in 1926, "••• the confidence of the working class is
gained not through force but by the Party's • readiness and
6ability to convince the masses of tlle correctness of its slogans.
The rise of the propaganda function is a phenomenon which is
associated with the growth of mass societies. Certainly, the development
of propaganda as an art would not have been possible to the extent pre-
valent today without the coincidental development and improvement of
modern means of communication. Concurrent with this has been a change in
the nature of propaganda. Mass politics makes it impossible for an indi-
vidual or a group of individuals to maintain face to face contact with an
audience. Instead, modern "mass media" are used as the channels of inter-
course, and as a result the type of propaganda used is simply that which
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is characteristically unilateral, indirect and symbolic.? It is evident
in recognizing this fact, that the need for the propaganda specialist has
now entered the picture.
The Soviet leadership has in recent years developed and encouraged
a sizeable reservoir of trained specialists, largely Party members, who
man the government's agitational, educational and propaganda posts. These
specialists are well paid members of the Soviet bureaucracy who share in
comfort enjoyed by the Party elite and range in type from the workers of
"Agitprop," writers, dramatists and leaders of the theatre and film in-
dustry to artists. These are generally conceded to be in one of the top
income brackets financially and on the top level socially. Their pro-
paganda machine has been described by one writer as "Bolshevism's greatest
h. . 8ac levement." In a lively sense, the Communist Party's twelve million
members in the Soviet Union are all propagandists.
The primary methodology of Soviet propaganda is based on boldness
and repetition, the blending of facts and symbols into propaganda themes,
and the attempt to associate these themes in the minds of the audience
with emotional reactions which the Soviet government wishes to stimulate
and maintain. This can be easily illustrated by a haphazard glance at
communist propaganda of any year since 1917; indeed, any editorial comment
on an event or action is invariably slanted to reveal the communist "per~
ception" of such an event. Such "perception" naturally consists of an
intent to channel the reader's thinking along lines of orthodox Marxist-
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Leninist doctrine, as the interpretation given to an event by Comm1llist
writers reflects such applied doctrine. The propaganda of current inter-
pretation of this dogma, or "Party Line," is always subordinated to what-
9ever basic tasks confront the Party at that particular stage.
Used frequently in Soviet propaganda is ridicule and humor; satire
(the "art of the opposite approach,,10); shock (atrocities, gory scenes,
brutality); falsehood; half-truths (editing speeches, "doctoring" photo-
graphs); exaggeration; "just plain folks" Khrushchev and Bulganin's
tours); appeals of power ("we want peace, but if they dare threaten us .•."),
size ("the Soviet Air Force is the world's greatest"), and skill ("who
but Soviet technologists could have sent the earth satellite on its
orbit?"); and affective language ("capitalist interventionists," "Nazi
looters," "imperia1ist warmongers").
The Soviets take advantage of perceived "antagonisms" and contra-
dictions among capitalist nations. Much of their propaganda consists of
deliberate efforts to incite one against the other, and to increase any
tension that may be present. These contradictions are portrayed as nulli-
fying any hope of unity of purpose.11 Nationalist aspirations of under-
developed lands are exploited heavily by current propaganda, and the sym-
pathy of the Middle Asian peoples within the USSR is played upon in a
Moslem version of Pan Slavism. There is a constant attempt to arouse
indigna tion and anger over Western moves by caref'ul reporting of alleged
methods used. Thus is de fa9to justification and popular assent gained
for Soviet policy counter-moves. The symbols "democracy,lI "sovereign-yy"
and "socialism" are manipulated at will by the propagandists to mobilize
opinion. Lenin's line that Soviet democracy is a thousand times more
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democratic than bourgeoisie democracy is maintained with sanctimonious
hypocrisy; in contrast, the United States is said to have merely "formal"
democracy, since the bourgeoisie control the real power: the means of
production.
A politically inept spokesman talking in a misleading, warlL~e
tone can be assured that his words will be skillfully exploited by
Moscow. For example, the utterances of a prominent American legislator
who in 1945 asked a group of United States soldiers if they didn't want
12to keep on going to Mosoow were widely reported in the Soviet Union.
The increased frequency with which the Soviet propagandists have re-
printed American cartoons and photographs with new or mutilated captions,
and the effectiveness of using our own "Words against us presents a prob-
lem. For example, the number of times the Soviets have reprinted the
photograph showing a Negro slum in Washington, D.C. with the Capitol in
the background has been considerable. This was originally taken from an
American magazine over fifteen years ago.
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CHAPTER III
GRAPHIC PROPAGANDA
Definition
All propaganda relies in great part on creating thought images;
after all, we usually think in images, rather than in words. Graphic
propaganda then, as an attempt to reduce symbols to their most easily
identifiable bases, may be considered to be a shortcut to Man's conscious-
ness. Certainly it requires fewer words to convey the impression intend-
ed; it requires less attention by the recipient, and is therefore more
suited technically to certain types of propaganda, such as posters,
billboards, as well as any event which involves mass movements, such as
parades. The graphic arts include some of Man's earliest attempts at
eoIntllunicationof iCieas (drawings, sketohes) and some of his most oomple:le
and recent (television and motion pictures).
Even in a society enjoying a common language, the s~e words may
not stimulate the same thought or intended meaning. In the Soviet Union,
with :Lts mult:Lple ethnic groups ~d. ls.n~afLes, there exists a tar /ireater
problem in mass communication than has the United States, with its nearly
homogeneous language group. Graphic propaganda can be used as an aid to
bridge this gap, particularly with an illiterate or poorly educated rural
population, such as constitutes a large percentage of the Soviet people.
In its simplicity, it is eminently suitable for use by the Soviets,
whose basic method of repetition demands non-complexity.
Graphic propaganda is, however, an intrinsic part of the overall
propaganda effort of the Soviets and must be studied in context with it.
As not all desired propaganda goals are readily accomplished by graphic
means, it is sometimes imperative that another method be used. The read-
er will do well to keep in mind that a propaganda effort, as with all
other broad ventures, can be successful only when all component parts
operate in harmony. As the Soviet anti-American propaganda effort un-
folds in these pages it will become increasingly evident how thorough
and all-encopassing it has been and continues to be.
Graphic propaganda includes within its scope any form of pro-
paganda which relies for conveyance of its message primarily upon visual
images. Some of its forms are purely graphic in nature; i.e., cartoons,
wall posters, placards; others are more comp.Lex and may include two or
more types od propaganda, such as motion pictures, television and lectures,
which affect both the sense of sight and the sense of hearing. Other
forms of graphic propganda are book illustrations, banners, circuses,
parades and demonstrations, billboards, artwork of all types in galleries,
slides, handouts, plays and tableaus, puppet shows, theatre marquees,
exhibits, photographs in magazines and newspapers, maps, schemes, diagrams
and charts, vignettes, illustrations, ornaments and illustrated headings.
It is readily apparent that this vast assemblage of media lends a
veritably unlimited assortment of tools to the professional propagandist~
Fully as apparent to the researcher is the degree to which the Soviets
have utilized this bonanza. Since the early days of the Revolution in
15
1917 they have given ever-increasing emphasis to the importance of
graphic propaganda.
The Symbols
As previously stated, successful propaganda requires the clever
manipulation of symbols. What these symbols represent must always be
clear in the minds of the propagandized masses. The Soviets were fortu-
nate in being able to take over from the previous regime a mass of mis=
conceptions, prejudices and preconceived ideas about the United States.
Some of the positive ideas--the admiration for America's technical
ability, the wonder at its progress--the USSR managed in time to turn
to its own favor by developing within the new Soviet man a defensive
attitude concerning his own abilities. A new hatred of !ltheWest" as
a monster which wanted to maintain the subservience of the Russians and
Russian technology was created. National pride was nurtured and strongly
promoted by the Soviets. Those prejudices which were anti-American to
begin with, the Soviets took over wholesale. These have been kept alive
through the years of communist dictatorship by the artful use of pro-
paganda. Several YEars' exposure to such propaganda enabled Admiral
Stevens to write in 1953 that he had "seldom been aware of anything but
distortion, dishonesty and deliberate misrepresentation in the picture
of America which the Soviet government gives to its citizens.,,1
As is true in the case of almost any great country in the world,
there are certain recognizable symbols, figures and characters which are
unmistakably identifiable with the United States. Basically, these
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include the Statue of Liberty, Coca-Cola, Uncle Sam, Wall Street, the
Ku Klux Klan and the Dollar. Perhaps unknown to the majority of stay-at-
home Americans but evident to almost any foreigner are many other symbols
which are fully as legitimate a trademark of the American abroad. These
include the bow-tie, the gaudy-colored necktie, the white-belted and
helmeted military policeman. Many other symbols, though not specifically
American, are frequently associated with the United States. In this
category are included the man in the silk hat and cutaway coat (Wall
Street and the capitalist), derby hat, dark glasses, pipe or cigar, whis-
ky, money-bags, and so on.
A main propaganda theme in the USSR has long been that the masses
of the American people, led by the progressive elements under the banrler
of the Communist ,~rty, urgently want peace, but that their dreams are
frustrated by the scheming and designing of a ruthless few. These latter
are invariably the capitalists, in some guise or other. Depending on the
period in history, these "few" and priviliged have been portrayed as
greedy speculators in Wall Street, Ku Klux Klansmen, militarists, the
culturally barren, gangsters, seedy bureaucrats or brutal oppressors.
In the propagandists I book it is a simple thing to tie in the activities
of any of these groups with any other, and it can be done on short notice,
as a sudden change in the Party line dictates.
It is noteworthy that the lines drawn between the "good" and the
"bad" are so clearly defined that even the least alert will quickly
choose between the two. Natural sympathy for the underdog comes quickly
to the fore when the two types are displayed side by side. Invariably,
the "bad" (the few) are caricatured as fat, evil-looking individuals,
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while the "good" (the many) are shown as thin, pale and clean-cut, with
sincerity and determination on their pleasant faces. The masses of
alleged homeless, hungry and destitute unemployed Americans come from the
latter group.
'I'othe Soviet eye, the average American is beset with a myriad
of difl'iculties, problems that compound one another and condemn him to
a life of subservience and dependence on the whims of the capitalist few.
His world is a world of the Depression years; the apple barrel on the
street corner and the haunted look of the chronically worried are por-
trayed as typifying America. Ever present in the background are the hov-
ering figures of the club-wielding policeman or the revolver-bearing
sheriff, and always the threat of violence and terror. Invariably, to
offset the poverty represented by an unshaven man sleeping on a park
bench, multi-million-dollar skyscrapers tower in the background and
well-dressed, fat elite drive past in chaufferred limousines, oblivious
to his suffering. Photographs of strike incidents are used to illustrate
either the internal struggle of labor versus capital or American dis-
organization and chaos, depending on the whim of the propagandist.
Thus is the world of the past evoked to serve the purpose of
modern propaganda. Situations that have not taken place for decades
are represented as happening daily, and events which are isolated or
instances of poverty and degredation as reported in the American press
are seized upon and reprinted as examples of life under the capitalist
system. These include child brides, illiteracy, etc. The "two Americas"
are vividly contrasted in Soviet propaganda, such as in two photographs
printed side by side in §ovetskaya Latvi_ya in 1957; a medal-winning
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poodle "gives a. champagne party" for thirty dogs, attended by servants,
while anuneluployed, moneyless man jumps from the top of a building to
his death. "Such are the two Americas: millionaires who don't know
what they want and unlucky unemployed, ending their lives through
suicide • .2n. . . Another article devoted to "Fifth Avenue, New York"
illustrates its opulence on one hand, while men "without a spark of
hopeI! while away the night on park benches nearby.3 The hovering spec-
t€ir.~o.f crisis is depicted as the "inescapable sputnik of capitalism. ,,4
"Racism--an ideological tool of the warmongers,,5 has been inter-
minablya successful theme in the USSR, with the Negro's unhappy role
in American life portrayed in vivid terms. The "Lynch Law," lack of
equal rights, his poverty and his hopeless conditions are contrasted
with the integrity and simple desires of the Negro. Bound Negroes are
6shown being dragged to a tree for lynching by the Ku Klltx Klan, and by
a posse which is warned by a policeman, "Tell the gentleman that they'll
have to move their autos from the road, or I'll have to fine them for
obstructing traf.fic.,,7 Anti-Negro rioting in Little Rock in 1957 was
well-publicized in the Soviet press. Photographs and remarks of fellow-
traveler Paul Robeson were used frequently in articles to support Soviet
8theses. At times, the plight of American Indians, Mexicans, J~panese and
other minority groups in the United States has been the subject of pro-
paganda. To support their "racist ideology," American scientists are
9accused of preaching Mendelian genetics.
American political institutions are condemned as false and merely
a facade for gangsterism, costly campaigns in which politicians are
bought and sold,elections won by bribery of the voters or threats on
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their lives.10 The Soviets claim that both parties are the same, with
the same objectives, so there is no real choice for the voter to make.
Kt9~9dil, immediately after the 1952 presidential campaign, showed the
GOP elephant and the Democrats' donkey being herded into a common stable
(If Wall Street") by a capitalist.11
Armament and militarization are two of the most common,themes.
The profit-hungry capitalists, monopolist greed and the need fo~ main-
tain.:tngthe munitions industry at top productivity form the presumed
basis for such propaganda. The Marshall Plan, NATO, SEATO and other
such milestones in United States foreign policy have been attacked
regularly in the press. American ties with "Fascist scum" (Franco,
Salazar, etc.) and the Nazis in particular (the new German ~deswehr,
"rehabilitation of war criminals") are associated with the resurgent
militarism of the United States. American officers are shown as super-
vising the refitting of brutal Nazis,13 as arm-in-arm with Nazi generals,14
being the direct descendants of Rimmler,15 and as black-marketeers.
American 0V1erseas bases are the subject of mueh propaganda, along
with the alleged excesses of "G.L's" at these bases. Native populations
16 h.lare shown resenting American "occupation" of their homeland, w l e
"puppet" governments serve the needs of the United States.17 Krokodil
cartoons showed an apprehensive British lion being immobilized by heavy
concrete weights ("United States military bases"), while a cigar-smoking
American officer says, "Just a few more--and then you can be perfectly
assured of your safetyl,,18
A rude soldier sprawJ.s in a chair in a foreign home where he is
billeted. The room is a shambles, mirrors andpottery shattered, a
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machine gun pointing out the window. The "Yankee," a cigar between his
teeth and a whisky bottle in his hands, mutters, "It's strange! Everywhere
I have been, they don't like me!.•••,,14 The ghost of Beethoven observes
American drunkenness, jazz bands and militarism and sadly comments:
"Though I was born in Bonn, there's no place for me here now! ,,20
The individual American soldier is depicted as a purely negative
ty·pe. Tainted with cowardice, laziness and irresponsibility, lack of
training and education, drunkenness and debauchery, venality and corrup-
tion, he fits the needs of the Pentagon, which does not want him to be
any different, for then he would not fight the "peaceloving" communists.21
A full-page article in Krasna;y_S!:Zvezda ("Where the American Occupiers
Make Themselves at Hornell)was illustrated with three photographs of
drunken, learing soldiers in West Berlin: "Here they are, 'Defenders of
Western Civilization! ,,,22 An 'American soldier gluts himself with milk
while an emaciated French mother and her children stand by: "To your
child's health, Ma.daml,,23 14"Drug addicts in the United States Army"
15was the subject of a Soviet officer's letter in ~~~~ ~vezda.
Atomic and other nuclear weapons have remained the symbol of the
USA, although the Soviet Union probably has them in similar quantity.
They are shown as representing the American threat to world peace, as
their destructive power has given the United States overconfidence in its
. 26 27aggresslve power. Uncle Sam has been shown with an A-bomb for a beard;
A- and H-bombs are shown scattered under the table in an "occupied"
apartment,28 are object for adoration in a church by "bombworshippers,1I29
30and are being served as "imported food" for the hungry rearmed Germany.
A wealthy capitalist sits before his fireplace, "at last contented"
because he is surrounded by casks of gunpowder and huge bombs.31
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Courts of law are a mockery of justice, as criminals with money
do not go to jail. At a trial, Krokodil portrays a witness taking the
oath on a Bible, which is then opened and money poured into the witness'
hat.
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Court judges are bought and sold,23 and as the police force is
in the pay of the capitalists, there is no real justice. The policeman
is invariably shown as the enemy of the average citizen, but as the
confidant of the wealthy criminal. "Collusion of court and criminal"
is attacked in one cartoon which shows the judge bargaining with the
accused.34 In another ("When the police don't meddle in the affairs of
the press"), a policeman turns his back and smiles while Ku Klux Klans-
men pillage and burn a "Workers' Newspaper Office.35
American lack of culture is a theme that has been constant for
at least three decades; it appears to be used as a "filler" when no
particular emphasis is being given to another topical campaign. Asso-
ciated with this are the symbols Hollywood, tasteless music and art,
comics, juvenile delinquency, moral degeneration, sensational sex and
gangster movies and novels, faddism (!~rock 'n roll"), 36 immodest display
of the body (bathing beauty "Queens"), the ballyhoo of advertising and
its offensiveness, seedy affectation and preoccupation with materialism,
barbarity and vulgarism in American literature. Above all is the reminder
that in the "Land of the Dollar" money can buy anything, including a man's
self-respect. An article, "Perverted Amusement" in ~ol~k~~
Pravda in October, 1957 portrayed a young Ametican girl smashing a new
automobile with a sledgehammer. In a raffle "for one dollar, if you
have the lucky ticket, you win the right to smash this beautiful machine
with a hammer. ,,37
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A cat howling on a rooftop is heard by a mother and her daughter:
"You!,re right, it's Elvis Presley. But how'd he ever get up there?,,38
Mickey Spillane's Mike Hammer is dissected in "American Don Quixote,"
as a cartoon shows him complete with roadster, armament and blonde.34
"Gangsters of the Pen steal, loot, murder "and then 'write their mem-
. .(. Am. 40oi.r-s a.n er~lca." A cigar-smoking child is jailed for murder, but
the "chief criminals (,tTV, .IIHollywood, J. and ,\Comics ,I, ) hide themselves. ,,41
A gangster questions a boy co-worker: "Hallo, Jimmy; how did last
night's raid on the cashier's office gel?" "Just as it says [in the
comics] •1I'~1>2A photograp h of children "shooting" blindfolded youths
while playing "firing squad" was hailed in Ogony~k as "the upbringing
of murderers. ,,43
American youth is portrayed as wallowing in a morass of criminal-
ity and despair from which there is no hope of escape under present con-
ditions. As in all nations the youth is the "hope of tomorrow," but with
his environment of poverty, and lack of hope for future improvement coupled
with the hostility and tension created by the American militarists and
businessmen, his lot is miserable, indeed. Progressive youth, enlighten-
ed by proper leadership and education, can still save America; thus is
the door always open for cooperation with the communists. All the ab-
normalities attributed to the American way of life are cited as reasons
for the position of young people.
In the Fifties, Soviet propagandists began to pay increasing
attention to the teenagers of America, concurrently with a noticeable
upswing in the Soviets' own problem of juvenile delinquency. The con-
venience is obvious in being able to blame American "faddism" and deca-
dent influence as a basis for their own difficulties.44
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The "Press in Chains" is another theme which has seen long
service to the propagandists. According to their interpretation, the
American press is the lackey of the capitalist and merely serves his
bidding; nothing is printed which has not been approved, and thus the
press is sterile. The mass of the people are dupes of this cunning and
corrupt press, which draws their attention from the realities of the
class struggle. A postwar play, The Russian Qg_estion had this as its
central theme, and Moscow often portrays the capitalist as controlling
government policy and thinking. .9~ in 1948 printed an article,
"Randolph Hearst, King of the Yellow Press,,,45 with a center illustra-
tion showing Hearst lying in bed amid all his wealth. In the article,
Charles Beard, American historian, was quoted as saying, "There isn't
a variety of'vice and crime which Hearst would not use to make a profit."
Vyshinsky declared that by Hearst's orders his newspapers "carryon a
bloodthirsty agitation against the Communist Party, the revolutii.onary
workers' movement and the USSR.,,46
Krok_Q_gilportrayed the "capitalist press" as a blowsy prostitute
accepting the arm of a fat capitalist--"at your service"--while he
proffers money.47 Western journalists are seen as "news falsifiers"
. .1 48--Vlnes which grow when watered by American dollars--by Krok.9.9d_,
as a "sordid conccctd.on••• marked 'Made in U.S.A.t,,,49 and as speaking
"with an American voice.,,50 Similarly, the Voice of America radio was
dismissed as "those ugly sounds which pollute the atmosphere.,,51
At every opportunity, the vices and shortcomings of the United
States are contrasted devastatingly with the advantages and morality of
24
the Soviet system. As long ago as 1920, Sovetskaya Pravda declared,
"If we compare the conditions of life in Russia with the conditions of
life in the West, we have to state that our position is brilliant.,,52
Lack of subtlety may be called almost a trademark of Soviet
propaganda of the past. Impressive though it is from the standpoint
of volume and universality of coverage, there is none of the subtlety
which earmarks cartoons of such masters as David Low (Manchester Guardian)
or the photographs of David Douglas Duncan. A capitalist is called a
capitalist and is caricatured in the form manner, according to Party
demands.
One of the shortcomings of the bulk of Soviet propaganda is that
it lacks the skill and attention to detail which would make it more
plausible to those who are accustomed to it. Some of the purported in-
cidents, the descriptions of events, are so obviously incredible as to
raise immediate doubt in the mind of the reader. The Soviets rely on
repetition of a limited number of basic themes to create habits of thought,
Simultaneously excluding competing thoughts, as their government excludes
On the other hand, Soviet cartoonis~ are exceedingly clever and
competing parties. Such a method has been aptly named "the buckshot
method" of propaganda.
capable. Their work reflects the wry humor of the Russian turned to
political advantage. Most of the selected themes strike directly at the
heart of the matter, and often the master cartoonists in Krokodil have
managed to c reate a cartoon which is memorable by virtue of its simpli-
city and boldness. An excellent example printed in 1954 portrayed the
head and shoulders of the Statue of Liberty, with two policemen peering
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out from inside, their cruel faces forming the pupils of the statue!s
lleyes.1! The policemen!s billy-clubs (hanging outside the corners of the
!!eyes!!)form two large tears: Liberty is weeping for justice in America.
Very effective propaganda!
Techniques of cartooning used are, as might be expected, many and
varied. All the old tricks of political cartoonists have been used and
continue to crop up in print at intervals. Many old themes have been
used again and again; sometimes in the raw, other times with modifications.
An excellent example of this is the cartoon which shows Uncle Sam watering
the seedbed from which pop the bayonets of resurgent militarism; this
was used with little change in 1936, 1947 and 1954 in Krokodil.
A few of the devices commonly used are: the teetering I!house of
cards!! composed of members of a coalition or alliance; unstable figures
supporting one another, with those on the bottom being stepped on (alli-
ances); a marionette dangling by strings held by Uncle Sam or Wall Street
(!!puppet!!governments); reflections in a mirror which show similarities
tothe past (Hitler, etc.); Wall Street juggling the law, the White House,
or militarists; Uncle Sam!s hat (or a military cap) used as a nest for
eggs which hatch !!espionage,!!!!terror,1!or !!diversion!!;holding dogs on
leashes (controlling governments, individuals); the wagon being pulled by
statesmen in yokes; feeding money to swine in troughs (statesmen); sawing
down a tree which represents the UNO, peace, etc.; the firebrand-bearing
madmen teetering on a precipice; blowing up balloons (the !!A-bomb threat,!!
the I!Hungarian Question!!) which explode and dissipate; and roads which
fork and are marked with signs, i.e. "t.oPea ce;" "t.oWar.!!
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=An innovation which is really not new, but which was being used
more frequently and with more finesse in 1957 is the device of taking
an article or series of photographs from the Western or American press
and reprinting it in part with comments and captions supplied by the
Soviets.54 These articles which appear in the Western press are basi-
cally of two types: those about the USSR which are reprinted with sar-
castic and amused observations by the propagandists (playing on the
people's pride), and those concerning the United States which show us
in a bad light. The original captions are often sufficiently anti-
American to justify their retention, but just as often the Soviets draw
their own conclusions in additional comments.
Photographs from Life were reprinted in "Life Speaks Untruth"
in 9gonY~k.55 Beside the original American photographs were those of
the same persons, objects and places taken by Soviet cameramen from more
advantageous angles and under different conditions. The captions of these
ridicule Life's original article. A New~weelf.article concerning anti-
Americanism throughout the world was reprinted in part, with the least
I I
reproduced drawings from the article, Ogony!!k emphasized that, though
Soviet scientists always preferred to work for peaceful aims, "the people
complimentary quotes given prominence and put into context with an "ex-
56planation."
"'Mechanics Illustrated' Claims the Hight to the Moon,,57 reprinted
the American author's demand, "Let's claim the moon--nowl We can beat
the Reds with this plan to shoot our flag to the moon by rocket." Under
in the U.S. in a.llwalks of life see 'aggressive plans of'the Soviet
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Union. ,"58 Under the banner heading, "Imperialism Develops Murderers
and Rap l.at.s ," Komsomol' skaya Pravda reprinted photographs from Newsweek
which showed a smiling family group. The caption describes how two of
the women vTere later murdered by a fourteen-year-old son. 59 A young
American boy in another photograph plays with "an atomatic gun and
guided missile launcher, which shoots and explodes like the r_eal thing."
A cartoon from Th~ Christian Scie~ Monitor showed a rat (Hiriflation")
nibbling at the "U.S. Dollar bp.ying_power.,,60
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CHAPTER IV
THE APPARATUS OF PROPAGANDA
Organization
The Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop), which
controls all propaganda within the Soviet Union, is immediately respon-
sible to the Politburo of the Centra.l Committee of the Communist Party.
Fanning out under it in the organizational structure is the subordinate
propaganda control apparatus, numerous Agitprops on a smaller scale.
Inkeles describes the functions of this department as
• general responsibility for moulding and mobilizing
public opinion in the Soviet Union so that it will most effec-
tively support and facilitate the achievement of those long
and short-range ends which the party lradership has defined
as the goals of the nation as a whole.
The present Agitprop was created in 1939, having been proposed at
the XVIII Party Congress "to concentrate the work of party propaganda and
agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation depart-
ments into a single • administration.,,2 As the Politburo determines
the tactical line of the Party on major questions, its close control over
Agitprop insures a "unity of voice" of Communist propaganda on any given
issue. Agitprop, a policy staff, acts in the capacity of planner, direc-
tor and watchdog of all communications media. For internal propaganda
the flow of direction is from the Central Committee, directly to Agitprop
to Pravda, and thence to the internal media: the Home Service,
.3~~~3iya, Mosfilm Studio, etc.
The internal organization of ~Q£ is elaborate, consisting
of fourteen subsections in 1957: propaganda (administrative); agitation
(administrative); central (Moscow) press; local (provincial) press;
publishing houses; films (Sovfilm); radio; fictional literature; art
affairs; cultural enlightenment; schools; science; party propaganda
and mass agitation; VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations
withli'oreign Countries).4 Within these agency subdivions, the assign-
ment of key personnel is rigorously controlled by the ~~2~ adminis-
tration.
Since 19.39, directors of the Department of Agitation and Pro-
paganda have included Zhdanov, Shepilov and Suslov, all important
members of the Central Committee of the Party. Its head in 1957 was
F. V. Konstantinov. The post of director has served as a stepping stone
for many to other high government and Party posts.
The second largest component of Soviet expenditures as revealed
in the annual budget in the postwar years has been financing the so-
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called "cultural and social measures." Under the heading of "education"
in the budget is included also the cost of political propaganda, all
newspaper and book publishing; therefore, no factual information on
exact expenditures for propaganda is available as such. An estimate by
Evans in his study of world-wide Communist propaganda activities gave the
amount spent by the USSR and its satellites in 195.3for such purposes as
over three billion dollars.5 This source credtts the Soviets.alone with
spending over 9.35millions for broadcasts, news services, films and the
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financing of agitators; 56 millions to train propagandists; and 85
millions for domestic book and magazine publishing; while the satellites
were estimated to have spent another 4S1 millionso6 The director of
the United States Information Service in 1957 estimated that the Soviets
7were producing 100,000 trained propagandists and agitators per year."
The Soviet press is not a free press, nor is it a commercial
enterprise in our sense of the term. It is an industry which is formally
controlled by the government, but which is actually the organ of an ex-
clusive political party. Instead of reflecting public opinion, it is
designed and primarily intended to mould and shape it. To fullf::Ulthis
function, the government exercises monopolistic control over all press
media, all books and periodicals published in the Soviet Union. Indeed,
this control extends to all paper and new·sprint manufactured in the USSR,
as well.
Censorship and control over all publication is exercised by the
Party in two ways: formal and informal. The former is the most effective
and all-pervasive; this is carried on both before and after publication
of any material by branches of the Main Office for Literature and Pub-
lishing Business ~:;l"!J_. Its charge under law is to carry out "all
kinds of political and ideological, militaTJT and economic control of
printed matter, manuscripts, photographs, pictures, etc., designed for
pUblication or circulation, and of radio messages, lectures and exhibi-
tions.uS There is a Glaylit in each Soviet republic and a central
Glavlit in Moscow.9
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Facilities for printing are confined to Party, governrrlentand
government-controlled organizations. Printing offices of any kind, in-
eluding mimeographing or hectographing processes "may be opened only by
. 10government agencies, cooperatives and publlc organizations." All
agencies, including governmental agencies except the Communist Party,
IZY:.~a and the Academy of Sdences (which maintain internal controls
of their own) are controlled by G~~i and must account strictly for
all paper and type metal used.11
Informal control over pUblication is exercised mainly through
individual members' adherence to the Party line. As practically all key
positions in the industry are held by Party members or candidates, the
self-restraint they practice serves to perpetuate their good standing in
the Party--and thus ensure their political future.
A former Soviet writer described the method of controlling themat-
ic planning in the nation's press:
Every once in a while the Central Committee sends out a
directive telling the editors what they must emphasize--things
like ••• settlement of the virgin lands, when to criticize
the United States, when to talk about "peaceful coexistence," and
so on. Practically all directi¥8s are secret and are concerned
with aspects of major policies.12
By Lenin's decree on December 1, 1917, the former Tsarist
The Role of TASS--------
Petrograd Telegraph Agency was designated "the central information organ
under the Council of PeopJ.e's Commissars. i,13 Over a period of years,
this agency developed into the huge structure which is now called TASS
32
(Tslegraph Agency of the Soviet Union), and which scours information
from and provides information to almost forty percent of the world's
14
population. TASS's importance is further emphasized by the fact that,
together with correspondents in 1:r_~vda,Izv~~ti~~, !~~d and K9m~omol'ska2~
~yd~, it is the sol~ QrovJULer of news to the press of the satellite
nations. It is thus in a position to "control" news in these countries,
and thO 15.'!JS it does as a matter of policy.
The head of TASS in 1955, N. G. Pal'gunov, in a booklet entitled
1h...f?. ~~ .at: msl?. Informa tio~: TASS §In<;'1.It.§. ;R.ol§.,explained TASS's
function as "not to disseminate information which, by its content and
nature is like a mere photographic precess ••• but information which,
based on Marxist-Leninist theory, provides an analysis of events.1l16
Pal'gunov further emphasized the difference between Western and Soviet
editorial procedures in his definition of the function of information as
"agitation with facts.,,17
TASS is subordinated to the CouncU of Ministers and the Party
leadership. Its organization consists of four main staffs: the offices
of li'oreign Information, Information for the Foreign Press, Union Infor-
mation, and the Local Press. In addition, there are four editorial of-
fices of supplementary information: Eadioillfor.!l!§.._~.,Pres~l;:>~,
18~2khronika and Pressklishe._._--- ---------
The Office of Union Information (RSI) "gathers and adapts infor-
mation about life in the Soviet Union, transfers it into print and
manages a net of TASS correspondents in the autonomou.s republics, krays
19and ohl_ast§.of the RSFSR." The Office of Information for the Local
Press (RINP) "prepares information for republic, Jcr~, city and £Sl:X.2_11
newspapers ••• for expeditious transmission to the periphery press.n20
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~k;_:lJ&h.~ 1'.A§.§, which was absorbed in November, 1954 by
M9.k.hro:~:likCl:JAS~, provides "photo-information and illustrations in
the form of prepared matrices for immediate printing,,,21 and thus en-
ables the small local newspaper to improve its format with illustrations,
which are costly to engrave.
Fotgkp.ronika JASI2. provides editors with "indispensable chronicle
photographs" taken throughout the USSR and the world. In 1955, 25,000
22separate domestic photo-subjects were covered. E2....0jch_:ronikaTASS
also provides the editors of central, republic, kr~, and QblSlJ3tnews-
papers with prepared captions for the photographs to insure uniformity
and correctness. While such a procedure is perfectly in accord with
those methods used by Western press services (e.g., Associated Press),
the advantages of such a system to the propagandists are self-evident.
1
)
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Some idea of the capabilities of 'I'ASSmay be gained from the
revelation on December 6, 1957 that within ninety minutes of the failure
of the United States to launch its first earth satellite ("VanguardIY),
'I'ASSin Moscow had the story "on the wires" to its subscribers; that is
to say, the Soviet and satellite press. Alert to the propaganda signifi;;...:
Among the reasons given by Pal'gunov for TASS's careful pursuit
cance of such an event, the news agency displayed "remarkable agility.
in moving the story toward publication.,,22 In a rare follow-up story a
ha.lf',,-hourlater, they added quoted explanations of the failure as issued
by American scientists.
of foreign information was: "To contribute to the unmasking of Fascist
propaganda, to counteract the propaganda of ra(';ism,natj_onal discrimina-
24
tion and superiority, xenophobia, and the propaganda of national hatred."
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CHAPTER V
SOVIET-AMERICM~ RELATIONS 1917-1945
The United States and Russia coexisted reasonably well in the
early Nineteenth Century because the two powers had common foes (primar-
ily Great Britain) and common problems (such as freedom of the seas).
Neit~nation was particularly aggressive, in spite of the effects of
Pan-Slavism and Manifest Destiny in that century. Above all, neither
power saw much of the other, and each could expand without impinging
on the other's domain,
An astute observation by the American Secretary of State Seward
in 1861 is worthy of note:
Russia and the United States may remain good friends until,
each having made the circuit of half the globe in opposite
directions, they shall meet and greet each other in the regions
where civiliza tion :first began. 1
12.17..::..:1..2.1.2: yorl~ :\1aJ;:.@<d .InterventioI!
When the United States belatedly entered the Great War in April,
1917, it found a badly mauled Russia as an alIy. President Wilson's
continuing attempts to keep Russia in the war ran counter to the efforts
of the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power with promises of "bread,
land and peace," and open hostility of American diplomats and statesmen
to their regime was not soon forgotten. An active anti-Bolshevik pro-
paganda campaign was even waged by a group of Americans. This has since
been depicted by the Soviets as an effort to take advantage of the pre-
carious position of the newly formed Soviet government and thereby to
2gain a favored position for certain economic groups in the United States.
Such an important personage as Ambassador Francis was involved
in an attempt to discredit the Soviet regime by "proving" $n purchased
documents that Lenin and Trotsky were, in fact, German agents.3 These
and other attempts to emasculate the Soviet regime were not appreciated
and have not been forgotten by an eternally suspicious regime. "American
hypocrisyll has been the subject of much Soviet propaganda, both then and
since that time. Izves:tjy~ in late 1917 reported:
The American president Wilson, adopting the tone of a Quaker
preacher reads •..• • a sermon • . • but the people know the
Americans came into !he war because of the interest of the New
York Stock Exchange.
The intervention of 1918-1920 came about as the result of no
clear policy, and was :Llllplementedin a series of half-hearted political
and military steps. This resulted only in deepening Soviet distrust and
hatred of the United States. In history's light the affair was a tragic
farce; indeed, intervention was delayed from February until ,Tuly, 1918,
until the Wilson government could find a suitable anti-Bolshevik with
5whom to cooperate. Nevertheless, M. Veltman, in his 1922 work, So~t
;Ru~~i~ .§._nd.Cal2.i:\&list Alr!.~!:iq_~ admi tted that although Amer ica support ed
Whites and even the Poles, the United States was the last nation to inter-
vene and was on the whole, the least dangerous of Soviet Russia's
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enemies. Another Soviet writer, I. Maisky declared the following year
"that during early 1918 United States policy was more favorable to Soviet
6Russia than that of the Entente."
It may be presumed that the Soviet government did not consider
the United States as immediate an enemy as Britain or France, and thus
its propaganda attacks were reserved largely for the latter. A typical
cartoon printed in a book published some years later showed top-hatted,
fat capitalists providing the motive power for Kolchak, et aI, in the
war.? In fact, the position of the United States during the entire period
prior to the Second World War was rather paradoxical in Soviet policy.
As America was remote geographically, it did not pose a threat to the
Soviet Union; yet, as the center of world capitalism, it was the greatest
8potential enemy of the Russians and world Communism.
At the time of the Intervention, Soviet propagandists rarely
attacked the Americans as such; rather, the "capitalists," often with
elearly identifiable French or English symbols took the brunt of the
attack. It is interesting to note, however, that renovated Intervention
propaganda of the post-Second World War period is viciously anti-American
in content, and features Uncle Sam in the role of the chief malefactor of
the time. How well this fit into Soviet propaganda needs of the 1950's
is obvious.
Much of the propaganda in the early years of "militant Communism"
was viciously anti-West in content. As the Bolsheviks were confident at
that time of early world revolution, they proclaimed the strictest
9Communist internationalism and the fight against imperialism. The
conclusion is inevitable that the propaganda campaign then waged did
3?
z { .
damage to a considerable degree the Soviet citizen's impression of
America. Such posters as one by Deni, "The Entente--under the mask of
10
peace," showed an evil capitalist hiding behind a mask; this could be
interpreted as depicting anyone of the three Big Powers.
The volume of revolutionary propaganda was tremendous, as is
suggested by the fact that in the State Public Library in Leningrad
about 100,000 various posters, placards and appeals of the period have
11been pr'eserved. However, as there was no institutionalized system
of propaganda and agitation in the Soviet Union prior to 1920, coordi-
nation and uniformity were lacking and the effort was often a hit-or-
. 12mlSS affair.
1920-1927: War Communism and NEP-._ -- _._-- ._- --
Events coincidental with the Intervention--the attempt on Lenin's
life and its aftermath of the "Red Terror"--created in the United States
a long-lingering "Red Scare," which was evidenced in deep public distrust
and fear of the Bolsheviks. Its effect was reported by the Soviets in
1921 :
Russian workmen, emigrants who have returned from America • • •
state that the Russians in America are suffering great hardships.
They experience there all the horrors of prison life. Workmen
are arrested for participating in Party conferences; torture is
resorted to when they are ~~ing cross-examined. Jv'"J8.nyunions are
obliged to work in secret.
The mass deportations of aliens in 1919-1920 were a direct result
of the hysteria created by the "Red Scare.1I It was inevitable from such
a national attitude that non-recognition of the Soviet regime be the
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popular desire of the time. Soviet reaction was voluminous external
propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy,14 in expectation of
early world revolution.
Lenin, who in Auguflt, 1918 had warned the American workingman
15of the "beasts of prey of Anglo-:Prench and American imperialism,"
now stated angrily:
Either the Soviet government triumphs in every advanced country
of the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs, the
most savage imperialism which is out to throttle the small and
feeble nationalities and to reinstate reaction allover the world. 16
The election of Warren Harding to. tlw presidency in 1920 initiated
a period of turn-away from Europe and Asia, and a preoccupation with Q~
domestic policy which has since been interpreted widely as "isolationism."
At no time in this period was rapprochement with this revolutionary
country which appeared to be a menace to the internal institutions of
the United States seriously considered. A period of semi-hostility and
half-hearted unofficial relationship was thus initiated; this persisted
throughout the decade.
The great famine in Russia in 1921-1923 brought into play the
generosity of the American people; however, Soviet gratitude was rare,
and often officials tore down posters and otherwise prevented the people
from realizing who was the benefactor. Nevertheless, the ARA represented
the most constructive aspect of American-Russian relations during the
early 1920's.
Coincidental wj_th these events, the Department of Propaganda and
Agitation was created within the Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the Party. With formal control introduced for the first time, Bolshevik
propaganda could now be geared fully to political needs.17
39
1922-1927
Harding's Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, adamantly main-
tained the Wilsonian policy of hostility to the BolSheviks, declaring:
"This government can enter into no negotiations until these propaganda
efforts are abandoned.,,18 Little coordination existed between the
economic groups which engaged in trade with the Soviets and the small
circle of men who viewed recognition as the first step toward a col-
laboration which would secure world peace. The isolation of Russia
from the rest of the world resulted in her non-participation in the
security system of the 1921 Washington Conference on armaments.19
In 1922, the Soviet government evidenced to the world its oppor-
tunistic nature when it aligned itself with Germany in negotiating the
Treaty of Rapallo. Officially, this was due to fear of renewed military
intervention by France, inspired and supported by Britain; however, it
can be assumed that the Soviets had not forgotten Lenin's injunction to
playoff the world capitalist powers against each other. A hostile
American press was gained by the Soviets in the following year, when
the execution of Monsignor Butchkavitch after alleged tortures incensed
Roman Catholics throughout the world.
The onset of NEP (New Economic Policy) in 1921 had led to a
general relaxation throughout the world, as the optimistic saw Soviet
Russia going the way of growing capitalist nations, and the naive pre-
dicted that COIDlIlunismin Russia was disintegrating. In fact, the internal
weakness of the Soviet Union simply dictated a cautious policy to
prevent its collapse, and this period of return to semi-free enterprise
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took enough domestic pressure off the government to allow it to con-
solidate and recover from the disastrous effects of seven years of war.
In 1924, the United States government shifted its emphasis to
Soviet propaganda, rather than economic considerations, as the official
basis for the dispute between the USSR and the United States. This move
was mainly as a result of the world-wide propaganda of the active
Comintern, which had been formed in.1919. The resignation of Hughes
at this time helped pave the way for a new flurry of interest in recog-
nition of the Soviet Union; however, the State Department remained
firmly opposed to such a move.
After the death of Lenin a lessening in anti-West propaganda
was noticeable, as under the tutelage of Stalin less emphasis was put
on the world revolution. The damage which had already been done was
too deep set, however, and in the decade of the 1920's occurred the
Schism of the world into two mutually distrustful blocs whose exper-
ience seemed to confirm each side's prejudice regarding the other.
The ascendancy of Stalin to the leadership of the Party and his
methodical consolidation of power signalled the end of NEP in that year.
The attitude of the Soviet government was well illustrated by a bas
relief of a revolutionary fighter erected at the corner of'one of
Moscow,s important streets which bore the inscription, "Let's break off
with the Old World I,,20
In spite of the mutual distrust and hostility of Soviet Russia
and the United States, America continued to represent a model of tech-
nological progress to the average Russian. The influx of American
idealists, engineers and technicians, especially in the late years of
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the 1920's, helped create much good will for their country and tempered
the anti-Americanism felt by the Soviet citizen at the time. Soviet
propaganda was described then by an American visitor as "perfectly
. 21futile," and lacking cleverness of technlque. The writer, a public
relations expert, was told by the Soviet government "that as a government
it is conducting no propaganda against any foreign country, least of all
. 22agalnst America."
The period 1921-1927 saw the introduction of what was to become
fleXible tactics for the Soviets: the "united" or "popular" front, which
was Communist phraseology for a sudden switch in the Party line from
standard revolutionary tactics. From 1925 until August, 1939, the
entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union was directed toward peaceful
cooperation in varying degree with the capitalist powers. This took
the form of innumerable commercial treaties and non-aggression pacts
with any country that cared to join.
1928-1932: Gathering Strength
The Stalinization of Russian which began in 1928 was accompanied
by an ever-increasing emphasis on the alleged danger of new foreign
interventions. A parallel theme was the constant danger of internal
subversion by counter-revolutionaries with foreign ties. Such a pro-
paganda campaign was designed, of course, to promote national unity and
Party centralism and to prepare the Soviet people for the tremendous
sacrifices required of them in the era of industrialization and
collectivization.
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The capitalist was portrayed as first sneering at the "Five
Year Plan," then crushed by its success.22 It was at this time that
the real events of the Intervention were "reinterpreted" and changed,
then went into eclipse as the United States began slowly to emerge as
the arch-criminal of the peridd 1918-1920. This period of reintroduc-
tion of old-style Bolshevik revolutionary tactics also saw repressive
censorship used to an inordinate degree in the Soviet Union.
The Stock Market "crash" at the end of 1929 and the resultant
world-wide depression had a considerable effect on American-Soviet
relations. In 1930, Amtorg (Soviet trading organization in the United
States) published a list of companies which had technical aid agree-
ments with the USSR: forty-three were named, including some of the
largest in America. United States businessmen had been conducting
trade with the Soviet Union since the early 1920's, and in the early
depression years the Soviets were the only big customers for many Ameri-
can manufacturers.24 However, opposition to mutual trade was still
considerable, as the American Federation of'Labor complained of "dumping"
on the domestic market of "slave-labor-made" goods by the Soviets.25
The ills of capitalist America were widely publicized in the USSR,
as articles described its nightmare of unemployment, creeping poverty
and industrial paralysis. Some publications contrasted the continued
well-being of such capitalists as J. P. Morgan in the midst of starva-
tion; such propaganda was intended at least partially to offset the
negative effects of brutal collectivization and the famine which resulted
from it.
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Disarmament had been a popular cause in the 1920's, but as one
of its chief proponents, the United States was severly criticized by
the Soviets and others. In a cartoon of 1929 in Krokodil, "Chamberlain
Discovers America," the English statesman is shown lifting Liberty's
skirts to expose a battleship bristling with guns. The commentary
claimed that litheKellogg Pact poorly serves the cause of peace and
26certainly does not interfere with an increase in American armaments."
President Hoover was very blunt in his antagonism to the Soviet
government, and in an interview published in the San Fran~isco News on
August 13, 1931, acknowledged that his goal was the destruction of the
S . t 27OVle Union. The groups which demanded recognition, however, were
gaining supporters as fear of the "Reds" waned among the rank-and-file
in the United States. In the Senate, debates were recorded on the
threat which Russian embassies might pose as potential centers of espi-
onage if the Soviet Union was recognized.28
The growing American interest in the Soviet economy after the
mid-1920's consisted of trade, concessions and contracts for technical
assistance; the presence of large numbers of Americans friendly to
Russia had created a lasting effect on the people of the USSR. Good
will and admiration for America's technology might have been a decidedly
positive factor in Russian-American relations, had the Soviet government
not almost entirely ignored it publicly. Emil Ludwig in an interview
with Stalin in 1931 made the observation t.hat there appeared to be much
admiration for everything American among the Soviet people. Stalin went
29out of his way to assure him that such was not the case.
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Hoover was assailed by the propagandists anew in the presiden-
tial campaign of 1932. Krokodil, in a cartoon, "American Capitalism's
Campaign Position" depicted him in a tuxedo, well-groomed, waving his
silk hat: "America f'lourishes anew!," while another view shows him f'rom
the back, his clothing torn and ragged, held together with Pins.30
Upon ascendancy of'Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency in
March, 1933, proponents of'recognition of'the USSR conducted a concerted
campaign to gain their objective. The attack of'Japan on Manchuria in
that year, and the resultant deterioration of'the situation in Asia now
Signalled the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union to maintain
stability in the Orient.31 Also, the sharp reduction in exports to the
USSR (103.7 to 12.5 millions of'dollars) as a result of domestic agita-
tion over alleged unfair Russian labor practices made itself felt on the
32economy when business was most needed.
The official stumbling blocks to recognition had always been the
repudiation of'the Tsarist debt by the Soviets and the subversive pro-
paganda which they had carried on in all nations since the Revolution.
When Roosevelt agreed to recognition of the USSR in late 1933, the terms
included agreement by the Soviets to discontinue all anti-American pro-
paganda and also to drop claims against the United States which arose
from the Siberian expedition in 1918-1920. The decision to grant re-
cognition was basically a product of domestic pressures and was given
at least tacit approval by the public.
Izvestiya greeted this move with an editorial asserting that the
growth of the Soviet Union's political and economic importance had
"compelled" the United States to recognize her.33 The depression of'
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1929-1933 had increased confidence among Communists that the capitalist
system was disintegrating and it inflated the prestige of the Russians
in world affairs. Propagandists claimed that the United States had
sought recognition mainly to help save American capitalism from disaster
by providing new markets, and thus little good will was gained within
the USSR by the move.
Soviet propaganda was toned down considerably for several months
after the initial "feelers" for recognition were sent out. Some friendly
remarks can be detected in a survey of the press; however, the government's
concern in this period was primarily domestic and in an effort to counter-
balance the negative effects of the First Five Year Plan, its line was
generally one which portrayed America in the worst of lights. A visitor
in 1932 remarked that "the real distinguishing feature of Russia today is
the state of revolutionary tension in which the country is being constant-
ly maintained.1I34 The intervention scare continued chronic in the press
right up until the Second World War.
Russian-American collaboration in the Far East did not materialize
as new events created new quarrels and tensions. The Soviet Union had a
long-standing interest in China, and the Soviets envisioned a situation
in the Pacific in which conflicts between Japan and the United States
would take the pressure off Siberia and facilitate Soviet expansion into
China. For the time being, "the desire of the United States to conquer
China economically,,35 was blamed for the failure of China and the USSR
to resume normal diplomatic relations.
The Soviet Union in 1934 swung away from its twelve year align-
ment with Germanyy primarily as a result of the rise of Hitler to power
and the increasingly menacing attitude (if the Third Reich. In the
same year it joined the League of Nations (despite having called it "a
league of imperialist robbers"), and Soviet propaganda now became vio-
lently anti-fascist in content. Undoubtedly, the complete lack of 801i-
darity among Great Britain, France and the United States and the isola-
tion of the Soviet Union at the time were fundamental in the successful
rise of Hitler to the leadership of Germany. At the same time, frequent
armed clashes with aggressive Japaneffitroops in the Far East heightened
antagonism between the two powers.36
The presence of American Communists at the Moscow congress of the
Comintern in 1935 enraged Secretary of State Ccr-de.lL Hull, who protested
this breach of the 1933 agreement. Rejecting the protest, the Soviet
government disclaimed any association with the acitivities of the orga-
nization. During the entire period the United States continued to be
concerned over Soviet (Comintern) propaganda;37 however, the debt issue
remained the primary source of friction and was caricatured in the Rus-
sian press as reflecting American greed.
United States relations with the USSR continued on a non-~ciendly
basis as considerable friction developed between Ambassador Bullitt and
Maxim Litvinov at this time. Molotov declared in a speech in January,
1936 that it was impossible to ignore the anti-Soviet press campaign
. 38belng developed in the United States by pro-fascist circles. The
Soviet publication World Economics and Politi££ in August declared:
Fascist tendencies have undoubtedly grown in strength under
the Roosevelt regime and Roosevelt has made no serious attempt
to fight the forces of reaction. All this has brought home to
the br-ead masses of the American proletariat that they have
nothing to hope for from the old political parties •••
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The Soviet press was equally guilty o~ incendiary reporting. In
this period the specters o~ racial discrimination, bruta.l suppression of
strikes by police, and rampant gangsterism were placed be~ore the Rus-
sian public with increasing ~requency. A typical cartoon was one printed
in Krokodil ("The dream of an American bandit") in 19.36, which shoved two
gangsters talking in an alley: "I've been dreaming about this child ~or
so long, and now, at last, he's born!" "Congratulations I" "Hold your
congratulations; I haven't kidnapped him yet."
In 19.36, under the new ambassador, Joseph Davies, relations con-
tinued to deteriorate between the two countries. 'l'heonset of the
Great Purge trials further alienated public opinion in the United States.
The USSR's support o~ the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War aroused
mixed emotions throughout the world. Although Americans generally ~a-
Vored that side in the conflict, the all-out support which the Soviet
government was giving the Loyalists alarmed many people.
In the period 19.36-19.39the Communists again switched to "united
~rontlY tactics to gain external support ~or their regime. In doing so,
they ~ollowed the dictum o~ President M. 1. Kalinin, who said, "Each
historical moment requires its particular form o~ agitation and propa-
ganda.".39 The words o~ Stalin at the XVIII Party Congress in 19.39
re~lected the ever-increasing emphasis of the Soviet government on pro-
paganda: "••• i~ our Party propaganda ~or some reason goes lame
then Our entire State and Party work must inevitably perish.,,40
By the Spring of 19.39, relations between Moscow and Washington
were as poor as at any time since recognition in 19.3.3. Isolationism in
the United States had made great headway, along with wish~ul thinking
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by many Americans that they could stay out of the "European War."
As Washington seemed to retreat farther and farther away from the
possibility of a united stand against fascist aggression, the Soviets
became increasingly disillusioned, this may be detected in Soviet
41pronouncements as early as June, 1938.
Negotiations concerning an Anglo-French-Russian alliance against
Hitler completely broke down in 1939, and the consistent unwillingness
of the United States to assume responsibility or throw its weight on yhe
side of order in either Europe or the Pacific resulted in a complete
turnabout by the Soviets. On August 23, 1939, it was announced to the
world that a German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had been signed by repre-
sentatives of both nations in Moscow.
1939-1942: Second World War
On the whole, the period between the start of the Second World
War and the German attack on the Soviet Union was one of the worst
chapters in Russian-American relations. Adhering to the sudden and
decisive change in the Party line immediately following the signing of
the German-Soviet Pact, all pretense at friendship with the Western
Allies was dropped and a mass of accusations and abuse was poured into
the news media.
The United States was singled out for particularly harsh attack
for her allegedly hypocritical attitude toward the "Second Imperialist
War." Moscow claimed that the United States was professing to conduct a
policy of neutrality, while at the same time rendering assistance to
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Great Britain and France, not for humanitarian purposes at all, but
rather, to increase the profit of the bourgeoisie in America. Britain
was pictured as on the verge of disintegration, while her creditor (Uncle
Sam) was often caricatured as striving in ludicrous ways to salvage his
invested capital and at the same time to inherit as much of the crumbling
British Em 0 0plre as posSlble.
In 1940, the following cartoons appeared in Krokodil: John Bull
is depicted lying on his deathbed while Uncle Sam is anxiously exclaiming,
"He t 42mus not die; he owes me too much I" Another portrays a ship (repre-
sent'lng Great Britain) sinking. John Bull is desperately trying to save
sU't1 cases, which are labelled "Canada" and "Australia." Uncle Sam calls
to him from below, where he is in a lifeboat. "Sir, throw down your
t ~runks; you will feel lighterl" A IIphilantropic" Uncle Sam is shown
in a third cartoon accepting gold from Western militarists. "I'd be
happy to sell you armaments. But I beg you, please don't hurt anybody
with 44them. "
The policy of the Soviets, so blatantly hypocritical, was obvi-
OUsly due to increasing American interference in European affairs, and
the deSire of the Russians that the United States adhere to its previous
"policy" f 0 1 0, 0 lSO atlonism.
hand , were so blundering
The moves of the Soviet Union, on the other
as to further crystallize American public
opO 0lnlon behind the Allies.
The attack of the Red Army on Finland on November 30, 1939
aroUsed anti-Sovietism in the United States to a pitch unattained since
the 1920's. When the gallant Finns not only defended themselves, but
on occasion met with what appeared to be spectacular victories, the
50
American public went wild with approbation. Reacting quickly, the
United States placed a "moral embargo" (December 2, 1939 - January 21,
1941) on certain goods to the USSR. This embittered the Soviets, and
only their embarassement of their own initial losses and mistakes
prevented them from making their displeasure felt more strongly. Sumner
Welles remarked that "by the Spring of 1940, official relations between
the two countries were only nominal.,,45
The sudden annexation of the Baltic countries in June, 1940
was a hard blow to supporters of the Reds. That month may be looked
upon as the height of political antagonism between the Soviet Union and
the United States in the period before the war. The State Department
declared that the United States was lIopposed to predatory activities"
as well as to lIany form of intervention on the part of one state, how-
ever powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other state, however
weak. ,,46
The American press supported the stand of its government strongly,
while the Soviet press viciously attacked the United States for its
alleged hypocrisy. Molotov stated publicly that although
there are certain persons in the United States who are not
pleased with the success of Soviet policy in the Baltic countries47we must confess that we are little concerned over this fact •••
On August 1, he reported to the Supreme Soviet: III shall not dwell on
our relations with the United States, if only because there is nothing
good to say about them." Such smug self-assuredness reflected anew
the Soviet confidence in its policies and contempt for the words un-
implemented by actions which characterized American policy throughout
this crucial period.
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The United States had not lost faith in the possibilities of
gaining Soviet friendship. Records show that in early 1941, Sumner
Welles, Secretary of State, repeatedly warned the Soviet envoy in Washing-
ton that according to reliable information, the Nazis were about to at-
tack Russia in early summer.48 This obvious attempt to bring about a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union failed utterly when the Russians
concluded later that year a neutrality pact with Japan.
When the Nazi armies crossed the borders of the Soviet Union on
the morning of June 22, 1941, they appeared to take the Russians com-
pletely by surprise. After the early shock and confusion, the Soviet
propaganda machine was rewired to a new soundtrack: what had been a cap-
italist war became overnight a "war of liberation" from fascist invaders
bent on world domination and enslavement of all free peoples.
In his speech on November 6, Stalin introduced the phrase,
"Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition.,,44 Roosevelt and Churchill quickly
became key figures in allied lands who represented leadership among the
"progressive forces" seeking to help the Soviet Union. The press gave
great play to these and other leaders, but only in the first months of
the war did it report world news which involved the common man in the
United States. Thus, by such personal presentation of news was the way
paved for ominous questions in the minds of the Russians: "What will
happen if these friendly leaders lose power in the allied countries?"
Until the end of 1941 (the Battle of Moscow) American war news
Occasionally was featured on the front page, with an infrequent picture
of American equipment or of President Roosevelt; however, after that
t· 50 b .lme such items disappeared entirely. Lend-Lease was far too 0 VlOUS
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to be ignored; yet, the Soviet government attained the remarkable record
during the war of never according in any major policy statement more than
carefully qualified recognition of its value to the Russians. Not even
in his speeches of July and November, 1941, when survival was in the
balance, did Stalin suggest that American aid was a factor to be con-
'd 51Sl ered.
Throughout the war, by clever and VJell-planned symbol manipulation
the Soviets succeeded in achieving tremendous influence over public
opinion in the United States. This was evidenced in many ways, notably
in the millions of dollars privately donated by Americans to the Russian
cause, and by such pro-Russian films as North Star and Mission to Moscow,
which gained wide popularity in the United States. Concurrently, the
method of presentation of the story of the Allied aid to the Soviet Union
was calculated to sustain the morale of the Russian people when the govern-
ment needed support (especially in the first year of the war) without
arousing fraternal emotions or stimulating dangerous ideas. When the
full potential of the Soviet land was brought into play, and the need
of American help diminished, even the minimum of recognition previously
accorded was often omitted entirely.
The "Coalition War" was given considerable play in the press.
Stalin's assertion that ideology and institutional differences were no
bar to cooperation among countries soothed American fears by generating
popular support among the American public. E'very major event in the
development of the coalition was greeted by the Soviets with 8. fa.nfare
of publicity.
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At the same time, practically no attention was given in the
Soviet press to American domestic politics and activities. After years
of attacks on "racism," etc., this is particularly noticeable in retro-
spect by its omission. However, even that information which was divulged
to the Russian people often was filled with glaring inaccuracies. An
author in 1944 saw a Soviet film strip on America which stated that
Michael Gold and Richard Wright were the two leading American authors.52
Even during the first"critical months of the Russo-German war,
the baSic, traditional themes of Soviet propaganda concerning capitalism
were only muted and never completely disappeared. The attitude of the
Soviets at the height of their display of "friendship" with the Allies
at thl' t . . f" ds lllemay be characterlzed as one 0 SUsplClon an reserve. A
careful survey of Soviet news media of this period will provide an
impression of failure to attack, rather than positive support of the
West. Nothing in Stalin's speeches or in the great volume of Soviet
wartime propaganda could be construed as repudiating the basic aims or
principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
The retrospective role of the United States in the Second World
War, as revealed to the Soviet public in such books as Voroshilov's
Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR, printed in 1951, has further
reduced the American effort to one of purely self-interest. The Allied
failu.re to make a landing on the continent in 1942 and 1943 has long
been attacked as a deliberate desire to weaken the Soviet Union while
the Allies waited for the Russians to destroy the German war machine on
the Eastern Front. Voroshilov states:
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••• only after it became obvious that the crushing blows
of the Soviet Army were unavoidably fatal were the Churchills
and the Marshalls compelled to hurry the opening of the second
front.
• •• their secret and not-quite-secret hopes that the
Soviet State would be enfeebled, bled white in its single
combat with Nazi Germany were completely dissipated ••• 53
Thus was the role of the United States minimized after the war. Also
distorted were its motives for having participated, for the Soviets
claimed that the Americans wished to eliminate its world market compe-
titc)rs and establish a dominant economic position on the earth.
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CHAPTER VI
SOVIET-1U1ERICAN REIATIONS 191~5-l953
19L~5-l947: Dissolution of !££ Alliance
In the Second World ~var the Communist Party had seen how close
it had come to disaster through unpreparednesso Its preoccupation with
survival vms manifested in the postwar period in reconstruction of the
Soviet Union's war-torn industries aJ;ldcontinued rapid expansion of the
war economy. After the tremendous sacrifices made by the exhausted
Russian people during the war, it was evident that tne new demands
would require new motivations, as the old incentive of fldefense of the
motherland'! had been eliminated ivith t.he defeat of the German Army.
Too, the Party desired to tighten its monolithic control over tbe Russian
people to check the disintegrative tendencies wh'ich had arisen in the
Soviet system due to the laxity and strain of the war emergency. An
addi tional reason :forcontinuation of bread rationing was a most serious
crop failure in 191,6, which was admitted later to have been wor se than
1that of 1921. ~
The new sacrifices of the Soviet peoples were extolled by propa-
gandists as hardships required for the building of'a better world. The
lot of the masses elsewhere was pictured as worse than their own, and
thus conten~t was instilled for the "decadence of bourgeois civiliza-
tion. It Thus also was the bogey' of foreign i~erialist attack revived.
:;- . :z
It was not coincidental that the United States was selected as the chief
target of these postwar xeno:phobic thrusts of the Soviets, as that coun-
try, in gaining victory, had appeared as the logical leader of any anti-
SOviet opposition that might develo:p. It had taken the place vacated
by the Nazis as the "spirit of evil" in the "foreign horror" spectacle.
As early as 191.~4, authoritative publications such as Planned
!conomy and War and the Working Class asserted that the inevitable ten-
denCies of the American capitalist system previously held in check by
the war- were reasserting themselves. Russians wer e reminded that the
vrar had been fought by Americans primarily because of self-interest,
and not for altruistic reasons; the role of the Soviets as leaders in
the war to save humanity from Fascism was frequently contrasted 'vith
that of America. The Master Lend-Lease agreement signed in 1942 had
the unfortunate wording that the aid granted to Russia 'Viasdone so as
her war "against aggression is vital to the interests of the United
States of America." The value of such a phrase to the propagandists
il':- eVident.
The Soviet peo:ple were reminded that the Americans had maintained
diplomatic relations during the war with the "fascist beasts" Vichy
France, Spain and Argentina. The specter of Fascism was kept alive
after the destruction of Germany as a useful interim aid to the govern-
ment to 1prevent the people's dissatisfaction from becoming a ever 011
policy. The prewar Communist concept of two wor-Lds in rivalry was now
reVi ved under the new alarm bell of "vestiges of fascism" and "microbes
of Bitlerism" which the Soviets claimed wer-e still present in the West,
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particularly in the United states. The Soviet govermnent now demanded
the "moral, ff as well as the political destruction of f'asc.l sm,
It nmsed retrospectively that the death of Roosevelt, a "friend
of peace ;" vIaS the "great divide" in history; with the loss of his
f'riendship to the Russian people the future seemed perilous. The new-
president, Truman, "(vasaccused of having rejected his predecessor r s
policy:
Under the pressures and in the interests of monopoly groups,
• • • ministers of the Roosevelt cabinet were gradually replaced
by ?onservative figures. Reaction~ry forces took measures also
aga.Lnst the • • • working classes.
It was in his election speech of February, 19L16, that Kaganovich
reiterated the phrase "capitalist encirclement" for the first time since
before the war. TYro months later a lecturer in Moscow declared that
If the USSRis surrounded by capitalist states wh.i.chare constantly send-
ing in streams of diversionists and spies.,,3 Molotov's speech at the
opening of the San Francisco Conference in 1945 reveals more in retro-
spect than was read into it at the time. He war'ned vbhaf if agreement on
the United Nations was not reached, the peoples of the w-orld wou.Ldsoon
repudiate their governments and the USSRwould take the lead in finding
"ot.hez- means" to assure the peace and security of bne world. This muted
threat and doubleta1k became the embodiment of Soviet policy in the two
years 1946 and 1947.
In a speech on February 4, 191f6, Stalin bluntly restated the
classic Leninist doctrine that capi tal.ism leads to war. This was the
opening gun for a rash of articles and editorials based on the premise
that the entire present period in history is an era of the "general crisis
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of capitalism.!! The views of the economist, Eugene Varga, as set forth
in his book, Changes in the Economyof Capitalism ~ ~ Result of ~
I,
Second 1-Iorld vJar r were widely accepted at that time. Varga maintained
that an economic crisis of' the 1921 variety 1'1OuJ.dovertake capitalism
vri thin a f'ew years, caused by the sudd.en end of the wa.r and the inabil-
ity of the United States to utilize fully its huge industrial capacity
developed during the war. The unemployed millions in the United States
vTOuldcreate a sharp political economic and political problem which
wou.Ldweaken that nation and force it to pursue a relatively unaggressive
policy toward the USSRin the foreseeable f'ut.ure , The Soviet press em-
phasized t.ha t America f s only hope was to collaborate wi t11 the Soviet
Union to open up new markets an@thus end unemployment; the only alter-
native course was a reactionary one which wouJ.dbenefit only the forces
of Fascism.
In a study of news taken from American sources and reprinted in
P".cavdathroughout 191t6, one of four main themes was found to be indus-
trial strikes, unemployment, inflation and the inevitability of an
economic crisis.5
Soviet postwar policy, predicated on the Varga thesis, confidently
gave the nod to expansion westwar d, Beginning with Poland and Rumania
in 1945, the Soviets had acquired by 194b a buffer of seven "satellite"
nations vrhich it completely dominated. Yugoslavia coincidentally fell
under the power of' Tito, and Finland was forced closer into the Soviet
orbit through a defensive alliance with the USSR. During this period
.Manchuria was prepared for the Red Chinese by a Soviet army of a:!cupaiiLon.
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Signs of stiffening resistance to the Comnnmist.scould be detect-
ed , however , as under strong wor-Ld pr es sur-e the Soviet Army evacuated
northern Iran in 1946. Turkey, with American backing, refused the Rus-
sian demand for return of Kars and Ardahan , The famous address by
ChLlrchill at Fulton, .Missouri, in that year ('IAn iron curtain has des-
cended.. • .") 1m3 given a big play in tne Soviet press and created t.ne
first of the "war scar-es" whdch the government has used to keep the
Russian people keyed up since the war. Yet, tine Soviets were confident
perhaps until early 1911-7that their objective--withdravml of the United
States forces from Europe--vrould be realized.
By the middle of 19~6, a 'dar-fear psychosis tied in with the i,-:1:1:)1
cles in the United States. Former Governor George Earle of Pennsylvania
repor-ts of the Soviet Army's acti vi ties was gaining headway in some cir-
stated publicly and not too tactfully that vre should attack Russia with
the A-bomb "wh'iLe we have it and before they get it."6 People were
realizing that the Soviet Union had joined the United Nations, not in
good faith, but in an effort to dominate it to safeguard her own inter-
:E,'verycounter-move by the United States in this period vras offici-
ests, as well as to use it as a global sounding board for Communist
propaganda. The Soviet delegation brought futility into the Sec'uri ty
Council by routine use of the veto. Within a few months after the end
of the war , Lhe United Nations had become an organization of two blocs--
the East and the \'lest.
ally interpreted in the USSRas further evidence of its retrogression
to fascist des Lgns , and was seized upon as a basis for continuation of
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the Soviet war industry, ma.i.nt.enanceof its huge arm;y, and further
strengthening of the military and economic might of the Soviet Union.
The phrases, !T dollar diplomacy" and IIatomic diplomacy" became more fre-
quent after the failure of the London Conference in October, 1946.
A Moscowcommentator in December accused the United states of
having an "atomic psychosis, 11 through wrri.ch "cert.aj n 'atomic maniacs'
believe that 'by the atomicvJ'eapon the United States wi.Ll,guarantee peace
to the wor-Ld; Professor Urey, for example, states that the United
states may be compel.Led to apply the atomic weapon to assure peace "7. . .
The Amer i.can "atom mania" vas ridiculed in the press vri th photo-
graphs from the United States bearing the captions lIatomic cocktail,1I
"at.oml,c blonde," etc. The Soviets claimed, however, that such diplomacy
had failed utterly, and during this period the destructive potential of
the atom bomb was minimized in domestic press coverage.
Much attention wa.s given in the press to United States overseas
bases and its other military and naval activities throughout the wor-Ld;
In Ju..ne, 1946, there began a violent campa'i.gnpublicizing a "ring of
such bases" whi.ch the Americans were creating around the USSRfor the
purpose of using them as "springboards of attack. 11 This was a carbon
copy of the pre,var fear of "the West" as expressed by Stalin in his
speeches in the late 1920's. Special emphasis was given to the charge
that the United States was trying to organize China and Latin America
as its own military preserves.
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The appointment of'General J\IIarshallas Secretary of State and
General Walter B. Smith as Ambassador to Moscow was Lnt.erpret.edby the
Soviet press as proof posi tive of the coalition of miU tary and Wall
Street which was directing United states foreign policy. These "facts, 11
pointed out by the propagandists to the Russian people, were only a part
of' the grovnng anti-American spirit which pervaded the press of'that
nation.
Beginning pUblication in June, 19q6, Kul'tura .:!:. Zhizn,8 conducted
a continuous campaign wh'ich attacked all phases of'American culture.
A.ndrei Zhclanov's ideological housecleaning commenced in t.neautumn of
that year, and almost at once destroyed all vestiges of former praise
of'~vestern culture. In the f'o.Ll.owf.ngyear, Soviet intellectuals wer-e
under heavy pressure to eliminate from their thinking all traces of
"subservience to bourgeois culture" and "cosmopolitanism."
Spring, 19!J.7, appears to mark the turn of the tide in postwar
Russian-American relations. Soviet aggressiveness in Eastern Europe
and her opportunism in the state of "favorable chaos" which then existed
in Southeast Asia and Europe has finally aroused the American public to
a realization of the danger world connuunism represented. On March l~,
President Truman urged the United states to support the free peoples
of the world in their ef'forts to escape Communist engulfment; this
developed into a policy commonly known as the "Truman Doctrine,!1 and rep-
resented the first effective American resistance to Soviet expansionist
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presSUTe.9 In March and April, the United States took a firm stand on
the Gerll1..anques ta on at the Moscow-Conf'erence, and in June, Secretary of
State Marshall annolL~ced at Harvard his plan f'or Euxopean recovery
t.hrough systematic American economic aid.
Thus began the new policy of containment of' Communismand rehab-
i1i tation which has been maintained to this day. Against the E.'uropean
Recovery Plan (ERP), the Soviets mounted the most gigantic propaganda
offensive in history. Called by the Soviets "t.he enslavement of Europe
by the United States, II the Marshall Plan nevertheless became a reality
in April, 194b. Under the Truman Doctrine, military aid -was immediately
dispatched to Greece and Turkey to assist those countries in maintain-
ing their independence.
It now became apparent to an off-balance Moscowthat diplomatic
maneuvering was producing diminishing results, and thus a shift in t.heme
vlaS made by the propagandists from conventional relations to .M:arxist-
Leninist analysis of international affairs. The Molotov Plan was ann01LYJ_-
ced in Europe as the eastern equivalent of the .M:arshall Plan, and in
the spring and summer of 1921-7the USSRz-easser-ted her domination of the
vlOrld communist movement. The previous tactics of the "united front!!
were dropped and the traditional system of tightly disciplined, higruy
. d t . 10ln oc rJ..nated cadres was reintroduced. At a conference of economists
in 1vJay,Professor Va.rga's theory of the economic crisis of capitalism
was denounced officially.
In September at tne United Nations Assembly at Lake Success, New
York, Andrei Vyshinsky delivered the f'irst in a series of inflaJYnTh.:'l-tory
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speeches against American "varmongering." He further claimed that "Hash-
ington was opposed to the reduction of armaments. Thus began the new
Soviet diplomacy, which was more suited for the fish market than the
diplomat's table. Its vituperativeness marked it from this time 1LYJ.til
the death of Stalin.
The Soviet concept 0:' the wor-Ld as tyro armed camps, one repre-
senting the rising forces oi' socialism and the other the decadent forces
of capitalism came into being in the summer of 1947; however , it was in
September that Al1drei Zhdanov gave the phrase its official iteration
that established it as a Soyiet thesis. At the conference wh i ch estab-
lished the Cominform, Zhdanov praised the USSR and the "new" democracies"
as leaders of the "anti-Imperialist" and "anti-Fascist" forces, while
opposing them were the United states and its "satellites," France and
Great Britain. The intention of the latter camp vias to "strengthen
imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, and to combat socialism
11and democracy."
Domestic discontent vas diverted by sensational IIspy scares, It
beginning in 1947_ The evils of racism, unemployment, and the corrupt
press in the United States rrere frequently publicized vJith lurid and
fantastic reports. Articles by an American author concerning living
conditions in the USA, and a series by Ilya Ehreriburg on racial and
ethnic minorities were published. Ehrenburg claimed that the United
States had created a racial hierarchy in which Anglo-Saxons comprised
the top aristocracy, vihiJ_ePuerto Ricans and Negroes were on the bottom
of the class structure. KOJrlsomol'skaya Pravda referred to a previous
article by Olga Mishakova, a tDP Comllru....ri st youth leader, to the effect
that many American Homen, losing their 'vrartime employment, had been
n 1"" 12lorced into prostitution to make a ava.ng, Trud quoted in Em article,
"The Unvarnished Truth Regarding America, II Yu, Zhukov l s statement that
in 191.~1.!seventy percent of American families could not meet their Ii v-
ing expenses.l3
In the United states a new "Red Scare!! had been created by the
House Cornmittee on Un-American Activities, whi ch uncovered increasing
evidence of Soviet espionage. The t'lvO"worLds" dr-ew farther ana. farther
apart in what came to be called. lithe Cold lV-areII
In 191.1.8,Soviet domestLc anti-Punerican propaganda became wcrse ,
The campaign to insinuate imperialist America into "Intervention" liter-
ature and historiography now began in earnest, reaching its height three
years later.14 In its hysteria, the press accused the United States of
actively encouraging and supporting continued Japanese aggression in the
SOviet Far East as late as 1922~ Hardly a non-technical book or magazine
was published in this period that did not contain a section devoted to
anti-Americanism. In the d.i.verse f'orrns this propaganda was encountered,
it often was completely out of context with. tne book, itself.
The theme of all-out political, economic and ideological struggle
betlveen the tw'o cam:ps (symbolic of the old and the new, the bad and the
good) was communicated by ever:r means to the people. A..rnbassadorSmith
stated in September, 191.~7, tha1; the violence of these attacks surpas sed
that of Soviet propaganda against Nazi Germany.15 M.A. Sus1O1-r , head of
the Department of Agitation and. Propaganda, declared on January 21, 191.~8,
that "the Amar-ican imperialists are clearly seelci.ng to take the place
of fascist Germany and Japan. 11
In February, Czechoslova_lda fell into the Soviet camp, and in
April IvIarshall Plan aid began in Europe. cartoons in Krokodil and the
daily newspaper-s were invariably on the theme, "the neviAmerican threat
to peace, 11 or its !!designs against the independence of Europe, II In its
propaganda the USSRbecame the champion of war-torn nations trying to
retain their sovereignty against United States economic and military
pressure. WhenERP continued to operate successfully, the Soviet line
01" attack became one of clai.ming that the American capitalists were using
the program to dumppoor quality goods at high prices. It 'NaS alleged
that such policies flowed inevitably from the predatory nature of that
nation's capitalism. Ogony~kcaricatured !!the disembarkation of the
'American horse fleet' in Western Europe" as tincan "steeds!! gallop
down to the dock bearing the signs, !!Eat Horsemeat! II .16
:::1
In June, the Soviets blocked all roads leading from the ~,fest into
Berlin, and thus the Berlin airlift came into being. Under tremendous
By the middle of 191~d, two worlds were indeed in evidence, as the
Soviet Union and the United States drevr farther apart. What had seemed
pressure, this succeeded in supplying the beleaguered city until Mayof
19L~9, when the Soviet s gave up the blockade with considerable loss of
face. COincidentally with this, sixty A...mericanbombers f'Lew to English
bases, to remain there indefinitely.
to be differences in opinion now showed up as irreconcilable contradic-
tions in policy. At that time, the State Department reported thirty-
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seven Soviet violations of Russian-American agreements, mainly the Yalta
and Potsdam Pacts. 17
The Progressive Party leader, Henry Wallace, in the 194b presi-
dential campaign declared irresponsibly that the United States--and not
tIle Soviet Union--was the aggressor, and that a Wall Street-ridden
A.rnerl·
ca was out to "enslave the wor Ld ,II Such rich propaganda material
Was qUickly seized upon by the Soviets and exploited as representing
the real sentiments of the American people.
In autumn, the Soviets commenced another shift in propaganda
direction. It being obvious that threats and subversion were at least
tel'l'Tnor.1 " f'f'ensIve ' h' h .... .1:-' ara y unsuccessful, MOSCOVl began a peace 0 - ensa w. lC mana-,
fested itself in widespread activities. In 191-1-8 and 1949 a series of
peace and cultural conferences were held in New York, Paris, Prague,
v/roclaw d th " f II b.iLi t· f' fI,an 0 er cltles under the banner 0 mo l lza lon or peace.
The expreSSion of the desire for collaboration vQth the peace-loving
peoples or the w-orld and the constant reiteration of tne feasibility of
II
CoeXistence',' marked this period.
American opposition or alleged opposition to this "battle for
peace" was condemned as evidencing the aggressive tendeneies· of the
rUling circles in the country, and cartoons of the time used the theme,
"w-e are for Peace!!! to satiety. vJhen the Soviets advanced unacceptable
propOsals for disarmament, Russian propagandists declared that American
Warmongers feared the collapse of their industries as a consequence, had
they accepted. Moscow's unvnllingness to agree to a principle of free
international inspection caused all atomic control discussion to be sus-
pended in 1948; however, in the USSR this suspension was attributed to
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adamant United States aggressive aims.
If the Sowiet hate campaign was virulent against ERP, it reached
the proportions of near editorial apoplexy when negotiations commenced
in the West in late 1948 for a defensive alliance of North Atlantic
nations. From autumn, 1948, until April, 1949, when the North Atlantic
Pact was ratified by the U.S. Senate, the Soviet press was filled daily
with the most violently anti-American cartoons, photographs, articles
and editorials. On January 29, for example, two full pages--one half
the press--of all Soviet newspapers were devoted to an official state-
ment by the Minister of Foreign Affairs against this treaty. Andrei
Gromyko attacked the treaty in the United States in addresses on April
13 and 15, and Jakob Malik continued the attack for over a year. In
the three issues of Krokodil for May, 1949, twenty of a total of forty-
two cartoons printed were on anti-American themes.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was looked upon in
the West as symbolic of democracies forced together into a defensive
alliance by the Communist threat; in the USSR it was conderrmed as the
chief instrument of the Anglo-Arr:ericandrive for world domination, and
as a hysterical attempt of American capitalists to solve their domestic
economic problem. The Soviet Union immediately countered by setting up
a Communist regime in East Germany, and in February, 1950, the Chinese-
Soviet Treaty was signed.
The explosion of the first Russian atomic bomb in August, 1949,
paved the way for an entirely new propaganda campaign based on the
premise that America's "atomic blackmail" was at an end. TASS's
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communique was held as suddenly deflating the United States "atom mono-
18poly balloon." The Soviet Union now posed as an even stronger "sentry
for peace," and could warn the "Imperialist warmongers" that irrespon-
sible adventurism would lead to their destruction.19
From 1948 to 1953 Ogony~k frequently printed on its inside cover
a full-page "satirical panorama" which ridiculed supposed events such
as a "New Year's Reception on Wall Street," showing the specter of
crisis, Chiang Kai-shek, Franco and others sitting around a table
(shaped like a "$") with militarists and capitalists.20 Others included
"Spring in the Dollar Jungles,,,21 and "Spring Parade of the Warmongers.,,22
In 1951, an entire issue of Collier's devoted to "a preview of
the war we do not want" contained imaginary descriptions and drawings
of what the Third World War would be like. The logical foe--the USSR--
was depicted unmistakably, and drawings showed the destruction of Moscow
by atomic bombs. The Soviet press capitalized on this "evidence" of
American "militarist-adventuristll thinking with a photo-montage in
Krokodil showing a wolf wrapped in a shawl which concealed bayonets,
bombs and an issue of Collier's magazine.
A slight increase in unemployment in 1949 signalled more inten-
sive coverage in the Soviet press of American economic conditions. This
persisted through the years following, usually with solemn "surveysll of
the production, inflationary spending and income of Americans, accompan-
ied by descriptions of the decadence and parasitic privileges of the
wealthy, and the dreadful poverty, degradation and humiliation of the
worker. This followed the theme of the poor growing poorer, and the
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rich growing ever-richer from enormous profits. A series of full-page
articles printed in Vechernaya Moskva in 195023 proclaimed, "Capitalism
bears the workers to unemployment, poverty and hunger." A fat capital-
ist, his spouse and their Mexican hairless dog sit smugly by, while
behind them slumps a saddened "Liberty" with padlocked lips. In the
background loom the specters of "Hunger," "Poverty," and "Unemployment,"
as always; in the text the virtues of the Soviet system are extolled
in comparison.
The "destitution and ruination of American farmers" was the sub-
ject of an article in 1952.24 A few years later, a full-page article,
"At What Expense They Grow Fat," numbered among its illustrations a
25photo-montage which showed a vise squeezing humans flat on top apply-
ing pressure is a figure with the face of the U.S. dollar.
On June 25, 1950, Communist forces from the north invaded South
Korea. When the United Nations voted North Korea an aggressor and in
vain demanded withdrawal of its forces, it was forced to call upon its
member nations to halt the invader. The United States responded, and
within a matter of days was at war with the North Koreans. As the Cold
"American capitalist"; there was now a systematic effort to stir up
War became a hot one, anti-American propaganda in the USSR became
intense and less discriminating, and the press vilified the United States
in every conceivable fashion. It was no longer directed mainly at the
hatred for the entire American people for the first time. This was
especially true of the repetition of atrocity stories concerning the
behavior of American troops in Korea.
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Soviet propagandists developed the theme that the United States
had planned and started the war by inciting the South Korean govexmaerrt
to invade North Korea. To support this claim, they published photo-
graphs purpor t.tng to show American preparations for the war , One depict-
ed John Foster Dulles with Amer-i.can military advisors to the South Kor-
ean Army at the 30th Parallel in ,Ju..ne,1950, examining maps of North
26Korea. American troops were described in action in Korea as
burning peaceful cities and villages with napalm, making
use of bacteriological weapons and killing thousands of pris-
oners. This is nothing to the American monsters; they warrt to
put our who.Le planet to the torch, to cover the Whole world
"rith millions of' corpses, to dr-own the wrio.Le earth in rivers
of' human blood.
Atrocities allegedly committed were described at length in the
press, along with photographs purporting to give proof of the claims:
Amer Lcan soldiers • • • drove the inhabitants to a certain
place. • •• All the womenwere then raped. • • • the 'domenwho
had resisted the ravishers had a ..rire put through their noses
by the Americans and wer-e led by this wi r-e through the village.
The monsters gouged out the eyes of many w-omenand hacked lumps
of flesh out of their bodies. The butchers d.i sembowe.Ledmany
pregnant women who fell into their hands. 27
The campaign alleging American use of germ w'eapons in Korea and
China commencedin January, 1952.2b From that time until the end of
hostili ties eighteen months later, the Soviet press was filled with
29articles, photographs and cartoons based on this theme. Such move-
ments as the I!World Peace Council Appeal!! signed at Oslo on April 1,
1952, purported to show the indignation of the !!peoples of the world
[whoJ are against germ warfare. "30 General Van Fleet r S remEtrks in a
private intervievT wer-e distorted and given wide publicity as rrVanFleet
adnti ts use of germ war-f'ar-e, "31
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Krokodil published cartoons showing Secretary' of State Dean
Acheson and Trygvye Lie shooting tubes of "germs" into Korea, shouting,
liThe USAdoesn+t use bacteJ'iological ..reapons!! ff .32 Again disclaiming
use of such weapons in a speech, Acheson, ..lith the body of a flea, is
• 'J?
plctured concealing bottles of germs behind a speaker's podiuw_.JJ The
American f'Lag is shown lifted high by the militarist in Korea in another
cartoon. The stars are insects, and the stripes germ-filled testtubes.34
Ogony~k printed a tvo-page spread of photographs entitled, "The
Facts Convict,1l showing micro-photographs of insects and germs allegedly
dropped by the Americans in Asia.
From February, 1952) until the armistice the Soviet press was
filled with gory and detai2.ed accounts of a.lLeged (1;trocities perpetrated
-:<5
by the Americans against North Korean and Chinese prisoners.J At
first done largely through the fiction of "escaped POVl's,!! this coverage
was ext.ended at Pan..rnunjomand reached its c.i.Lmax when the actual major
exchanges of prisoners wer-emade in 1953.
Communist correspondents filed hundreds of "eyewi,t.ness" stories
and photographs whi ch were intended to serve as a counter to United
States charges of Co:mmunistatrocities. One such account by Vlilfred
Burchett quoted a prisoner ..rho "t.o.Id ho..1 the butchers cut off pieces
'26of his arms and legs.'f.)
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CHAPl'ER VII
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1953-1957
gt~ Stalin
In 1953 the United States was portrayed as wanting to continue the
war in Korea because of tremendous profits. Although the election results
o:rt.n .e prenous November had "indicated a universal demandrt to "put an end
to the war,,,l the :fear o:fan economb crisis was cited as making peace
unthink bIa e to the American munitionsmaker. Cartoons showed the capital-
ists waxing :fat while United Nations soldiers :froze and died on the front.
A World rapidly going :fascist was seen by propagandists, who
lamented that
o ~h~ ~santhropic ideas and practices o:fracist lynchers, geo-
P.lltlclans and neo-Ivralthusians, who demand the extermination of
~llions o:fpeople are being disseminated more and more 'rvidelyJ.n the USA.2·
An editorial in Trud under the title, "The Beastial Visage of
Amerolcan Imperialism" declared:
The dollar imperialists are working madly to :fan the flames
~f a new world war. They wish to enslave the peace-loving peoples,
o suppress liberty Whenever possible and to implant fascism. The
:gnates o:fWall Street are turning themselves inside out to turn
taCk history, to establish the bloody "American way o:flife"
hroughout the entire vrorld.3
A:fter the discovery o:fthe "doctors' plot" by Stalin in 1952,
SOViet "propagandists levelled all guns at "saboteurs, wreckers and spies
in a v' ·'119l ance campaign which lasted until that leader's death a year
later. Pravda "larned that "the i~erialist bosses try to develop as exten-
sive suber-si.ve activities as they can in the countries of the democratic
camp. 11 21_
In a book, On the Enenw's Trail, a young Soviet "exposes the in--- -
trigues of the American intelligence service, whi.ch is the chief source
of saoot.agc and espionage throughout the entire wor-Ld; "5 It is revealed
that the enemy agents plan to spread -over the Russian steppe tithegrubs
of an especially voracious locust, bred by the American Bertridge in a
West German 'Institute,.,,6
The theme of espionage was greatly accelerated at the time by a
seemingly endless array of "captures" of alleged spies, who were invari-
ably discovered to have been in the pay of American intelligence and who
were parachuted into the USSR.7 rheir detailed "confessions" made fascin-
ating reading, and the photographs of the alleged spies and their equip-
ment were widely reproduced. One of the most sensational of the spy
trials was that accorded 1. Slansky, et al., who w-ere accused in November,
1952, of operating an American intelligence conspiratorial center in
Czechoslovakia. Krokodil caricatured a beady-eyed agent who tirelessly
copied plans, while behind him weaved the serpent of IIespionage, terror
and diversion."S
The Itspy scar-e" continued unabated throughout this period. with
hardly a month passing without some new alleged capture being publicized
in the press. Ogonygk in 1957 devoted several articles to agents of
United States intelligence who haQ been apprehended in preceding months.9
Cartoons showed such spies as "money t.hr own into the air, II as they were
captured 'by alert Soviet border guards "ihile they parachute to earth.10
A press conf'erence "I·lithan exhibition of' IIspy equipment" took up half'
of'Pravda and Izvestiya on February 7, 1957. An illustrated page in
Sovetskaya lvloldaviya"unmasked" the arrt i.vpeop.Leactivities of'the Nego-
vist sect, and their Hties with the American imperialists."ll
Concurrent vlith the espionage campaign the Soviets waged a battle
against leaf'let-carrying balloons in 1953-1956. These were claimed to
be launched by American intelligence units in Germany, and the Soviets
. ,,12 Lat 1protested ae;ainst this "violation of'soverelgnty. .Ld. er dec arations
marked these balloons as "equipped wi.th apparatus f'ortaking aerial
photographs for intelligence purposes," and were condemned as "a gross
violation of international law."l3 Krasnaya Zvezda published multiple
photographs of'alleged aerial photo apparatus suspended from the bal-
100ns,14 and cartoons ridiculed American claims that these were only
intended for meteorological observation.15
The Soviet press from January until April 1953 was filled with
anti-American themes. Some idea of'the rising crescendo of accusations
may be gained from a random gLance at the press in the weeks before
Stalin I S death. Articles find the United states deep in intrigue in
Indial6 and Indonesia17 as weLl. as guiding Israel in its Zionist
"doctors' plot,"l8 controlling Finnish trade unions,19 Iltaking over"
Iceland,20 and revealing deSigns on 1I1anchuria!21 An illustrated article
by "the American journalist Stetson Kennedy" alleged that an estimated
5,388,211 persons were engaged in forced labor in the United states.
These included Mexicru1s, Negroes and native-born Americans. The theme
of racism was tied in with photographs purporting to show"a scene in a
75
Georgia prison carr~ after drUnken guards had shot and killed eight pris-
d t· th 2.2oners an wounded -wen-r:,y- ree. Another photograph shows IIa common
scene in the USA--members of the Ku Klux Klan have lynched two Negroes. ,,23
The Intervention was called to memory in a Soviet Far East new-s-
papers series of illustrated articles by "former par+Lsans ;" who des-
cribed Juuerican atrocities co~tted during the occupation of the Vladi-
vostok area. According to "an eyewitness account, II the Americans
seized two fifteen-year-olds and made short work of them,
poking out their eyes, cutting off their fingers and then
stabbing them vnth 'bayonets •••• Boiling water was poured
over the partisans once an hour. They were beaten unmerci-
fully • • •
"Remember this, Comrades!, 11 the newspaper appeals to its readers, "and
may the sacred feeling of hatred for invaders never leave your hearts!"
Photographs included one showi.ng "a jumble of bodies, hands and feet of
SovIet people who w-ere victims of the April, 1920 provocation. ,,24
\vhat has been termed "t.he new 100k1l iTl,Soviet propaganda was not
immediately appar-ent, af't.er Stalin's death in M'arch, 1953. There was a
period of seeming hesitancy, when t.he old "hard" Stalinist line was
dropped almost entirely for several months, then gradually reintroduced
in modified form, t.empered moth less blatantly crude attacks on the
United States, but vlith a perhaps more intelligently planned canwaign•
The period of confusion within the political structure of the USSRin
1953 was clearly reflected in the propaganda of the time.
Increasing signs of a pending Red coup in Guatemala caused
United States officials to expres s their concern over "cormnmi.sm in the
Western Hemisphere." This resllJ_ted in a Soviet protest against "Ameri-
can interference in Guatemala's internal affairsll25 and culminated the
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follo-vring year in claims that the United States had "pl.anned interven-
tion as long ago as 1952,,,26 and noted that it had "attacked Guatemala"
wi th military forces. 27 In the summerof 195~-,a revolution eliminated
the Commmfst gover'nmerrt, but not before the Soviet press had printed a
series of' violently anti-American articles. A cartoon linked the "recov-
ery from illness" of the Nell York Stock Exchange l'lith "conspiracy in
Guatemala. ,,28
A pending agreement betvleen Spain and the United States for
construction of air and naval bases on the Iberian peninsula brought a·
cry of "Fas cdsm" from the Soviet press. At the end of IvJay,Pravda
sneered: !! ••• the treaty will Lllldoubtedly lead to a further sharpening
f t ,,290- an agonisms between Atlantic Bloc members. The inclusion of Japan
in those nations receiving aid from the MUtual Security Agency30 gave
rise to cartoons whose theme was the rebirth of the Samurai spirit in
Japan and revanchism among the fascist militarists.
The conclusion of an armistice in Korea in July was f'o.LLowed by
seemigly endless claims of American truce violations, together w--lth
luridly detailed reports of atrocities committed agsinst Chinese and
North Korean prisoners of' war.
The continuing Indo-China War was now exploited by propagandists
as !!a second Korea,1I31 and increaSing United States assistance to the
French was interpreted as !!American intervention" by Pravda. 32
During the summer, and until its defeat the follmring year by the
failure of the French government to ratify, the European Defense Commun-
ity (EDC) treaty was the target of a main Soviet propaganda attacic.
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Denounced by the Soviets as a IItool of aggressionll and. the vehicle for
resurgent German militarism, the E'u.::'opeanArmy concept was strongly
33supported by the United States. 1>Testernmoves to integrate West Ger-
many into the European d.efense system appeared to have been a failure
when hIe French rejected EDCin Augllst, 1951~,but succeeded just before
the year's end when the French National Assembly approved. treaties ad-
mitting a rearmed Germany into N...A.TO.IvloSCOylfought these moves bitterly,
threatening dire consequences, and. announced its intention to form 3,
united military bloc of its ownwit:1 its European satellites. This was
accomplished in 1955, when the \{arsalf Pact was signed by ..the USSR and
East European countries.
Another cooperative verrcur e , the European Coal and Steel Conmuri-
ity (ECSC), which Vronsky called "a screen behind vmich renascent Vlest
'21,
German concerns are gathering strength, 11.) r was successfully established
f'or- the purpose of weLd.Lng heavy in:lustry together in several west ern
countries into a productive who.Le, Soviet propaganda hacked away at
the ECSCsteadily from its inception, as it was to attack the Common
1'Iarket in later years.
Foreign Ministers of lithe Big Three" (United States, Great Britain
and France) met at the vJashington C:mference in July, 1953, "1:;0 discuss
certain outstanding problems of the time, notably EDC. The USSRclaimed
II-" • t fueepern.ng contradictions between the USAand. its allies,! and by way o:
protesting the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the taD{s, reminded
them that "the consistent SOviet peaceful policy overturns, one after
the other, the barriers raised by the enemies of international cooperation
in the way of settlement of disputed international questions."
The meeting of government heads of "the Big Three" at the Bermuda
Conference in December was defined as a further attempt by the American
diplomats "to step up the notorious 'Cold War' .,,35 When delegates agreed
to a second conference in Berlin, the Soviet press interpreted this as
"effective resistance by the British and French to American pressure.,,36
The Cold War remained intense in 1954, but the "hot war" in Indo-
China was settled by a truce illthe summer. This was above all a year
of conferences, with propaganda brought to bear heavily in support of
Communist diplomacy at the conference tables. Soviet propaganda contin-
ued to picture the USSR as see~ing relaxation of international ten-
sions, while picturing the US as bent on disturbing and obstructing
peaceful settlements.
"Peaceful coexistence" received renewed emphasis, and after July
took on the proportions of a m~jor campaign; yet, the atom-bomb rattling
by Moscow and Peiping--in the latter's repeated threats to invade For-
mosa--made it increasingly eviient that any conceivable 'coexistence'
would still be marked by hostility and intense rivalry. Reiteration of
the doctrine of "two camps" ani continued vilification of the United
States filled the press.
The Berlin Conference of "Big Four" foreign ministers in January
was a failure, as no agreements were reached on German unification and
an Austrian peace treaty. Pravda commented that results would have been
better if the American delegation had shown a desire to work for peace;
"it is well known, however, that the United States delegation ••• had
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or-der-sdirectly to' the corrtc-ary,f!37
The Geneva. Con:ference frem February to' June failed in its attempts
tOvffirda pelitical settlement for Kerea, but ended the Indo-China vmr
threugh partitien of that ceuntry. The Soviet Union used the conference
as a sounding beard for its charge that the United States "intervened"
in Asia, and Trud quoted an Italian newspaper to that effect: "The
weat.er-n werld must realize once and for all that it vall never again
succeed in impesing its leadership and will on these enormous rmsses in
h . h ~ "Ir d II 38w em a new conSClousness as aw~ene • Pravda declared that American
f'oreign policy had envisioned increased participation in the Indo-China
cen:flict deliberately to forestall a peaceful solution there; Dulles'
departure from Geneva was seen as a "United states defeat, 11 his policy
"kayeed," while "United states plans fell like a heuse ef cards.,,39
America's "Hand of Friendship" was shown as studded "Ivith bayenets and
cannon. 40
Likelihood of an intensification ef Cemrmmist attempts against
Sout'heast Asia continued to focus wor-Ld attention on that part of the
earth, and on September 8, 1951~, the United states and seven other
nations met at Manila to sign a defense pact. Destruction of the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) thus established became another
major Seviet propaganda goal. In answer, the Communist Bloc in Asia
met the f'o.l.Lowi.ngspring at t.ne Bandung Conference.
The United States was continually attacked :forits support of the
Chiang Kai-shek regime, especially after the signing of a formal defense
pact, and was accused of using countries of Asia as "military spring-
boardsl! for future attack on the Soviet union.4l Failure of SKA.TO was
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predicted by Pravda, vThichclaimed "contradictions behv-eenmembersof the
bloc 11 d_ ,an declared "t.ne aggressive plans of the imperialists are running
again"'t an ' ,d' . .» lnsuperable barrler--the e'Gernnnatlon of the Asian peop]_es
to -"':t'1 ' )~2
J. )J,n;rate the conspiracy against peace •
In the United States the "vritchh1..mt"conducted by Senator
McCarth - .y and aSsoclates against Red infiltration into government in
1953-1954 was condemnedand ridiculed in the soviet press as represent-
ing the hysteria of a crisis-fearing nation,
from t11e c . . . d ,,1<")rlSlS and real lSsues at han • rJ
"which must be diverted
The "war hysteria" of
Du11es44 f " f' I'and other statesmen, and the desire 0 the -as.cl.S
t
ru a.ng
element" in the United States to destroY opposition reached its zenith
in mid-August, when Congress adopted a bill which, in effect, -banned
the CommunistParty of the United states. The Soviets attacked this
1a-w a'" II t,0 no only aimed against American communistsand the American
Trade Unl'on . :t.. • dmovement,but also against all k\merlcansvhlo
se
newS 0
not conf ' ' "Lt)'orm to those of McCarthyand other reactlonarl
es
•
Bookbannf.ng vlas condel(]J\edin a cartoon in Krolwdil ("In Wall
Street' ' 1Is IJlght ) shovring+wo policemen shining flashlights on bool-w,
ltGorky••• Tvrain••• Tolstoy ••• 11 '-ihich aze "t.o be confiscated! Andbetter,
not to be published! ,,1~6
After the death of stalin, EugeneVargaI s view'Son a pending
crisis ' At f' t hea.nAmerLcan capitalisrn becamepopular once again. lTS ,
caut. tlOusly quoted and distorted western soUrces and data, such as he
Boston Herald's lament:
On all sides vle hear that real peace would lillo
ck
the props
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out from under us. America would su:ffer such a serious economic
crisis that mortal danger wou.Ldthreaten our system. Wecannot
stand peace. Our fear ~f a crisis i~ alm~St as strong or just
as strong as the fear 01 vlOl'ld'illir, l.tselr. ~7
Varga r-enewed his attacks after Eisenhovrer' s State of' the Union address
in ,January, 1951~:
The increase of proD.'Llctionin the USAcontinued for quite a
long time after over-production was already present. In pursuit
of max.l.mum'Profit the capitalists increased production more and
1mmore • • •
In contrast, the "new trend in American propaganda" to admit the
succes s of the Soviet economy, but to try and minimize fear of its poten-
tial was brought out.49 Parallel with this, American backwardnes s in
education of engineers and technicians was frequently compared va th the
healthy standfng of the USSR.50
A propaganda canrpaign which vms aimed at shovnng the existence
of an Amer-Lcan"iron curtain" was inaugurated at this time, and has
continued to the present clay. The Russians comp.laf.nedthat the United
States government feared tile entry of Soviet musicians and artists,
while discriminating against them and setting impossible conditions
(e.g., fingerprinting) for their admission to the United States. Drnitri
Shostakovich, in an open letter to the editor of the NewYork Times,
lamented the loss to America from such an attitude.51 Pravda printed
an open letter to American veterans of the meeting on the Blbe, point-
ing out the defects in such a system.52 A cartoon in Krokodil depicted
the great success of artists and sportsmen in establishing cultural ties
ever-ywher-e in the world except the United States, where hysteria prevent-
53ed their entry. A cartoon ("With Professional Pride") showed I1FBI
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wor-ker-s" surveying their filing cabinets of fingerprints of "students,
peace-lovers, scientists ••• II: :11tI S nothing that respectable lleople
won' "t give us their hands, since we already have their fingel''J)rints.n54
In 1955, when Khrushchev and Bulganin took over the Party leader-
ship, the tactical. shift in Soviet propaganda vlhich began af'Le r Stalin I s
death was conwl.eted.55 The unspeakable vitUlleration and invective of
former years had largely disappeared from the media, although cartoons
and llhotographs in Krokodil and the press continued to hanuner away at
NATO and the ills of capitalism in America.
The United Nations through this period continued to serve as a
forum for Soviet propaganda concerned with disarmament and nuclear
weapons. President Eisenho-vler,in his "atoms for peace!! proposal at
the 8th General Assembly (1953) had created a tide of worLd opinion " ," '
II
favoring such a step. In 195!t, Vyshinsky introduced a resolution for
the prohibition of nuclear weapons, substantial reduction in armaments
and the establishment of international controls to enforce such meas-
ures. As before, nothing concrete Cfllneof such proposals. An American
plan for an "atomic pool" was condemned by Pravda in January, 1955:
• • • aggressive American circles have directed all their
efforts toward stockpiling atomic bomos , which they regard
primarily as a means of intimidation and b5~ckmail, as a tool
for imposing their policy on other states.
In May, the Soviets s.dtched from their adamant policy on dis-
armament and control of nuclear weapons to a softer line vrhich came to
"be called liThe Geneva Spirit. II When the Soviet government made minor Iii,
II
concessions to peace before the summit meeting, it threvT the West
temporarily off balance. The return of Porkkala navy base to the Finns,
demobilization of 640,000 Russian troops, and foreign aid and trade
overtures to several countries made positive propaganda for the Commun-
ist wor-Ld , and a campaign was soon underway 'which contrasted Soviet
good"dll and American Itcynicism. II By makd.ng trade overtures, the USSR
sought to picture itself as an advocate of normal economic relations
between countries. By increasing the travel--particularly of trade and
"cultural" delegations--between Communist and Free World nations, they
sought to rid the Soviet Union of the "Lr on curtain" onus.
Moscow centered its attack on the "vicious theory of peace
through a 'policy of a position of strength', II ,,,hich'VTaS said to be the
foundation of Western policy, and declared it to be a "dead policy.,,57
When the Foreign Ministers Conference met in Geneva in October
nothing constructive was acccmp'l i.shed, For the Soviet people this was
immediately laid to the stub-born, uncompr omi.slng attitude of the United
States. Referring to disarmament taL1cs, Pravda accused ~'lashingtonof
maliciously preventing agreement or settlement of the problem.58 The
poor results of the conference were laid to the "meddling of the business
circles and manufacturers connected. with armaments production" by Kroko-
oil, whd ch portrayed the Cold War as having been chilled through at
Geneva. 59
Soviet propaganda during this period f'o.l.l.oweddistinct patterns.
In a study of the major themes of Moscm'T radio broadcasts in 1955, it
was revealed that "aggression-intervention,!! which occupied up to twenty
percent of the themes through the spring, had been almost entirely
dropped by the summit meeting. Conversely, the theme "big power rela-
tions" grew' greatly in pr'cport.Lon and utilized up to sixty-tvlO percent
of the radio time by November. The high points for all propaganda for
60the year were, as may be expected, July and November.
When Bulganin and Khrushchev toured India at the end of the year,
their anti-American demagoguery signalled the official end of the sof't;
"Geneva Spirit." In their efforts to identify the West with colonialism
and the USSR with Asian nationalism, they reintroduced most of the old
recriminations and diatribes against the United States. On November
24, at Bombay, Khrushchev declared:
• • • we have never renounced, and will not renounce our
political line charted for us by Lenin •••• That is why I
tell you gentlemen who are expecting the Soviet Union to
change its political program: wait for pigs to fly. And you
know when pigs fly.61
In retelling past history, Khrushchev claimed that the West wanted
"to stage a comeback, and organized World War Two. They threw against
62" The netthe USSR the huge armed forces of Hitlerite Germany
result of the tour was a clear indication that the Communist "new look"
was simply one more in a succession of zig-zag tactics used by the
Soviet propagandists in seeking their basic objective of world domina-
63
tion. The hoped-for rapprochement between the two blocs, envisioned
by many before the Geneva meeting, was dashed in the disillusionment
that greeted the year 1956.
At a session of the SUFceme Soviet at the turn of the year, the
two Soviet leaders attacked the United States and Eisenhower in terms
which were stronger than anything heard -in the USSR since the days of
Stalin. The revival of belligerency included virtual threats against the
West with the new Soviet H-bomb and intercontinental rockets, and
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ap:parently sprang from increasing Soviet concern over South Asia. A
rash of cartoons in the press showed the jLmericans l1ma.nifesting colon-
. ,61.'~alism in another f'crrn" in tlle garb of SRA.TO,r and being knocked aside
by ne'\vly independent peoples who rejected the "economic help" offered
them.65
Dulles' "Brink of vJar" article in Lif'e was condemned in Pravda
as reflecting his "adverrcuz-esomepolicy, II and the wor-Ldwas cautioned
that "peace was ensured not because aggressive U.S. circles brandished
weapons , but as a result of the rebuff ••• [they] ••• received
throughout the world, a rebuff which has placed them in a position of
dangerous isolation.,,66
Internal discord was seen in SEATO,and the efforts of the United,
States "to bring South Vietnam into the Southeast Asian military bloc
and ultimately to replace French influence in Indo-China by American
rUle"67 were publicized. A::!artoon in Gudok showed a Vietnamese being
forced at gun-point by an American-guided official to vote for Ngo Diem.68
In !fAFriendly Meeting in Endo-Clri.na ;" the United States militarist
enters a native hut and kicks out tile French militarist.69
OnApril 23, the Soviet commandant in Berlin informed the :press
that on the preceding day an American ftspy tunnelH had been located
under the border of ~{est and East Berlin. Photographs of this alleged
spy-crossing pod.rrt and "I-rlretapping station '1:'Ieref'eatured in the new's-
pa: d t 1 ., 70 U· f!1."pel'S an on e evasa.on, Ogonyek also pr-lrrbed a two-page expose
with a detailed sketch and photographs.71 This tied in ,'Tell ivlth the
endless reports of American--;;rained saboteurs and spies apprehended by
86
Soviet police in border republics.
October and November, 1956, were crucial months in Soviet propa-
ganda, as important world events happened in rapid succession. The
invasion of Egypt by French, British and Israeli troops viaS loudly con-
denmed on the r'ad.i.oand in the United Nations by the Soviet government,
and in this the USSR found itself aligned with the United States.
Premier Bulganin sent a series of letters to the heads of
governments 01' the United States and the three "aggressor" pOI-leI'Son
November 6,72 condemning their actions and demanding immediate cessation
of hostilities. This was backed by threat of armed intervention on
November 10, when TA.SS informed the w-orld that the Soviet governrnent
would not oppose the flmany citizens who had volunteered ••• to expel
the aggressors from Egyptian territory."73 Only on December 8 mel,the
Soviet government revoke its threat to use Russian "volunteers,"as the
vfarring powers had started to vlithdravTtheir :forces from Egypt.72!-
The close ties of American business and oil interests in the
Near East, and sympathy of Americans mth Britain and France wer e the
subject of caricatures in the press which showed Uncle Sam playing the
part of the sanctimonious bystander, while innocent Egypt was looted.
By the end of the year, the Soviet propagandists claimed that the CIA
had had f'oreknowledge of'the invasion and had reported this to the
Whi te House, but that nothing had been done to prevent it.75 Thus, the
United States was linked as an "aggressor" in the Suez invasion, as it
was later in the Arab-Israeli Wal' in 1967.
The sudden Hlmgarian revc.Lt in October, its spectacular early
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successes, and. its eventual crushing by over-whe.Imlng Soviet military
force brought a new low ·point in Soviet world popularity. From the
begirming, Soviet propaganda tied in the USAand its attempt to sabotage
the Soviet Union's efforts in satellite countries with the u:prising. On
October 28, five days after the main revolt, Pravda declared: II
support for the reactionary underground forces in the countries of East-
ern Europe has long been one of the guiding princi:ples of the United
76States ruling circles. 11 Tvro months later, declaring American suppor-t
of the revolt to be "a crude violation of the sovereignty of free
states, II Pravda asserted that "r-ecent events in Hungary have clearly
shown that American intelligence agencies were directly connect.ed vrith
the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Budapest.!l77
The inflammatory anti-American pr-opaganda wh.i.ch filled the pages
of the Communistpress for the next f'ew months YDi3.-ybe attributed partly
to an attenrrrt to offset the effects of the news of the revolt on the
Russian peo:ple, and :partly to go on the offensive as the best defense
against charges that the Soviets were morally guilty of a terrible of'f'm se
in so ruthlessly suppressing a :popular uprising against an un:popular
regime. The United states took the lead in bringing before the United
Nations a resolution condemning the USSRfor its aggression in Hungary.
The Soviet delegation countered by raising "the question of aggressive
t· b th U· t d c<t t . .ty ,,78ac Loris y e m, e o a es 1·rhichcreate a threat to peace and securu •
Although the United Nations in 1957 published a report which clear-
ly marked the Soviet Union as the aggressor in Hungary, the Soviets had
sufficiently recovered their international composure by then to lampoon
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the action as efforts by capitalists to inflate a balloon ("'the Hungar-
ian question!f)~ vlhich was rent In.th so many holes that it collapsed at
once.79
It was obvious to all by this time that hopes aroused by the
"Spiri t of Geneval! were dead; a r-esumptd.on of the Cold ~va1'seemed
inevitable. The acceptance of ~he status quo in Asia had lessened the
danger of a general war ; however, the emer-gence of the USSRas a major
power in the :Middle East now posed new problems. The weakening of the
Atlctntic Alliance through the abortive Suez invasion and its aftermath,
which was a by-product of these new developments, represented an even
greater danger.
Tension did not lessen a:ppreciably in the MidGle East, due to
the Russian drive for influence in that area and Soviet expansion of its
foothold by supplying Egypt and Syria vn.th arms and economic aid. The
American response was dra.rna.tic: on January 5, 1957, in a special message
to Congress, President Ei senhower proposed a "doc't rLne" ..-a promise that
on request the United States wou.Ldgo to the aid of any Middle East
country threatened by Co:mmunism,Despite the limited effectiveness of
this broadening of the policy of containment, the I!Eisenhower Doctrine!!
served as a prime objective of Soviet propaganda at'0ack during the year.
The doctrine was immedia~ely said to "increase the danger to
peace in the Near and Middle East and violate the peaceful principles
of the United Nations. ,,80 The United States was seen as aspiring to
the role of "policeman" of the J.uddle East,8l While it "grabs the riches
of • • • the region, whi.ch ar e slipping out of the hands of the British
colonialJ·S·tc US0- ~ ~. c.... 8')Khrushchev called the doctrine "American imperialism. II ._)
A cartoon in Litera turna;ja
doctrine in the Near Easttl
Gazeta picturecl the "Lamp of the Eisenhovler
oL~
as a lighted bomb, and Sovetskaya Latviya
portrayed a saddened -Iohn Bull being invited to sit dOvID(in a coffin)
and drink (oil) from a tiny aperitif glass ·while Uncle Sam sits on his
85moneybags and drinks who.le vTaterglasses full.
A hu.Lk'i.ngAmerican militarist equipped with handcuffs, pistol
and. oil can approaches Arab oilvrells, telling liThe Arabian Tales of
Wall Street II through an oil funnel as he ivalks: III am a friend of +he
86Arab peoples, and I won' 1. infringe _on their wealth ••• It
nuclear weapons under one arm and bow and arrows under t.he other. He
On March 18, disa:rmament taDc.s opened in London with what; appeared
to be fair chances of success. However, the alleged Lnsi.ncer-L ty of the
United States delegation to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament
was mocked in Krokodil by a cartoon showi.ng an American officer holding
extends the latter weapons vrl th the cormnent, lIWeagree to conduct nego-
tiations on the banning of this type of classic armarnent.1I87
The United States "'\\1B-S accused of setting "far-fetched conditions If
and obstacles to end the nuclear arms race.8S In a note on disarmament
on May l~, 1957, the Soviet government declared:
Only in the Soviet Union and in some other states have laws
against the propaganda for i'Tar been passed. The absence of
Laws against propaganda for war in other countries cre~ tes a. 8
favorable ground for fanning militarist fever and itrar hyster'La , 9
Premier Bulganin again shower-ed notes on Hest European nations, I,
\1,1
threatening their "liquidation" if they permitted the Urrited states to
stockpile nuclear arms ill their lands. Eisenhow·er denounced these
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threa.t'" 11 00u as conro.Lt 1 . d f .'bl II~, d 1 '."..t:' e e y a,n _e'ens~' e,.-' an a cer reminded the wor Ld
that threa.l-« "h 91·,"'0 ave been a part of soviet activity for a long, long t:Lrne.II
In the
war] I
same week, Khrushchev 'VIasq:uoted as saying:
consider to be an indisputable fact.
H92
"That [the USAwants
The Soviets negotiated "d th seeming earnestness for five months,
then reverted to their former adamant demandswhich ended the taD\:s in
a deadlock on September 6. The launching of the first earth satellite
the f 11o owing month gave them a further pSychological advantage whd.ch
adJnitt de of no need for immediate concessions.
With the coming of spting blossomed forth a revived peace offen-
sive t, he "Ber Li.n Peace Appeal!! for the cessation of nuclear tests
through"out the world. Tied in closely with the then-current disarmament
talks ., thJ.s campaign portrayed the soviet leaders as realists and human-
itarians whowell understood the dangers of nuclear fission and its by-
prOdUct, "f'a.Ll.out, n93 ylhile the United states vlas attacked as an evil
experiment . .er whose recklessness ~ght cause disaster for the entire
vTOrld. Through appeals by scientists, manyof whomwere American
CitiZen ~ .s, che danger of unres.tricted nuclear tests "ras dr~ven homeand
the anxiety of the sovlet people increased. The question was stimulated
in their !tminds, I!~fuywonIt the Americans listen to reason? by such
cartoons tas that taken from the Philadelphia .!?9.uirer and reprinted 0
illustra'!-e a .t t.., half-page diatribe against tile United states in y. era -~-
Ridiculing American claims tbat i"o bad developed a "95'/0
Clean" b . .tl .t?!!9~'
omo, the caption asks, !!Evenso..-ivhot d vrant to 11.ve m-1 1. .
I
I:"
Khrushchev on M.ay22 made a prediction that the Soviet Union
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,vould in a few years I!catch up to and surpass :.he USA"in the per capita
d ~ n cor:·~0d:·L~J.·e~,.95pro llC cLon of certain staple rarm l.u.a V - This led to a rash of
comparisons on charts and graphs, and hundreds of photographs and draw-
ings which inevitably showed the United states lagging behind in pro-
duction. The fierce pride of the Russian worker was carefully nurtured
by incessent propaganda which drubbed in the tJ'emendous advancement of'
all things Soviet, and the disparagement of \{hat had previously been
ackno~Iledged to be American techno]Dgical superdor-i,ty. Khrushchev,
himsel:f, seemed eager to imbue the soviet people \,rlth his personal
dynamism, and the line taken by the propagandists played up the f'act.or
of a "new awakerrlrig" of the Soviet man to his errvi ronmerrt,
On May 25, all major Hoscov,ne~vspapers carried stories on some
aspect of what the Soviets claimed to be TTiIY!Pe:tialistlTactivity spawned
in Washington vrith the complicity of dictators and militarists through-
out the wor-Ld for the benefit o:fthe five Rockefeller brothers and
fiftY-nine other American families. FollOl'ling closely on the heels of
N.S. KhruShchev's prediction, it signalled the opening of a drive to
attack the American capitalist anew,
Each newspaper carried a main anti-American theme. For examp.Le,
PraVda carried news of the anti-American riots in Taipei, Formosa;
Izvestiya found Ngo Dinh Diem plotting with Eisenhower "behind the backfT
of the people of Vietnam to further reduce their living standards
through military appropriations; Sovetsldy ~ described howUnited
States military control was being extended over military forces in
South American countries, rendering them literally subdivisions of the
American forces.
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Komsomolt skaya Prav~ presented tyro full pages of photographs
PUroortin .).._ _ g ,-,0 be scenes vrhich contributed to the profits of bhe Rocke-
felleY'<" -_'" and others, whowere lit always in blood up to their knees. II
Included were a '.L ' I' ' ,"L-, •p~cvu:re of a pJ.pe a.ne J.n "GJ.Le!Yb..ddleEast, of six
Afri can Negroes behind bars, of Polish concentration carr[>victims of
World H 'al II, of a Negro lynching attended by Whites wearing clothes
of the 1920's , of riots in Jordan, and of a man leaping from a Ne,rYork
skyscra. per because of his poverty.
At a diplomatic function t'V10"\veekslater, A.I. Mikoyandenied
that t-her e was any new element of harshness in the press attacks on the
United Ctv ates. ~ljhenasked by a nevlComerto MoSCOWwhether the verbal
aSsault had II 1 II f
n
' 1-' 1 96a ways been this way, he answered a' I J.rma-cJ.ve y.
An anti-American riot on Formosa which resulted in partial des-
truct' 3.onof the United States Embassy there 1.JaS publicized vr.i.delyin
the <' 'vov~et press. cartoons showed a bandaged official (vlith an A-bomb
in hiS pocket) hiding in the ruined building together vrlth a pleading
Chiang Kai-shek,97 arid an J\J1lericansoldier showing~he mark of a band
("Yanlcee ' ") 98, go nome!") on his face ("A Formosan slap in -the face •
~ showed "bandits in the form of J\J1lericansold~""S" whoalleg-
edly bea+ 99, stole from and nroriiered helpless Koreans. ~asna~ zvezd!l
:prj,nted Ian "illustrated roundup" of the unpopular activities of 'Ameri-
can OCCUpiers"throughout the Ivorld.IOO The shooting of' a Japanese
'WDrnan b'y an American soldier, Girard,lOl resu
ued in a long court trial
and llJJJ.chagi ta tion concerning "ex:tra terri toriality"; tbi s provoked a
series "_ ott'of caricatures on the old theme of J\Jllerican soldiers cOJl}ll\J.Wg
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crimes without being punished because they are American.
An accelerated anti-American press campaign mounted in virulence
in June, as Krasnaya Zvezda began publication of a series of half-page
articles devoted to a grossly distorted and falsified United States
history.102 Purporting to show the world that the American claim that
it "developed without aggression and wars" was false, the articles
were nothing more than a rehash of the worst slanders of the 1940-1950
period served in chronological order. The tenor of the articles may
be gathered from a poem by an alleged American author, Richard Davidson,
entitled "The Lynch Law," which was used to illustrate the state of
terror in which the Negno lives:
Where down through the prairie to the sea
The River Mississippi flows,
In the beautiful Southern skie$
A pair of young Negroes hang.
Slowly up
Slowly down
Their bodies sway in tbe gentle breeze.
Blood on the tree
Blood on the ground
Bloody drops q~Je and there,
Everywhere •••
The twelfth anniversary of the first atomic bomb attack on Japan
104 105
was commemorated by Komsomol'skaya Pravda and Sovetskaya Kul'tura
with full-page illustrated features showing destruction wrought at
Hiroshima. Tied in with the Youth Festival and mass demonstrations for
peace were articles by visiting Japanese survivors of the attack.
At intervals through tbe years, Soviet propagandists have seized
upon an element of the American way of life and have levelled all guns
upon it for a period of weeks or months. During the Sixth Moscow Youth
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Festival in July and August, the Soviet press subjected American foreign
correspondents to abuse and denunciation for their coverage of the event.
Having lifted press censorship for the festival days, the Soviets almost
daily attacked one or more reporters verbally with generalizations that
t· ", tthey were working "under instruc lons "[,0 smear .he f'estival and the
Soviet Union t s campaign to portray itself as the leading advocate for
peace and friendship in the ·world. "The American correspondents care
not a fig for obj ecti vity," stated Sovetskaya Rossiya. "They are black
wi th rage and green vnth fury trying hard to belie and smear the Moscow'
F t
11106'es ival by hook or by crook. The Soviet press called the corres-
pondents "hired propagandists," "messed up in their lies," "foaming
,vi th rage,!! and "ma.Ltcf ous ,"
American press coverage of the youth Festival was condemned in
the USSR as defamatory and false. Krokodil had foreseen this in a
cartoon on its back cover in April--three months bef~re the event--in
which a detective is asked by a press cor-responderrt : ITThe Festival is
nearly here, Chief. HOvT are we to present it?" The Chief snaps, "Lie
about it! ,,107 Articles by members of the American student delegation,
such as one by Sally Belfredge,108 lauded the Soviet Union and Red China,
and lamented the IIstupid and blind policies of the United States in rrot
recognizing China.,,109
Racial tension and occasional riots or disturbances in the United
St.ates, such as the Clinton, Tennessee, riots of 1956,110 were sure to
be news in the USSR; however, the outbreak of violence in Little Rock
in September, 1957, received all-out anti-racist propaganda in the
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Sovi te Union. A beast-like Ku Klux Klansman was caricatured in Sovet-
"persecuting the Negro youths and girls 'daring' to
11111school 'With whites. A photograph of a Negro hang-
ing .a.n effilTlr W'l' th II II
oJ the sign, Nigger, this could be you underneath was
PUblished widely in the press with the text translated,112 as were
Photogr~:phs ll~of "troops operating against school children, II ".J and "bayo-
skaya E'"'t .'" onlya as
study .In the same
nets against Negroes.1l114
Vice President Nixon is shown smilingly embracing a Negro repre-
sentat' ave from Ghana, while a photograph beside this shO'iISa Negro girl
beino 115
_ 0 subj ected to indignities by a contertIPtuous mob. The same
:Photogr~ h
:P was used to illustrate an article concerning the lack of
rights .n 11601 an American Negro under the "Lynch LaW. II In a dra'Wing
taken f rom ~ Worker, a Negro child takes "Democracy's" hand to show
her "
reality" in Little Rock.1l7 ]{;t'okodi_:i:portrays "Education-_American
StYle " .s) U1 which t1'lO Negro children are assaulted by gun- and club-
'Wie1ding men. "You want to @ to school! Well, weIre ready to teach
you! ,,118
As early as April, a soviet "scare offensive" waS in the making
in the Middle East. The deterioration of the situation in .Jordan and
SYria led t b .o Soviet requests that the united states and its aUies a Jure
and its menace to pro_western neighbors, the United120
its intention on September 5 to fly arms to .Jordan.
In alarm over the pro_comnrunist shift of the
until the end of the year, nearly all newspapers carried cartoons on
this theme. TQrkish soldiers are caricatured as being fired as shells
at S "b 1 '" 121 +>" b d f th U" 1- d st t ,.,."th Fl tyrla y Unc e 0am, as Llre ran s 0 e nl"ve a-es 0lX 'ee
in tl1e Mediterranean, 132 and as an American periscope shouting threats
at Syria.123 A huge bomb ("American military assistance to Turkey!!) is
tied to a Turk t s neck as he is being hurled off a cliff, 12t~and while
the United states goverilllent declares, HAll is quiet in the Middle East,"
a hOOdlumin the night uses a battering ram ("The Eisenhower Doctrine")
with a Turkish "warhead" to batter in Syria t s door •125
Photographs showing "Turkish troops with American weapons" on
maneuvers on the Syrian border,126 and Marines on !lOperation Deep Water"
in the "Turkish foothold of the Pentagon" were published in the mili-
tary newspapers in the USSR.127The Russians held maneuvers in the
Caucasus, and Marshal Rokossovski was appointed as head of that military
border district. On September 13, Bulganin accused Turkey of poising
troops 01" Syria's borders for what he termed a United States-masterminded
attack. On October 7, in an interview vrith an American correspondent,
Khrushchev asserted the Soviet goverrunent had uncovered "proof" of a
IIsecret plan of aggression" to overthrow the regime and exploit Syria's
128natural resources. OnOctober 18, following a denial by the State
Department, TASSconnnunicated details of an "attack plan,!!129 but by
November 5 the wa.r scare was vrearing thin, and on January 3, 1958, it
was acknowledged that the threat was ended.130
Vlhat may be looked back to as the "beginning of a new era in
Soviet propaganda occurred on October 14-, when the first Soviet earth
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sate1lit_ e was put into orbit. surely, because of the tremendous bLow
to Ame.ri.can TYl"e"'t'
.1;'_ '-' J.ge throughout the world, the public react.ion to such
a scient'rJ. J.c achievement had far_reaching effects vritnin the United
States. A cartoon in sovetskaya ~l 'tura shmfed the "Fall of the Propa-
gandist IIs, as the shining It sputnik" tears t}:1_rougha paper held. in the
hands of "an Amer-i.can businessman. Onthe paper is printed: "American
science J."s first in the world! 11131
Pew newspaper's were published in the Soviet Union within a week
follOWing the successfu.l launching that did not contain at least one
cartoon "showf.ngassumed Ame:ricanreaction to the event. "The Voice of'
Ame:t"ic11 " 1a J.'" as I- d t "t'" d 32 a;" t I' I-0.:> ser- ...e 0 have lost J. s vOJ.cea.n vroner, a c pJ. a.ta s'...
st "rJ..kes himself on the head in surprise,133 united states officials are
:Pictured 4as nob believing the news,13' or watching the "sputnik' s''
progre as tllrough "military eyes" (gun barrels).135 All the world won-
derin 1 1~6g Y Vla;t h " _) If t' k"c es the satellJ.te overhead; the spu rn, '- passes over
the United
S'tates and calls downto the American satellite, "Fly up to
me' It lr'7
. , and is answer ed, III still cannot. II' :J
Aft
er the launching of the second satellite on Nove:nib
er
3,
Izvest·~ gloated. aver American "hysteria," and asserted tlw:t the achieve-
ment pro . U "t dved conclusively tha-t the soviet Union ivas ahead of the m, e
States , not only in rocketry, but alsO in industry, education and
CuItU:te 138• A cartoon portrayed the first "sputnik" as having struck
a blow" ta American technicS, but the second "sputnik" as having knocked
it out 139• The AtlantiC Alliance was soon threatened by a ",.lnd over
NATO l1JJW, and by delegates at meetings whO spend "all their time looking
at t.ne heavens. 11141
A full page of foreign cartoons in Literaturnaya Gazeta jibed at
the United states' futile efforts to launch a satellite on December6:
ltSputnik in the heavens; 'Spate-nile I on the ground.lIlLj.2 The "Vanguard"
1 t ll~3 l! •t II • b . d b .roc ce was shown as worm-eat.en, and Jup~ er as be.i.ng uro.e es~de
the graves of other American rockets wn.i.chhad failed, too.144
Frequent allusion was made to the small size of the American
satellite, as conwared with those of the USSR. A cartoon in Komsomol'
skaya Pravda pictured a sturdy vreight-lif'ter (USSR)balancing two huge
weights ("Sputniks"), while a vrizened Uncle Samattempted to lift a
grapefruit-sized sPhere.145 The llmch-vaunted United States satellite
is ShOwn bursting in the "Exploding Sensation,,,l46 and in liThe Career
of an American Sputnik. ,,147 Thus was the illusion that the United States , I
is technologically unchallengeable shattered, as the United States is
declared. to be capable only of shooting "rockets--from its mouth.H14b
'l'his seems in retrospect to be only c), logical extension of Soviet propa-
ganda wh.i.chbegan to claim in the early 1950' s credit for almost every
scientific discove1s and invention.
The political as well as the military significance of the new
earth satellites was soon obvious, as Soviet propaganda began to take
on tones of confident belligerency. The new technics, together 'lirith the
intercontinental ballistic missile vrhich they unveiled a fe", days pre-
viously appeared to be merely instrmnents of "r-ocket. diplomacy, II which
the Soviets might use to cow the wor-Ld into submission. A net bid by
nl1+9Khrushchev to the United States for "peaceful coexistence was seen
,
"1,,1'
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as a move to split the NATO allies, and in answer on october 25, Presi-
dent E'_ Lsenhower' and Prime t,1inisterIf.l8.cM.illancalled for a su.m:rr.itNATO
meeting t, 0 deal vath the soviet missile challenge.
As the preparations commenced for a NATO meeting, the soviet
:PTo:pag. . anda assault reached a nevr crescendo of verbal and printed attack.
The 110.octrine of mutual dependencel~ vIas mocked as an American maneuver
to IIrone . II it:: ..t' l.n the other nations /0 and tie them together for easy con-
trol 151• Khrushchev vrith tactlesS vigor and sharp verbiage lashed out
at NATo and warned the members of the alliance that they would suffer,
should the United states use bases in their countries to attack the
USSR-, however, his blundering threats and tactlessness empbas
ized
more
than anyt' .mng else the element of commondanger which served to instill
in th e NATO memb er s a new spirit of cooperation.
On December 10, MosCOW did a turnabout and opened a nev peace
Offensive as the heads of government of NATOnations gathered in pariS
far their coni'erence.
Bulganin called for an 0.110. to nru:tual recriminations and propaganda
A few dayS later, in letters to v·Jesternleaders,
attack,s. "It is time," he said, "to take measures to discontinue the
:Pro:paganda in the press
ion a' ] 52nd >ll-will." . A look at tile press for the final weeks of 1957
vroUld .g>ve no indication that there had been any lessening of thc usual
:Pl'ogramof condemnation of the uni"ted states, however. criticism con-
tinued. to mount on thc results of the NATOconference, the deepening
econo!nic recession in the United states, and the need for vigilance
against .Amerl.can-inspired espionage.
and radio which evoJ<esmutual distrust, .uspi
c
-
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The cel " 'eoratJ..on
tion 'an Moscow·
the new
in November may 'be said to have been the high-point of
Khrushchev policy of "feeling his oats." Regarding himself as
the conqueror of out h ' l'd t d h' t' Li l-- • -er space, av~ng conSo ~ a e.. ~s domes ~c po lv~cal
:POi'l"er h) e fe..ltentitled to speak, not only £'rom a :position of strength,
but f :rmrn a
of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolu-
From tbb iat. self'-assUJlled position, he mockedat ArneriC8J1technOlogical
aclt\'l"a:rdmess ru1d undertook in effect to dictate the terms of coexis-
tence "• KhruShchev threatened a soviet walk-out from the United Nations
Disarlllament
position of superiority over the United states and the Wes·t.
Commission, and in the same breath called for
mit meetin 11g for the ostensible :purpose of outlmling war,
armam ent race
another Hsum-
ending the
and establishing competitive but peaceful coexistence.
After a week of meetings in the Kremlin, a joint declaration of
11baSic law 11s and "unity of aims" was signed by twelve co_,nist states,
and a 11peace manifesto,,153 was published at the end of November. The
fir ts called for a revival of the "popular fronts" between co_,nists
and oth, er pOlitical groupS "to win state pOl«r ,dthout civil war."
Errtr>hasis was on Soviet leadershiP, and it is believed that a modified
'Vel's'J.on of the Cominform was created at that time.
. The end of the yea:r evidenced no lessening at thc propaganda
d1rected ag .
1.
af.nst the United states.
ast few weeks 11of 1957 revealed savage attackS on pra
cuca
y ever:!
theme :p:rev-l ously mentioned.
Photographs depicting "the J\lJlerican rea=en
t
of Gern>JJ1y"filled
o'Verhalf of Kom I' k P d on Decenl"her.J? " Lhe suffering Americansoma s.a~ _!av a lU
A glance at the press during the
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taxpayer was seen burdened ,,f,.th the cost of arms and inflation,15L~ wh.iLe
representation in Congress was asserted not to include the farmer or the
wor1<::er.155 The A-bombwas vlorshi:pped by the weaLt.hy , the militarists
and clergy as "their Godu156; the United States was accused again of
subersive activity in the satellites157; of coveting France's North
African oil discoveries15b; and so on, ad infinitum.
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CHAPTER VIII
ILWSTRATIONS
Political Cartoons
In newspaper , and especially in magazine publishing, dralvings of
val'ious types are Ividely used., For periodicals in the USSR, artists use
:pen and Lnk'-,v;ratercolor w-ashes, black ("Italian") pencil, and watercolors
in Bingle tone color. In such publications these drawings vJi11 be seen
in diverse forms, as this branch of art seems to allOY; for the v.ridest
a:pplication of creative ability, ,vith vJidely varying results. As is true
anY\rhere' . . .', an artlst's style often is recognlzable i'llthoutdifflculty
tbrou hg easily discernible "trademarks"; hovrever, the subject matter is
all t_ 00 often unimaginative and follows a rigid pattern. Original, crea-
tive thought is usually absent, as Soviet "planning" seems to have denied
all work nrust be
the art'lsts the possibility to be truly imaginative;
II
functional" and useful to the Soviet state.
In G.F. Volchek's vlOrk on illustrations in the Soviet press, he
states_ tID• ramngs, as in all forms of illustrations in soviet periodicals,
shOUld 1and must be used only in a realistic setting." This, apparently,
has' Deen . t II IJ.nerpreted to mean that there is no place for art for art s
sake!!· ., lnstead, the eye perceives a monotonous procession of portraits,
gel:U:'e scenes and architectural achievements in the press. Frequent use
i S lnade of sketches to illustrate stories, essays and biographies.
A typical example of the illustrated article is liTheSad Fate of
Abe Lincoln 112· h' ., a.n if Lch Lincoln comes back t.olife amid modern surroundings
in America. Offered a job in Hollywood to wor'k on a film called "The
Plague from Overseas,!! he encounters many unpleasant adventures. mentu-
ally b, _e ends up in a district ·where, for trying to protect the rights of
a Negro voter ,
...,
he is lynched by a mob •.) The series of illustrations ends
Wit'}L one showing the corpse of Lincoln hanging beside that of a Negro.
DraWing . ij.s 1.n Brodyagi showed a Negro boy being hounded by a sheriff's
Posse and k1'eked to t.. the :floor by rifle-carrying villise s,
Every Soviet illustrator is cautioned to remember that, in the
Words f0" Lenin, Hart belongs to the people; further, 11itmust unite feel-
ings, thought and will of the masses, and raise their spirits."5
Political cartooning suffered a decline in the \>lestafter the
invention of methods of inexpensive photographic reproduction in news-
papers, and to this day has remained primarily an adjunct to the editori-
al page. It is a fact that in those countries where photo_reproduction
is ,...,~oor and technically substandard--and this includes the Soviet Union--
lUore U"'e . d 'nk t» 1S made of line drawings of many types. Pen an 1. and im: er-
Colors are used almost exclusively, no doubt because ot' poor reproduction
qualities of other art methods. The crude caricatures of early Revolu-
tionary days were soon supplanted by sldllf'ul cartoons drawn by profes-
Sional t "IT•• 1"s, such as Deni and Moore; these, in turn, have given way -0 ,u..t\.ry-
niksy II G 1 b ttl t d, anf and Yefimov, as well as a myriad of lesser mown, u a en e
al~tists.
Vo Lchek described political cartooning as an art vlhich "helps to
unmask the intrigues of enemies of the Soviet land • • • (anoJ calls :for
searing with fires of satire all that hinders the forward movement of
our society.116 Volchek insists that in ...vork which involves international
themes, "car i.ca'tur-Lst.s must work in close contact vath international
journalists.tl7 He then reminds readers that !lunder such circumstances a
caricature must not turn into an unrealistic picture pierced inth empty
sneering. liS
Cartoons are a medium of communication understood the world over.
Such sirr:g;>lepresentation of facts is easily corrwrehensible even to the
illiterate, and thus has universal appeal. A Soviet caricatrist is
reminded that
a cartoon must be on a concrete example of the survivals of
capi taJ_ism in the consciousness of the people, and not just to
ridicule its defects !lin generaL" Soviet caricature is not mock-
ery, but a means of education, a very power-f'u.L means of struggle
,vith all that interferes I'dth Soviet construction. ')
In the USSRof the past three decades, the publication most noted
for its cartoons, both of a political and sociological nature, was Kroko-
d.iL, a thrice-monthly hurmr magazine published by Pravda. Krokodil
boasted the work of the best-lmovm Soviet cartoonists. The master was
ackno"lvledgedfor years to be "Kukryni.ksy ;" a portmanteau :for three
artists, M.V. Kupriyanov, P.N. Krylov and N.A. Soko10v. As students at
an art institute, these three began to work together forty years ago.
'l'hey wer-e almost immediately successful and attracted the attention of
MP,ximGorky, who--according to Soviet sources--advised them to fIgo out
and have a look beyond the boundaries of our Motherland, unmask the
enemies of the Soviet government."10 Equally talented vrere Boris Yefimov
and Yu.ri Ganf, both of whompr-oduced some pointed caricatures at the
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height of the Cold ';Tar.
Alrnost every Lssue of Krokodil carried anti-American political
cartoons. A study of themes used in only the 'back-cover cartoons (a
very desirable spot for attention-getting) indicated that in the year
1956-:eo _. _ . . -. _ . _, l" exa.nw1e, of thil~ty-'b'WO :I.Wlilues cr I\rol\,odil view'ed, eighteen-----.w ~
vlere devoted to anti-Americanism in one fot'm aX' ane.)'chlOlr.
Newspapers frequently use such cartoons, and even the annual
calendar• printed by the state political Publishing House in 1957 had an
anti_Am ... er~can cartoon to illustrate the date February 28. liOn the street
in the USA" a newsboy approaches a fat, cigar-smoking capitalist.
Buy a nevTspaper. II "~Vhat for? I already bought its editor. ull
"Sirl
"""
Ma:nl':~~ Charts
A glance at the large soviet ~Cyclo;ped:ia12 will serve to snow the
reader to what, extent maps and charts may be used for purposes of propa-
ganda. Cho.i ce of subject: liThe Rise of the vlorkerS
r Movement in the
United CIt . t. U' 1113 IIo.ates and Demonstrations Championing the SOVle' mon, Exter-
minat·~on Wars Against the Indians in t.he Territory of tbe United states,
18-19t'n Century,"14 and the mGthods of using these maps and charts sup-
:Port "dell '_ tne thesis that the field of graphiC propaganda is almost
L1l11imited. The first of the above maps, for example, illustrated the
SOViet th teme that the Americans are a divided people; in thiS case, he
ind".,t .
·'-Co rJ.al;sts~_ against the workers.
"
American Bases for Aggression" in the Arctic, North AtlantiC and
:i.n Afro 15a.ca were subjects for maps in !!_OvetskiY~ and I(rasnaya zvezda,16
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Whereb .ombers and warships are depicted as poised to attack the soviet
Union. A reprinted map from Newsvleekshowed"where racist terror rages
strongest in '7the Southern states."-
Charts taken from the statistical Abstract of ~ united states,
~WSweek -'_, ~ and other American publications were used to provide
tIfacts!! ba out lynchings, murders comnrl:tted,sex offenses; in short, any-
thing "-, vmich served to show the United states in a bad light. An example
is the chart I! II, America's Biggest Crimew-ave, talc.enfrom U.s. ~ ~
Horld R~ e;port in 1956.18
Axnerican aouz-cos lent further credence to the soviet governmentf s claim
to present t he "unvarnished truth" to :Lts people.
That these statistics i"ere taken from official
The book, Statistics of the Foreign Trade of Capitalist Nations
19
is _-'. -----
Ii terally IIfull of charts which purport to give a true picture!! of
COrtnner.cJ.al conditions in thev[est , with the united states being invariably
the bas'J.S for comparison. Polovitskaya's EconomiCRegions of ~ United
States· Th ··0--=. -" South2 has a fi.eld day with graphS and charts of comparative
statist·acs ; here she gives muchevidence of i'lhat an author can do to show
only that side of an issue which he intends to shOi'r.
NeWSpapershave printed graphS showing the amazing progress of the
DSSR .an production, as contrasted with the United states, which was said
to be 1agging behind.21 Often the grmrth of American industry was depict-
ed on charts in novel vrays: in a full-page article, "Monopolists of the
DSA-_:Cn~" 22 h d II f" e"~.J_JJ.rersof WarAdventures, II Komsomolr ska~ £:rav~ s eve pro J.
Yr.l.th pile d moneybags; "growth of u.s. military ex:pen<litur
es
"is traced
1ilith a long-barreled artillery piece. A strong socialist worker is shown
stl:'idi ng con:fident1y up tbe line on the graph tracing Communistindustrial
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grovrch, whi.Le a bent old man with a cane 1iTearily-climbs the Lower line
of capitalist growth.23 liThe countries of the socialist carqpl!are shown
smoothly climbing a graph in a modern streamlined locomotive, wh.iLe cap-
italist countries are represented as ,jerking along in an ailing jeep,
held" f II f" I- 1121+- back by a heavy cannon and bags 0 pro at s ,
Photographs
In the pages of Soviet nelvspapers, magazfnes and books a reader
will encounter reportazhniy photographs--current :photo-chronicles;
indiVidual photographs related or unrelated to the text; "phot.o-casays"
created from a collection of several photographs; photo-montages, which
are an artful grouping of photographs or parts of photographs; and repro-
ductions, i.e., taken from documents and the like. The wi.de fieLd for
falSii'ication in photo-montages is exemplified by the frequent elimina-
tion or substitution of figu:.ces in photographs of meetings of Soviet and
other leader s,
Nothing in this categorization differs Markedly from the methods
used in the West; however , in the technology t.her e is a remarkable dif-
ference. The quality of photo-reproduction in the USSRhas been very
poor, especially in books and magazines printed 'before 1950. Not much
improvement can be noted in Soviet newspapers since the decade of the
1930 r s , I!Screeninglt of photographs, i. e., rendering the black and gray
coloring in photographs into microscopic groupings of dots through acid
etching on zinc plates, vlhich ...rnen coated wi.t.h printer's inlc and pressed
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agaf.nsb a wh.i,te surface gives the desired outlines and shades, is extre..mely
crude by our st.andards ,
As many Soviet photographs are "lifted" from foreign publications
vTherethe " I ' t' tor~gJ.na photograph or prJ.n J.S no available to the Russian
printers , a negative is made of the already screened, printed reproduc-
tion. Th tb'e results vThichare obtained when .J.S photograph is, in turn,
screened for the second time may be imagined. The "double screening"
destroys detail and renders the photographic reproduction colorless and
flat.
The chronic shortage of newsprint and hard-finished paper in the
Soviet Union is of't.en reflected in the sub-standard qualit;y of the books
and new'spapers for sale; however, the use of pulp-paper for books means
that one of the prime requisites of mass propaganda--easy accessibility--
can be fulfilled, as the books then can be sold for ridiculously low
prices. Even such an important "lOrk as ~ large soviet Encyclopedia
in its prewar edition was poorly printed on Lowgrade paper, with exten-
sive use of line cuts instead of photographs; hOl.;rever,the 1953-
1
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edition was printed. on good quality stod::. In 195'7, a brochure commem-
orating the visit of Kh.rUshchevand Bulganin to southeast Asia was illus-
b'ated with color photographs of better_than-average quality, and other
improvements have been noted since then.
Documentary photographs are published frequently in the Soviet
press, where "by the strength of their agi tational and propaganda in-
fluence on the readerl! they are considered to be superior to other
forms of printed propaganda. The reader-interest created by such photo-
graphic reporting is a fact that has been vridely recognized 'by public
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opinion analysts.25 Some of the timeliness and effect on t.hereader is
lost, however, when phot.ographs of current events are not printed in
Soviet newspaper-s until after a considerable lapse of time. For example,
photographs of the May 1, 1957, parade and demonstration in Red Square
wer-e not published in the Sovoet press until May 1... Again, photographs
taken on November 7, 1957, were not printed until November 9 and 10.
This is unquestionably due to the detailed censorship and over-caution
practiced by Party organs.
The :purpose of the "illustrateds!! is clearly defined by Volchek
as I!topropagandize t.hepolicies of the Communist Party and the Soviet
government by all means • • .026 Pravda in FebruarJ, 1958, chided
leading Soviet newspapers for wasting time and space on photographs
wrd.ch were pointless or merely for entertainment. While acknmdedging
that photographs play an important part in propaganda, the newspaper
claimed, nevertheless, that "only those which reflect the most stirring,
striking and noteworthy events in the life of the Soviet people deserve
space in the press. II
CRAPI'ER IX
PRESS AND PUBLISHING
~ Press
In the Soviet Union in 1957 more than 7,500 newspapers
l
and
about 1 76 2 3, 0 magazines were printed in seventy different languages.
Not all of these gave scope to graphic propaganda; however, the very
considerable number of so-called "illustrateds," and the large printing
devoted to them has ObI t SOt' °made propaganda access~ e 0 every ov~e c~t~zen.
If the Soviet claim of 53,500,000 newspaper subscribers4 can be accepted
as fact f, some idea of the all_pervasiveness of the press 0 the period
may be obtained. In addition to thiS, the unique tradition of the "wall
newspaper" at factories and the public posting of newspapers for passers-
by to read made coverage by the press almost universal within the USSR.
One of the Bolsheviks' first acts in 1917 was seizure of the
press facilities of Russia.5 vyshin,sky declared that under the guidance
of the Party, lithepress in the USSR became a mighty instrument for the
true education of the masses ••• for fostering new discipline among
them • • e for the building of socialism. ,,6
Lenin hailed the value of newspapers to the party as tlnot only a
collective propaganda organ and a collective agitator, but a collective
organizer."7 "The press," he said, "is one of the most powerful weapons
[and i?] ••• not less dangerous than bombs and machine guns ." 8
As such, the newspaper still represents the 'basic method used by
the Party to spread the information that it desires the Russian people
to heed. A former Soviet writer, Michael Koz-Lakov, stated pointedly
that "Q ..j... r t .j... • t f . f .j... •vov~ev newspapers don reporv news JUs or In" ormavlon. They
wage propaganda."9 And further, "newspaper-s are a continuation of the
Party machinery and print only what suits the Party. It is from the
Party that all initiative derives."IO Khrushchev wrote in Kommunist:
The press is the long range weapon of the Party. Wecan,
if we select our OvID newspaper articles ..Tell enough, hit the
mark thousands of' kilometers away ••• nIl
An editor or journalist is very well paid by Soviet standards.
For example, a staff ~·rriter on NewTimes in 1955 earned 2,000 rubles
(*500) base pay. With additional payments for published pieces, his
monthly earnings frequently totalled 3,000-l~,000 rubles ($750-1,000).
A writer for Pravda received, a base pay of 3,000 rubles, and payment for
every sketch and article, with a total of about 5,000-6,000 rubles each
month.12
Photograph "art" is used by the Soviet press in two ways: in con-
junction vrlth an article, or separately, .dth a caption. The former is
usually supplied by Fotolillrcmika TASS, together ..zith a topical article;
the latter may originate in Fotoklishe TASSor may be a topical photo-
graph of a recent event, also from Fotokhronika TASS. A photograph has
an element of prestige because many individuals assume that it is an
accurate reflection of reality; in addition, it has a muchhigher interest
value to the reader, and thus vrill be noticed even by casual readers.
An investigator once estimated that Ita pictured page in a nevspaper wi.Ll.
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be read. by a third more adults than anything on the front page.,,13 The
addit ional effect created by a photograph printed in the small four-
page SOY' ta,e newspaper is not difficult to imagine.
Psychological techniques known the vrorld over to "ad" men are
f'ullY understood and utilized by the SovietS. Although the first page
of nevrspa;pers represents to us the roost ilY!Portantposition for news ,
Europeans G"Y' di'_a tionally look to the middle or back page for last-minute
news I• n Pravda or Izvestiya anti_American newS and cartoons or photo-
the page possesses a perceptual advantage over the bottom
half , as -nerrr.leb~ _~ egin to read from the top. In Vechernaya Mosk~ from
1949 to 191:13/ anti-American photographS were invariably at the top of
graphs are usually on the back page,
top half of
and sometimes on page three. The
page three.
decisi Ve: an illustration can be boxed in by 'Wavy or heavy lines,
U.nuSual s .' .pace arrangements, or in conjunct10n W1th a capt10n whose type
differ s from the standard body type in the paper. In this way, cartoons
and sketches are often located at the bottom of the page and are no less
However , factors in the layout of a page can be even more
not·1ceabl e.
Literaturnaya Gazeta is a thrice-weekly publication of the Union
Of SOViet Writers, and because of its "non_official" status, is uscd
far much of the Soviet propagandists I rougher hatchet-1ilO
rk
•
serVes as an outlet for material whose dubioUS authenticity and libelous
chara t 14 A .I't
C or might embarrass the government and party organs. no. " ary
attach~ [once declared: " ••• in spite of its cultured '_e, it has]
l'l.ttle to do with literature or culture of any kind. It is merelY,an
It also
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extremely scurrilous rag, mainly devoted to publication of virulent
attacks on prominent foreigners. n15 vJhen John Foster Dulles was still
Undersecretary of State, a photo-montage of a monkey with a hat, glasses
and pipe w-asused to illustrate an article concerning the "Biography of
a Scoundrel,!T which concerned the diplorna,t.16
Cartoons are frequent in Literaturnaya Gazeta. These have includ-
ed "Truman and Hall Street, II 19L~8(Tru.rnanas a waiter serves the world
to a greedy, monsterous Wall Street); "Attenshun! Eyes on corrnnand!lI,
1949 (General Bradley stands on a jeep hood, his hands in his pockets,
reviewing the "Western Alliance," which is bound together with a U.S.
money-belt); "Close ties of civilization bind vIall Street to Europe, It
1949 (a huge spider web covers Europe vnth the center in the United
States, wher-e an ugly black spider--Marshall--clings to it).
An issue on the 12th anniversary of the atom bomb attack on
Hiroshima printed a photograph of a brochure, NoMore Hiroshimas: For-- ---- ---
~ Banning of the Atom and }LYdrogenBombs. The text of tne brochure
(Japanese) is explained t.o readers, vrith a plea to end the horrors of
atomic war'f'ar-e and the death of Japanese fishermen. The publication
was brought to the MoscowYouth Festival to encourage youth of the world
"t.o "r\rotest t' 1117J::' against nuclear weapons and a onn,cwar,
Magazine publishing the USSRhas taken a great upswi.ng in the
years since World War II, both in quantity of units published and in
the quality of the product. MaGa.zineshave an advantage over newspapers
in their additional prestige. Their dignified appearance, the more
elaborate layout, the increased use of color and their substantially high-
er cost can produce greater submissiveness among readers than the more
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ephemeral newspaper. Infrequency of publication usually prevents maga-
zines from exploiting primacy and recency, but this factor also enables
them to achieve greater perspective and obtain more facts.
The relatively larger size and space le~ds itself to diversity
in layout whf.ch sets the Soviet magazine distinctly apart from the news-.
paper. Only here is initiative displayed and originality shown in the
publishing world of the USSR. Krokodil Llses color throughout, not only
in cartoons, but often in captions and headings. Full-page caricatures
are common, and often a double-page center cartoon is printed, such as
that which depicted ItTheBosses!! from the series, "Enemi.es of Peace."
l'his showed Krupp, Rockefeller, Ford and Du?oni gathered around a huge
pile of gold coins and bloody soldierst skulls, fondling the money
d. 18 ,!I (gree ~ly. A typical cartoon showed "Europe s New Christ Uncle Sam)
before a microphone, an olive branch on one hand, a bloody toga over one
shoulder, vuth the dollar representing a halo eround his head. Behind
the folds of the toga can be seen guns, aircraft and tanks.19 In another
cartoon, Franco harangues his Fascist guard "At the beginning of'the
school year" at the "Washington Diversion Faculty of Espionage, Border
Incidents and Executriona'[r !lyoukids completed your middle school under
Hitler and Mussolini, and here you'll get your higher education!". In
the IIschool!!are seen an executioner's axe, grenades and KKK klansmen.20
Ogony~k frequently illustrated articles with wash or ink drawl.ngs,
such as hanging Negro corpses in liTheKingdom of rwnch,,,21 or the Statue
of Liberty burdened with a militarist demanding "wor-Ld domination, II and
gangsters "I"litha sign: "We are a Higher Race! ". Capitalists carry
placards: "Quickly Drop the Atomic Bomb!", !tLoya1ty Oath,!! and "Search
for the Reds!!!. Around the base of the statue are Ku Klux Klansmen
Complete with gaLl.ows and signs: "Business ••• A New War! f! .22
Both OgonyID~ 23 and Krokodi124 reproduced vratercolors which wer e
on the th It IIeme, Mayakovskiy on America. Dravm to supplement anti-
American verses of the famous Soviet vn~iter, these had been displayed
at tbe 19c_ ::>1All-Union Art Exhibition. A terrified Negro tied to a tree
and being burned to death is representative of the series.
The Soviets claimed to have 360,000 libraries of all types in
operation in 1952, ..nth forty-four millions circulation.
25
There wer e
more than 100 million books in military libraries alone.26 Boole publish-
ing in the USSR has always been of prime importance to the Party and
government, as the fantastic rise in volume of publication indicates.
By Soviet data, in 1955 in the Soviet Union 1,004,100,000 books were
:Published-_twelve times more than in 1912. The soviets point out that
in the quantity of books published, by title, the USSR by far leads the
wor1d,27 '~ftrl1ebook publishing in the USA has remained almost LUlchanged
for over forty years.28 In 1957, nearly one and one-half billion books
w-ere published in eighty-four different languages.
As might be expected from such a volume of printing, there is
great diversity of products in Soviet book publishing. While most books
are poorly printed on low-grade stock, some hooks in recent years have
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been of superior quality, both in paper and typography used. bven photo-
reproduction is iraproving, and in some books has been excellent. The
quality of this material as literature has been as diverse as its physi-
cal makeup; however, the heavy ideological handicap forced on it must
share the blame for many of its shortcomings. Zhdanov expressed the mis-
sion of Soviet writers in his Cominform address of 19~·7:
IIrq)erialists and their ideologies, lackeys, their literature
and journalists, their diplomats and politicians, seek by all
means to slander our country, to present it in a false light •••
Under these conditions, the task of soviet literature is not
only to reply blow for b.l.ovrto all this foul slander and attacks
on our SQviet culture • • • but boldly to fly out and attack
bourgeois culture.
Literary vTorks which have included anti-American propaganda have
been very numerous and varied in type. Some non_illustrated books have
had lurid cover illustrations vrhich, as in capitalist countries, heJ1>
11 1 IIse 1 the contents. American Silhouette, published in 1936, bore on
its cover a picture of a forlorn hobo set against the New York skyline.
The theme of the book was the social decadence of technologically pro-
pressive America; this 'vas explained to the reader in terms of unemploy-
ment, poverty, racism and moral and cultural barbarism.
29
~ ~
About the j\.JllericanLegion depicts a fat Legionnaire with a skull and
crossbones on his necktie. He is held on a chain by a hand v[hich is
labeled "s. tr30
Agency of Wall Street (1951) showS a gloved hand (on the sleeve:- ",,__,.. ~: ..--"$ It " d It$ II, , Wall Street tr)holding leashed dogs who root in bowls marke ' •
The dogs bear the unmistakable faces of John L. LewiS and William
Green, American labor leaders.31 In 1957, the cover of !£ ~ ~ ~
!2. Testing of Nuclear Heapons showed the peoples of the ,[orld holding
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high placards which demanded "No Bomb!".32
In the years 1950-1953 books filled "nth the utmost in vitupera-
tion 'were published in the USSR. Frequent use was nade at that time of
cartoons, and in the two years 1950-1951 a veritable rash of unbelievably
libelous books of caricatures by top artists made their appearance. For
~ Lasting Peace: Against the "Harmongers professed to see (in redravm
cartoons) the close link between Wall Street and the Nazi menace before
1940.
Uncle Sam is shown watering a seedbed ("Ruhr") with gold dollars.
"Blood and Business" shows him calculating with an abacus (beads are
human skulls) as I1warnews!! comes oVer the radio. The postward American
den ("VJestern Zone") is featured as a gathering place fort~ascist filth, 11
including all the hated figures of the Soviet past; a banner proclaiming
I1Democratization of Japan!! is altered to read "MacArthurization of Japan,!!
as the General sits i·nth hi s feei-;acr-ess the Emperor's throne. Under
the "Marshallization of Italy," that country is seen being weLghed on
the scales in exchange for "horsemeat, chewi.ng gum and cigarettes." 33
The Frenzied Anglo-Americanizers depicts a :fat capita1ist riding
on a moribund old nag ("The Marshall Plan") to Western Europe, whf.Le
b h.i d h' . 1 ' t lie" "e ln 1m ln the sadd e rides ~he spec er rlS1S. Truman cuts the
British lion's mane in a HWall street stripping," and uses !!devaluation"
to soothe the shame. A madman (I1ForrestalH) tries to jump :froma win-
dow, shouting, I1Help! The Red Army attacked the USA! !11, "lhile Harriman
holds him back, and in another cartoon Forrestal is ShOi-IDas a madman
in a strait jacket. 34
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In Fables, a journalist's pen impales a frightened American capi-
talist who carries an A-bomb, and a Yankee pig with a cigar and flag
C'North Atlantic Aggressive Pact!!) ri.des a thin English lion to the brink
of a cliff.35
':(,.-
Various editions of The Large Soviet EncyclopediaJoshow
dl'amatically what force pro:paganda can exert on supposedly cultural pur-
suits. In a comparison of two editions, the difference found in sections
on United States history is enlightening. At the time of the "Coalition
\iarn (1945), this section is toned down and not offensive to America,
'out,in a later em tion (1956) graphic coverage of Urribed states history
is much distorted. These drawings and photographs in no way fairly
represent such history; of nine illustrations, six are devoted to demon-
strations and strikes, and tvlO to American-Soviet meetings! 37 A random
selection from the 1952 edition (Volume XVI) shows photographs of a strike
at the Ford River Rouge Plant in Detroit,38 and a magazine cover vath
General Ri.dgeway ("General Germ") hanging from a lamp post.39
Children's Literature
As the system of educat.Lon is rigidly controlled by the Ministry
of Culture, this has resulted in complete uniformity of textbooks used
throughout the USSR. Shortcomings and disadvantages have been noted in
this superimposed rigidit~ on Soviet education, but in general the system
1Iis one of the most effective channels through which propaganda is dissem-
;nated,l!l~Oand Ls +'-'l'b P t t~ ~ success~~ y ar y s·andards.
The Soviet schoQl system did not always enjoy its relatively good
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current standing; from 1921 to 1931 it was in chaos, inth very Lax disci-
pline and poor results. HOvlever, in 1931.Anatol Lunacharsldy was replaced
as CO:rnmissarof Education by Andrei Bubnov, who had organized propaganda
and education in the Red JArmy. Bubnov carrie d out sweeping reforms and
greatlYin~roved the system with a cO:rYq)letereorganization of teaching
methods. The Second World VJar resulted in a temporary setback for educa-.
tion (in the RSFSRalone, the Germans demolished more than 20,000 schools,
according to Soviet claims), but the Fourth Five Year Plan called for
availability of 193,000 elementary and secondary schools with a total
attendance of 31,800,000.41
'rhe vast number of books and other publications wh'ich are printed
specifically for children and young adults is indicative of the emphasis
the Party places on raising the youth of Soviet Russia "pr-oper-Ly, It The
State Pub'Lish'i.ng House f'or Children's Literature (Detgizdat) has produced
works on almost every conceivable subject which might interest children;
however, "t.he monotony of themes and creative methods It has been criti-
cized.1~2 Of forty-six young people's books v.1JJ.ichwere the most popular
in the USSRin 1957, nine were on military and counter-intelligence
adventures, tvrenty-.three :)11 espionage and subversion, and nine on crim-
inaloffenses.43
The number of translated foreign books published annually in the
Soviet Union is considerable. In children's books alone, Detgizdat
between 1947-19511-published 280 books by non-Russian authors whi.ch had
"been translated from tvrenty-eight different languages. 11-4
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The hate campaign against the United states has been particularly
prOminent ._ In young people t s literature. No opportunity has been lost to
c!'eate th de esired impressions and images of America, though many of the
ca!'toon"""used have been in extremely poor taste under any circumstances,
conside'~'r a.ng the ages of the intended readers. The fore,vord to They Have--
No Chil__ dhood describes the purpose of the book as
bl' f'or preparation and introduction to talks at pioneer assem-
f le~. These talks help to cultivate in soviet children a
teellDg of pride for their great Soviet motherland and hatred
~vard capitalist regimes ~mich deprive p~ople of their bright-
est and happiest part of life __childhood.45
Sergei Mikhaklov, a favorite children'S author, declared to the
XI Congress of the Komsomol r in 19i~9, "We must create for Soviet childl~(-m
"Works th ta "Will vrrathfully snow the beastly countenance of the Anglo-
America .n lmperialists , 1
ld "lt6those warmongers, those s aveho e1's •••
Several1i'rriters of children'S literature have attained prominence
in the USSR; the most popular author is Samuel Marshak, whose -best known
boole is Mister Twister, the story of an American millionaire who decides
to take a trip around the ,vorld. ~fuen he arrives in the Soviet Union,
he .lS given a room at a hotel, but when he sees a Negro lLnder the same
roof he storms out to demand a room at another hotel. One after the other,
the hotels are "tipped off" in advance, am thuS refuse him, although he
offers large sums of money- Finally, tired and desperate, he is chastised
by th, e Soviet people and is given a room surrounded by a Negro, an Indian,
a Chinese , etc.
The book is illustrated throughout with amusing and well-
executed dr' 4'"'7awi.ngs ,
Originally published in the USSR as ~ story 2! ~ ~ ~
to publicize the First Five Year Plan in 1928, ~ Russia's Primer was
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:repr'J.nted in the Uni,ted ~-tates. A 1]·11 t .L. "
~ Vie ._-l_us r-at-edchapter, TwoCOUl1-
t:rie'" II." emphasd.z es the v;aste in America, the IIget_rich-quid:
I'
psychology
of the people, and the terrible results of capitalist competition and a
non::pl 4- anned economy. 8
YoungGermany (1951) ShovlSchildren howthe soviet Unionwarrts
them to view the American "occupation" of Western Germany. A photograph
Showsa crude United states flag painted on a wa.Ll, with the vlO
rds
, "GO
BOME!! sc:rawled boldly across it. "This is the worleof Germanpatriots, It
:reads th 1e caption. 1-9 ~ QE.eatvolga, nominally a story of the Volga
region -and economic development there, includes photographs vlhich snow
America . 1'"0J.n contrast as an eroded land of catastrophes.)
In the press, Pionerska~ Pravda and other publications for the
young described American Boy Scouts as trained spies; American children
hom the cradle up ,.;rereportrayed as playing with toys patterned on the
A-bomb 1, and are -thus trained as "little warmongers."5 A book for very
Young"'eaders II
" published in 1955 shOWSa positive1y nightmariSh c
a
pit
a
1ist"
vrlth a green, sca:Ly face and fangs who carries a lighted bomb in his hand.
Be is -'-h II-\, e lTlcendiary -bourgeoisie" who inflames fascist troops to advance
inm battle for capitalism.
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Literature for young adults is published mainly by the publishing
hOuse
MoloORyaGvardiya, Which is contro1led by the Centra1 committee of
TwO bookS wHI serve as examp1es of tbe countless anti-
Alner'J.can products which have originated there.
In They Have no chilahood, the chapter, "America: land of Child-
E .' ----_o~ S~," contains poorlY reproduced phOtOgraphS of Negro sl- in
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~'Tashington, vrith the Capitol in the background ("contrasts"); in San
Antonio a tin-sheet shack houses eleven of a Mexican-American family
(11 " 0Q2scrimination"); a farilily is dispossessed and all their furniture Ls
pj]ed .__ a.n the street (" insecuri ty"); a street is Ii ttered, filthy, crossed
with_ clothes lines, while children play in the gutter ("poverty!!); young
Shirley O'Brien, whose parents are migratory cotton pickers, was sold
by them to a filling station proprietor for five dollars and three gal-
lons of gasoline ("degeneracy"); Donald Menius, seven, an uneducated st.
LoUis shoe shine boy, vrorks from davIDto dusk ("child labor"); American
chol2 dren playa game, "Direct Hit, II using a toy airplane which drops
bombs on play houses ("militarization amongyouth II ); the Ku Klux Klan
is represented by a group of five-year-olds who form "part membership";
Navaho Indians are gathered around their hogan, where their poverty is
contrasted 'ltli th American White capitalist wealth. 53
Enslaved Youth: the Situation of Youth in the United states
.;..;._.---~...- - _-
tells about America as it is in actuality, of the difficult
position without rights and enslavement of the y~Ing generation
of workers in the land of the dollar, of the militarization of
youth. Also shown is the growing battle of the progressive
forces of youth of thli USAfor peace, democratic freedom and a
better future • • • 5 ~
The chapter, "Economic Enslavement of Youth, II contains dralcings of'
a hopeless man sitting on a park bench with his head in his hands; child-
ren in aduLt s t clothing leaving a factory, ",>Therethey "i-lorkon the night
shiftll; a man "with a degree from Columbia University!! sitting on a wooden
crate awaiting shoeshine customers. "American Democracy" depicts police-
menl<nuling a struggling youth off to a police wagon (he was seized "for
[listening to) records made by Paul Robeson"); gun- and rope-carrying
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men with a dog on a leash and accompanied by a policeman draw near a
Scene "where a lynching is going on. II "The }fi_,_arasmusof Culture" shows
t~o youths who have just clubbed a man, searching his prostrate form
("comics taught them"). Also S]lOwn are a group of cigar-smoking men
standing around a baseball player in uniform ("I'll buy this lad!"), and
an American soldier standing in the back of a jeep photographing hanging
corps ( t· ,,)55es of women "the fruits of educa lon .
The height of the anti-American campaign in children's literature
appears to have been the years 1950-1952, when it could be detected in
almost any publication. Its virulence lessened thereafter, but the cam~
pa:i.gncontinued. A hint of a possible renaissance of Soviet adventure
literature for children was seen in an article in June, 1957, in
Komsomol'skaya Pravda, which condemned the past development of such lit-
erature as "artificially retarded for a full decade and a half" and
acknowledged it to be "still in the experimental stage.,,56
Foreign Sources
Almost daily in the press and periodicals the work of foreign
caricaturists and illustrators is used. In keeping with Soviet methodol-
ogy, most of these drawings are s~lple, single-subject drawings with a
one-line caption. In Soviet newspapers, cartoons depicted "the Dove of
Peace and the Cold War,,,57 (Danish); vicious animals "In the Atlantic
58Den" (Bulgarian); "Newton" sitting under a tree, the fruits of which
59are "u.S. bombs" (Chinese); the United States militarists being knocked
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off h"1S perch "from
(Rumanian); and the
a position ••• of strength" 'ay the Soviet sputnik
60
"USA Embargo" sinking as Western Europe's movement
for closer ties with the countries of the socialist camp gathers strength
,,61 (• English) •. .
devot"1ng an entire page or'more inside either cover to "Foreign Humor"
Ogony~~ print similar foreign cartoons, sometimes
or "Sat"1re Abroad." One such page was composed entirely of cartoons
from B 1 " .u gar-a.a , Poland and Hungary on the theme of .Am(~rJ.cangerm warfare
in Kore 62a.
"1951 Model"
brOken harp
Illustrated foreign articles and short stories in Qgony~k have
included "Rickshaw" by Howard Fast, which professed to shoW uni'l"iendly
relati 65ons of American military men with natives in India, and a French
author's condemnation of racism in the United States, "Corpses--
the
By-
Products of Business." Illustrations showed frightened NegroeS being
persecuted b '1 1° 66y eV1 Whites, soldiers and po lee.
rn the Shade of Fort Knox, translated from the German, used almost
exclusively United States sources for its illustrations. "The Land of
Contrast" shows the huge trailer house whieh Ginger RogerS "uses from
tollne to time for a few hours" while an entire family is shown below
sleeping in an auto; in "The Land of Waste," a Broadway star "with
mOre dollars than taste" wears a dresS costing $20,000; Roy Rogers holds
Others showed "the evolution of German imperialism" with the
shouting, "Wall Street over alll,,63 and Adenauer playing a
("US Dollar") on instructions [:Com Washington.
64
a party for his horse and "friends" (other horses) on a New York hotel
roonop' "$10,000 thrown into the air"; an electric sign fifty feet high
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Over Times Square advertising candy His using nightly enough electricity
to light a small cl.ty"; a veteran "'i'lithvafe and baby sits on a park
bench under the open sky: !!Yesterdaya soldier--today, homeless!!!. Con_
gress is in session vrlth 'but a handru,l of people present: lithe real vmrk
is carried on in lob'bies!!; Henry Ford is met at Terrrpelhof airdrome in
Berlin by AmerLcan military authorities: "the Inspector comes!"; "Fascism
in the United States" is indicated by paraphernalia ta.l~en from Raymond
Nelson, self-styled "Fuehrer" of an underground nationalist organization
in MinneapoliS; tithe ~[iddle Ages on stone Mountain" shows the KuKl1L"C
Klan burning a cr-oss , The last photograph in the book, appropriately
vlith no cormnent, shows the statue of Liberty from the back, a huge litter
of trash strewn about the scene.67
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CHAPTER X
MOTION PIcTURES AND TELEVISION
As is true in all spheres of activity in the Soviet Union, the
f'lm1. industry is called upon to satisfy the ideological demands of the
Party. "Of all the arts, the cinema is the most important to us,tI
declared L . 1en~n, who fore saw-in its future growth the most significant
propaganda factor in the spread of Bolshevism. Indeed, the soviet Union
claimed "1.n1955 to have in operation 15,700 cinemas and 24,100 mobile
motion nicture un;ts.2.· t t ·th th 1 d~ ~ Th~s was ~n sharp con ras ~ e ear y ays of
the Revolution when lIofthe original 143 cinemas in MoSCOW, only ten
were functioning regularly; and because of lack of equipment, current and
films there w-ere many vleeks when not a single theatre in the city was
able t 3o put a picture on the screen."
It is interesting to note that Babitsky regards American film
d'l.rectors Griffiths and DeMille as the fathers of the soviet film indus-
try. 4 For months after they seized the picture-taking establishments,
the S .OVl.ets produced nothing more ambitiouS than short propaganda reels
who1.chwere destined mainly for the front. It was not until the advent of
SUch di t'rectors as Eisenstein, Puvodkin, ])ovchenkO and others whose ar ~s-
tr'y was based on American technology that the soviets began to produce
effective feature filmS. The period 1925-1929 saw the real establishment
of the Soviet film industry.
Soviet audiences in the 1920's responded enthusiastically to
American and f'or-e.i gn films. In 1926, for example, eighty percent of all
the films shown wer-e of forei.gn origin. 5 How'ever, in order to neutralize
their ideological "danger," Soviet authorities edited and cut them, often
beyond all recognition. In general, they accepted for import only those
films vrhich provided escapist entertainment or illustrated some deficiency
in the capitalist world. In 1929, VJith the onset of the Five Year Plans,
all foreign films vanished from the soviet screen at the direction of the
government. Since that time, Hol.Lywood has been caricatured as surviving
on the sensationalism of Ku Klux Klan lynchings, gangsterism and taste-
less sex. An illustrated article in Ogonygk in 1949 strongly condemned
/"
the Amer-Lcan film industry as devoid of art.o
As was the case with all Soviet :propaganda in the period of mili-
tant communism, the main figure of hatred was the ~vhite Guardist, especi-
ally the officer. A standard type was created; he was cowar-d Ly , cruel,
stupid and eternally drunk. Only after the onset of NEP, when it was
asserted that combat with such a disreputable type discredited the fight-
ing abilities of the Red Arrrry,did the White Guardist assume more human
qualities. During this period, the ItImperialist Trio" (France, Britain
and the United states) suffered considerably at the hands of the film
propagandists, mainly in scenes depicting assistance rendered by the
capi talists to the White armies. Even in films which featured spies and
diversionists whose activity was not necessarily ascribed to the United
States, but simply to "the 1;1est,1tor "the bourgeoisie," Amer-i.ca shared
127
in part of the audience's hatred and conter~t by propaganda symbol asso-
eiation.
In 1921, the Sovnarkom by special decree ordered the film industry
to speed up production on needed films and coincidentally ordered that a
prOpaganda film be included in every program in domestic theatres. In
that same year, some of the outstanding pre...;revolutionaryfilm directors
returned to their profession; hOvl"ever,only in 1923, vnth the formation
of Goskino in Moscow and Sevzapkino in Leningrad did the soviet film
industry, as an art, have its beginning.
American films, beginning with Griffith's I!%,atience in 1922,
made frequent appearances on the soviet screen. l~ry Pickford and Doug-
las Fairbanks, Rudolph Valentino, pola Negri, Emil Jannings and others
attained quick popularity among Russia.ns.7 By 1924, however, anti-
Amer'lcan propaganda was already evident in Soviet feature films, ~ Heart
~ Dollars8 and The bnusual Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the-- _- ----------
£0Isheviks.9 The latter film was hailed by MoscovT critics as a great
film which gave
American i~ressions of Soviet Russia and of Russians who
admire America. Mr. West, an American senator, decided despite
all terrors (w'hich, in the wor-ds of American newspapers are
extant in Russia) to visit the land of the Bolsheviks. In MoSCOW
he falls into the hands or the adventurer Zhban and his gang,
Who depict the life of Russia as the half-bal';:edsenator expected
to see it.IO
In reality, this film contained all the stereotypes (including a
COWboy) whi.ch unrealistically represent an American to a foreigner. On
the other hand, supposed vlild ideas of Americans about Russia were loudly
ridiculed. A 1927 production, ~ Voyage ~ ~. ,LIOyd
ll
is described as
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"ex 'poslng th i.te capl alist class and at the same time revealing the taste-
less 12worship of comfort, which the bourgeoisie utilize."
During the period of NEP a number of studios sprung up all
aver Eur opean Russia and in the CaucasuS. Concurrently, Soviet film
technology improved through modernization and adaptation of foreign meth-
ods of f'l '1 mlng and projection. The complexity and length of feature
films 'lncreased together with the experience of master directors. It
was in t.hd.s period that the first great work of Sergei Eisenstein was
produced.
also called ~ Days that Shook ~ World,13 was a great
that time in the Soviet Union, and waS premiered in the
Boll ShOl' Theatre in November, 1927. Perhaps because NEP was drawing to
a close , anti-Americanism was present in two respects in the film: in Scene
VI, oPpoation leader Kerensky is shown riding in an automobile bearing
the United States flag on its hood,14 and America is associated as linked
with the acitivities of the hated cabinet ministers of the Provisional
Government.
In the Party press of this period more and more frequently there
appeared attacks on "bourgeois influence" of the motion pictures imported
from ba road; finally, in 1929, foreign films were prohibited altogether.
They were not to reappear on the Soviet scene until ten years later, on
the eve of the Second World war.
15
Stalin recognized the value of motion pictures in propaganda work;
~ollowing the example set bw Lenin, he tightened Party control over ~ilm
activities to include detailed censorship of thematic planning and thus
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complicated the already difficult process of preparing scripts. Stalin
described Soviet cinema as "a great and inestimable force whf.ch has
exceptional possibilities for spiritually influencing the masses ••• f!
It is interesting to note that he saw the cinema only as a method of
agitation, and not as an art.
A purge ca.rrwaignagainst "formalists" res1Llted in the stifling of
creative effort and the absence of new forms and styles. This also rooted
out many talented personnel and interfered I'dth natural growth of the
industry. Themes of films produced during the period of reconstruction
and early collectivization included lithefight 'with foreign spies; the
economic crisis in the West, and anti-Fascist propaganda. ,,16 It was also
at this time that the model of the "new'Soviet man" began to emerge in
films. Though the first sound picture was produced in the USSR in 1931,
the quality of the films continued to be mediocre. As late as 1936--ten
years after the introduction of sound films--only twenty-one percent of
the projectors were equipped for sound.17 TI1e suppressed potential of
Soviet artists caused one British visitor to note in 1932 that Bolshevik
cinema was
the scene of a struggle 'be~reen art for its Ovffi sake and art
constrained to serve the purposes of propaganda. It has to cra1rl
along under a heavy burden of Bolshevilc propaganda, and for this
reason the visitor to Russia does not see many beaut~fUl films--
he only feels how fine the Russian cinema might be.lt)
In 1932 a number of'American Negroes of radical views were invited
to the Soviet Union to act in a film production vrhichwas to expose the
oppression and exploitation of the black race in America; however , influ-
ential American businessmen s.trongly remonstrated with the Soviet
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government and :pointed. out that such a film wou.Ldhave disastrous effects
on the :pros:pects of recognition of the USSRby the United States.19 Accord.-
ingly, :production on the film was st.opped , and the Negroes were sent home.
This did not :prevent the release in April, 1933, of the anti-American
film, The Negro from Sheridan (later reissued as Love and Hatred).20
The first Soviet color film was produced in 193~,by Eck , and in
the follovling year the industry celebrated its 15th anniversary with
great fanfare, including the awarding of titles and medals. After a
visit to Hollywood, the director Alexandrov produced a "comedy" in the
,I'
late 1930's which played on the popular theme of racial discrimination
in A.merica. The Circus told the story of an American white girl who
found hap:piness in the Soviet Union, 'where she had fled after being ri,d-
den out of tOvm because her baby had been fathered by a Negro.21
Whenwar came to Russia in 191.~1,many film studios were lost to
II:
the Germans; howevez-, this did not prevent the Soviets from producing a
number of war--agd, tational f'i1ms in other studios. Primarily documentary
in nature, these differed from those of the Civf.L VJarperiod in their
relatively high art quality.22
Parallel va th the substitution of patriotic for "Party" themes
came a relaxation of the ban on Western films. Certainly the most signi-
ficant field of communication during the lfar, films from the United
States wer-e imported in sizeable numbers. North Star, Mission to }i1oscmr,
Song of Russia, Edison wer-e some of the most outstanding. Also po:pular
wer e Deanna Durbin and vlalt Disney films.23 The latter, along wi.th films
starring Charlie Chaplin, had been perrntted after the Nazi-Soviet pact
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of 1939, as they had themes ("the Big Bad VJolf,1Ithe underdog) ,rhich
could be easily translated into anti-capitalist terms. 21+ From1921-3 to
1911-5, Soviet nevrsreels occasionally used fragments of U.S. Office of T;far
Inform,a,tion (OWl) commentaries in their makeup;
At the end of the war, the Soviets set to the task of rehabilitat-
ing their war-torn film industry 'with vigor. The Fourth Five Year Plan
for motion picture production, approved on May21, 1946, by the Party,
was ambitious. Its program included amongother propaganda points: the
advantages of the Soviet system over the capitalist; the people's vigi-
lance, patriotism and duties to the state; problems facing the USSR;and
popularization of achievements in science and technics. 25 It was hoped
that by 1951 there would be no fewer than two sound-El.Lm show-ingsper
month in each rural village.26
For all its potential, the Soviet film industry was not able to
meet its requirements under the Plan, and for nearly a decade after 19Lt6
it continued to run in low' gear. The Party offensive which had its origin
in the post'\var period Wd.S strongly reflected in political interference in
the movie industry. Pravda in 191:6 stated:
Soviet cinema has not and cannot have any interest or task
other than the interest of t.he sLate and the task of educating
the people and the youth, particularly, in the spirit of the
great ideas of Lenin and Stalin.27
The resurrected anti-American campaign in the early part of this
period (1945-1947) was waged vrlth old prewar films, including some cap-
tured Nazi propaganda films which happened to fit the Party line.28 Old
A1nerican films which portrayed the United States in a bad light were also
shown. These included The Grapes of Ivrath (the :plight of the "Okd.es" in
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the Depression years), and Black Legion (activities of the Ku Klux Klan).
Iskusstvo Kino declared: "Soviet art moved into a decisive battle with the
self-satisfied film art of contemporary imperialist reaction.,,29
After the huge success o.f Simonov's The Russian Question as a play
in 1947, it was filmed and thus presented to a far wider audience. With
the intensification of the Cold War after 1949, the Soviets portrayed
"the growing disillusionment of the Russian people with their former
allies" in the vividly anti-American Iv1eetingon the Elbe.30 Beginning
with the glorious juncture of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe in
1945, the film ends with a sordid revelation of the United States "espionage,
fascism and treachery." A veritable parade of stock characters is intro-
duced; these range from the heartless blonde spy and effete officers to
the reactionary senator. Only one American officer fights to promote
democracy in the American Zone, but is sent home in disgrace. Various
scenes show a "pin-u.p"-covered jeep, drunken and undisciplined soldiers
and officers, militarists drinking "to Wall Street," and an American at
the head of goosestepping German marchers. The final scene shows a fare-
well on a bridge which crosses the Elbe--symbolic of the "gulf" between
two worlds which Soviet propagandists were hard at work creating. The
film's popularity was attested to by advertisements in Vechernaya Moskva
within ten days of its opening which claimed "more than 1,500,000 people
have seen Meeting 2!l the Elbe."
Academician Pavlov and ~ in Bloom31 underscored the supremacy
of Russian science and the venality of American scientists who falsely
claimed credit for Soviet discoveries, or encouraged by Fascist bosses,
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resist the evident truth of Micherin's, Pavlov's or Lys enko I s theories.
Conspiracy of the Doomed32was directed against the MarshaLl Plan. During
the Korean vlar (1950-1953) the Soviets produced numerous anti-America_n
films. Both the following were shown to Soviet Army trainees during this
period: There 'Here Five ~ ~ told the story of five demobilized "c.z, "s"
who engaged in illicit trade with badly-needed penicillin; !2. Soldier's
~ in America concerned a veteran who became a gangster because of
abominable living conditi:ms and was ruthlessly shot downby the police.
'The most infamous ::If all was produced in 1952 when as support of
the Chinese claim that the United states 'vas 'waging germ vrarfare in China
and North Korea, a documentary film was made of the trials of captured
American airmen. Displays of "evidence" and the haggard faces of fliers
who confessed their Itguilt n made an irrwressive picture story. This was
widely shown throughout the wor-Ld and reached all parts of the Soviet
Union. Fo'Ll.ow-upnewsr-eel.s showed Chinese peasants w-ith masked faces
determinedly and clextrously using chopsticks in fields to pick up insects
which they declared wer-e dropped in "germ-bomb" canisters to spread
disease among the Chinese people. These were often shown in conjunction
vlith exhibits of allegedly captur-ed equipment.
In 1955, Footsteps in the ~ and In Square 45, both of which
depicted "the heroic and determined struggle of the Soviet people against
':>:>
spies, II..)':> signified the intensification of the then-current "fight
against United States spies and saboteurs." Another film of the time,
Silver Dust, will be described here at length. A vicious movie whi.ch
had a very 1iride screening in the USSR, it depicts Americans as guilty of
everything form superstition and corruption to :rape.
As the film begins, an American scientist, Steel, acquires riches
and the formula for "Silver Dust," a deadly ger!J1preparation, by marrying
the widow of the inventor. He is subsidized by Southern Trust, in which
he owns stock. At the Pentagon, General Mac Kennedy and his cronies
decide to purchase the formula from the United States Army, but first
intend to divert the formula to Eastern Trust, which is owned by their
relatives. To assist him in this venture, they enlist the services of
a former Nazi colonel, an itinerant preacher (to prey on the religious
credulity of Mrs. Steel), and a gangster.
The minister tells the widow that when in a seance Christ appeared,
he had asked him "When will the war of justice begin?" Christ replied, '
"You had better hurry." When asked aoout the danger of Russian troops,
Christ said, "But I have blessed my troopsl" The preacher then claimed
that the deceased scientist had joined the seance and had advised that
the formula be given to Eastern Trust.
Progressives in town hold a demonstration for peace, but the
preacher drowns out their speeches by leading in a blaring Salvation
Army band. When he later pinches a prostitute in a bar, he is thrown
out; however, he starts a fracas which ends with the girl and six Negroes
being taken to jail.
Steel needs live humans for laboratory experiments, so he telephones
the governor for help. He explains to the governor that prisoners of war
from Korea are too far away, and besides, use of them might entangle the
United States embarrassingly with the United Nations. The governor gets
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a sheriff to frame t.he six Negroes in prison; this is done by having the
prostitute accuse them of rape. They are convicted, but as the country
is stirred by the "Case of the Six,11 they are kidnapped by the Ku lUux
Klan and are to be burned at the stake. The chief of police f!rescues"
them from the mob and transports them to Steel' s laboratory.
At this moment, Steel's young son sneaks into the laboratory and
touches the "Silver Dust, II then dies a horrible death wh.l.Le the Nazi
colonel wat ches and coldly notes the details of the death process. All
this he reports accurately to the imperturbable father. The Progressives
learn of Steel's intentions and break in on General Kennedy and gangsters
as they torture Steel for the formula. The mob carries the Negroes to
safety, just before the police arrive to stop them. Hhen the general
tells the Progressive leader, liTheelectric chair awaits you!" he flees
into the night, saying, "Come on, let's get out of here. We don't warrt
to be under the whee Ls of American justicel "3t~
In an article in Izvestiya in 1953, the director of the Moscow
Shock Horker Theatre pointed out the poor quality of films:
Because of the printing defects in laboratories and poor
sound tracks, audiences sometimes see on the screen a darkened,
grey picture, accorrwanied by poor sound. The color is often
distorted in color films and barely comprehensible sounds come
from the screen.
The low quality of motion picture scripts submitted for production 'was
also the subject of an article in Sovetskaya Kul'tura.35 Directors of
the MosfiJ.m Party Committee complained to the .Ministry of Culture: It. . .
arc lighting is not even yesterday's film technology, but that of the
day before yesterday.,,36
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By 1957, however, studios were well-equipped and competently staf-
fed, with apparently unlimited financial resources. .Film stars and extras
were "Tell paid; for example, extras received as much as l~OO rubles a
day,37 as compared viith the 600 ruble monthly wage of the average Soviet
worker.38 The Ministry of Culture opened a free six-year school of cinema-
t()g-raphy for the training o:f motion picture technicians and the grooming
of "people's artists." Soviet writers wer-e also well-rewarded for thei.r
vrork. The author of a scenario received not only a fee ranging :from the
equivalent of $1,000-$30,000, but was paid a like amount for each hundred
prints o:f the :film released. Urru.sua.LLy successful films might "Tinaddi-.
tional moneyprizes.39
The industry in 1955 produced sixty-:five feature films, an increase
of tvlenty-seven over the previous year, and forty-seven over 1952. By
contrast, in 1955 the United States produced 254 and Mexico ninety-six.
Plans calling for ninety :full-lenth films in 1957 were overfulfilled.40
Though film production was not impressive by Western standards, the
Soviets seemed to be in the process of learning that the best propaganda
is that i'IThichis so subtle as to defy detection; in short, that an artistic
f'LIm of' high quality is, per ~, ef:fecti ve propaganda. Somefilms, par-
ticularly those intended primarily for domestic shO'lring, remained heavy
li1it.h propaganda, but subtlety was unquestionably a new keynote.
Although American "Cinerama" was characterized as "closer to a
tourist novelty than an art film" in Sovetskaya Kul'tura in 1956,41 an
illustrated article in Sovetskiy ~ at the end of 1957 hailed the prem-
iere of the llfirst Soviet panoramic stereophonic film" as the "successful
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beginning of a new form of native cinematography, having great perspective
42for development.ll
The continuing expansion of the use of films for propaganda was
evidenced during 1957 at the Moscow Youth Festival, when "tens of thous-
ands of Muscovites and their guests viewed films in open squares and
43parks." On January 29, 1958, after the United States-Soviet agreement
on cultural exchange was signed in Washington, preliminary talks were
opened on exchanging films for screening in both countries.44
Foreign Films
As has been pointed out in other chapters, Soviet propagandists
frequently use the work of foreign artists and press to their own advan-
tage" In addition, selected foreign films from the satellite countries,
and those from the non-Communist world which are ideologically suitable
are shown. Vechernaya Moskva frequently ran advertisements on its back
page from non-Russian films which were produced by fellow-traveler studios,
and together with Sovetskaya Kul'tura, reviewed those films with approp-
riate commentary and illustrations. Other films which coincidentally
carried an ideologically useful theme--Amer:ican cowardice, waste, racism,
etc.--"Tere also shown.
Kariera (Poland) had an anti-American spy story as its plot;
Hiroshima (Japan), made by the Communist-front Teachers' Union gave a
lurid picture of the horrors of nuclear warfare which suggests that only
an inhuman force could have been criminal enough to drop the first atomic
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45 46 7bomb. Mexican Girl (Mexico) and Under Sicilian Skies (Italy)4 are
typical of the anti-capitalist genre which was always "admissable" to the
48domestic screen. The Western Zone gave a Hungarian view of the "Ameri-
can bloc" as aggressive warmongers.
A film which falls into the category of innocently providing the
Soviets with suitable propaganda material is Bread, Love and Dreams,49
shown in the USSR in 1956. It was reviewed in Qg_ony~k as filmed "in a
locale so poor that the inhabitants are forced to eat only bread ,,50. . .
On Moscow screens one week after its London premiere in 1957 was
! King in New York,51 produced and directed by Charlie Chaplin. Ridicule
of rock 'n roll, Hollywood movies ("The Killer with a souL.. You'll love
him •.. Bring the family ..."), blaring jazz and television commercials is
interspersed with hysteria concerning witchhunts, the atom bomb and free-
dom in America ("There's no freedom here ••• They don't give you a pass-
port.,,)52 Soviet newspapers hailed the film as "a hydrogen bomb dropped
on New York's skyscrapers,,,53 and "a destructive satire on living con-
ditions in the USA.,,54
Animated Cartoons
As has been stated, Walt Disney's art has long been popu1ar in the
Soviet Union, but on1y in recent years have the Russians produced compar-
ab1e animated cartoons. In 1957, they c1aimed that their twenty-year-old
"Soyuzmu1" Studio was the 1argest of its type in Europe.55 Much use has
been made of cartoons during the past three decades in the armed forces
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and I!voluntary societies,!! primarily in the technical training of young
men and women; It may be assumed that in the future increased use "rill
be rna.deof animation in films by the Soviets, as the effectiveness of
this form of amD.senent-instruction is unsurpassed. Though the cartoon
lacks the realism of a motion picture, it is able tQ stimulate audience
responses more arbitrarily and thus can evoke strong emotions, even
among adults.
In 1955, an animated short film, The Painted FOX, cleverly ridi-
culed the United States. The film concerns a fox which accidently fell
into red, ivhite and blue :paint. .Hasquerading as a super-beast, he is
then able to rule the forest until it is discovered that under the paint
he is really just an ordinary fox.56
Television
The Soviet Union is devoting considerable effort to the develop-
ment of television. This is not surprising, in vie....t of the huge propa-
ganda potential represented by this medium of mass comnru.nication. The
newspaper Sovetskaya Kul'tuxa has described television as "a powerf'ul,
medf.um for Communist propaganda and the cultural education of the vlOrking
people.1I57 However, any connnents on television as used in propaganda
wor-k must still be largely gues swor-k, since the greatest development of
this visual broadcasting in the USSR is still in the future. As it has
the potential of nearly universal coverage, it could become the most im-
portant of all mass connnunication media.
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The Soviet system of' television was available in 1957 to a far
smaller percentage of Soviet citizens than in the comparable system in
the United States. Data published in April, 1956, put the nmnber of
sets in operation in the USSRat 1,500,000;58 however, in June, 1957, the
number had grown to almost four million, according to Soviet sources,59
of whtch over 700,000 were said to be in Moscow. The goal of the Sixth
Five Year Plan was "seven million sets with tvTenty-five million view'ers. n60
The Plan fUrther envisioned television in all republic capitals, as well
as the country's principal industrial centers.61
IvIoscovrand other large cities boasted television reception, but
still on a limited basis; i. e., the programming was not scheduled for the
entire day and evening. For examp.Le , a television schedule published in
Decemb er, 1957, indi ca ted that M:oscffir's ti-vOchannels did not operate sim-
ultaneously, but commencedat 2 p.m. or 7 p.m. (depending on the day of
the week ) and signed off at 10 p.m. daily, "rith periods of non-transmission
. b t 62 f II I-a,n e ween; A Soviet newspaper complained or Lengt.hy pauses taking up
to ten percent of the time.1I63
The quality of Soviet television came under fire in Sovetakaya
Kul'tura in 1953, "rith the admission that "many complaints are received
that programs are monotonous, dull and hastily prepared and that they are
frequently repeated." An old complaint is reiterated in the words,
11 ••• creative initiative is vital to feature broadcasts. Yet it is
precisely that quality that some studio workers Lack, ,,64 l'he same source
asked in 195L~,"Whyare [so many) television sets out of opez-at.Lon?" It
was claimed that in Leningrad, "of 1,260 sets sold in four months in 1953,
• 4,87 have had to be repaired." Though a trivial part "costs but
kopeks, wher-e can it be found ?u65
That Soviet propagandists quickly adapted their methods to tele-
vision's unique advantages is evident from a description of a program
wh.ich originated in Tallin, Estonia, in 1955. Included in the day's
programming was a sketch and song performed by "a meritorious Soviet
artist ," showing jobless American wor-ker-s who held out their caps, beg-
ging, "Give us bread or anything else, dear people! ,,66
In February, 1957, 200 foreign and Soviet correspondents were
summonedto MoscOl'l'SHome of Journalists, -v[herethey found the stage
set for a very dramatic presentation. Batteries of kleig lights and
television cameras were focussed on four pale men, who were surrounded
by a curious display of pistols, e:x:plosives, maps, Sovi.et currency, mini-
ature radios and poison pills. Foreign IvJinistry Press Chief Leonid
Il'yichev identified the men as Russian refugees, recruited as spies by
the United States and parachuted into the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955.67
As televi.sion cameras X"ecordedthe scene, each man solemnly told
his fantastic tale:
In order to turn us into obedient servants and make us forget
our love for our mother country, the Americans encouraged drink-
ing, gambling and bad language amongus and §ven took us to Munich
to visit immoral houses to enjoy ourselves.6
II 'yichev punctuated this confession inth a charge that the United states
was \·mging a II secret war" of subversion and espionage against the peace-
lovIng Soviet Union. The alleged spies were "told to obtain genuine
Soviet documents through bribery or i·lith the aid of thieves, and even by
rrmrdering Soviet citizens.,,69
It may 'De as sumed that, as the Hungarian uprising during the pre-
vious October had shaken the Russian people, the television show and
f'ilms made from the presentation would strongly support the regime's
contention that American provocateurs wer-ebehind the whole thing. The
arrest of Jack and ,MyraSoble in the United states as Soviet espionage
agents a.Lso undoubtedly spurred the Soviet propagandists to a retaliatory
move at this time.
American television has been widely and frequently attacked as a
cultural menace. Sovetskaya Kulttura on January 28, 1956, emphasized
the horror of television for American children in a cartoon wh.i.chshowed
children cower-Ing in fright from a mass of bloody gangsters, ghosts,
headless corpses, axes and A-bombswhich poured from a television set.
The connection between the terror of television and comics in the United
states was discussed in the article. .M3,nyreaders of this paper might
have been inclined to agree with the Soviet correspondent"lho commented
on the superfluity of American television commercials: "Only a stone
hi Id· f t t' d 1!70sp nx cou _ st i.ck to one of these per -ormances 0 cne very en •
Pr-opoaa.Lsfor an uncensored exchange of television broadcasts of
the 11 canned" variety resulted in inclusion of this matter in the United
stateS-Soviet agreement on cultural exchange signed in early 195iJ.71
After the f'ilmed interview of Party leader Khrushchev, which was tele-
vised in the United states on June 2, 1957, Hikoyan and Molotov had both
expressed their approval of such an idea. First Deputy Premier lI1ikoyan
had cormnentedat that time that television could be especially suitable
for the co:rn:petition of ideas because it wou.Ldbe more difficult "t.o
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f'alsify" before the cameras than on radio, lias you cannot only hear, but
also see , n72 A surprising feature whl ch was not "widely publicized at the
tim.e was thirty minutes of American newsree.Ls shown on l,foscoivtelevision
once weekly in 1955.73 These films, supplied to the Soviets by Hearst's
'I'eLeriews Ne:..vsreel Agency, emphasized baby parades and sports contents,
and "Here thus ideologically neutral.
CHAPTER XI
PLAYS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
Plays
The stage is less important as a propaganda vehicle than the motion
pictuYe. The ID~ber of theatre-goers is necessarily restricted by the
fewer theatres; yet, in spite of the relatively small number of its pat-
rons, the play exerts a wider influence than wou.l.dbe expected in the
Soviet Union. In that country, the theatre is more important as a means
of entertainment than in the United States, although there, too, it is
largely confined to the bigger population centers. Izvestiya complained
that "rural audiences are poorly served by the theatres. SpeciaJ_per-
formances for collective and state farms • are given only rarely. It
is not often that a theatre troupe appears in the countryside with a
traveling show."1
The shortcomings of the playas a propaganda medium are headed by
the spectatorts consciousness of the fact that he is watching actions
which are not reality. He, himself--and not the camera--selects stimuli
on the stage to vrhich he responds, and t'ewtheatres can compete with the
motion picturers efficient use of sound and light. The lesser cost of
plays is to be noted; hmrever, as the Soviet government has never given
any indication that it lacks fUnds for propaganda purposes, it may be
assumed that the cost of propaganda is not a primary consideration in the
USSR. A play can be adapted to a smaller audience eaSily, and the propa-
ganda can be more -blatant than in a film. In areas of the Soviet Union
which are isolated the government has employed small dramatic companies
for years.
The mission assigned to the theatres ~ms similar to that of the
press and film industries. As Culture ~ Life (the organ of the Central
Propaganda Department of the Party) stated vlith frankness in late 1950:
In the world peace campaign our stage productions unmask the
beastly features of American imperialism. Our theatres exhibit
a whole gallery of stage types of enemies of peace--American
politicians and gangsters of the pen, industrial tycoons and
bandits • • • and lackeys of Viall Street.2
To put such a program into operation, eighteen anti-American plays ..rere
produced in the Soviet Union in 1949; the follovr.ingyear this number vms
increased to twenty-six.3
Such crude anti-American plots as wer-e common after 19t1-6 in Soviet
plays were not always the case, however; A visitor to the Soviet Union
in 1927 reported seeing in plays "no attacks on capital or capitalism as
such, but always upon the extravagent profligacy and brutality of the
Tsarist regime.,,4
It would be a mistake to assume that the United States escaped
unscathed, because the u..run:istakablefigure of the capitalist was present
in many plays from the time of War Corrnnunismand after. In general, h01'1-
ever, not untd.L the late 1920' s and more particularly, just before the
Second Horld Har, did the United States figure importantly on the Russian
stage. Especially popular was Uncle Tom's Cabin, adapted from the Ameri-
can play vrith many changes in the script and setting.
l~-6
During the Second VJorld ~-Jar, the tone was quite friendly to the
United States, in th several stage adaptations of American plays and films
running from 1942 to 1945. It Happened One Night was adapted as ~ ~
to New~,5 being performed successfully by the Leningrad ComedyTheatre
all through the war. Immortal in 191.~3portrayed an American newspaper-
correspondent who joined the Red guerrillas and fought the NaziG in a
straight, positive role.6
Perhaps the best known of all was The Mission of _Mr.Perkins to
the land of the Bolsheviks.7 In this play, produced in the autumn of 194'+,--- ---- -- --- ----------
Perkins, a millionaire from Chicago, went to the USSRto find out vlhether
it was possible to do business vli th Stalin. A journalist comparrlon, He11'q),
represented "the American Yellow Press. II Hempfound confirmation of all
his prejudices and retained his original opinion, while Perkins, an unsen-
timental but open-minded businessman, was convinced that it was possible
to get along with the Soviets. The play was quite friendly, vlith many
amusing scenes; Perkins was portrayed as friendly to the Russian people.8
After the war, a rash of plays with anti..,American themes appeared
in the theatres. At the height of the Cold VJar, no comedy revue was com-
plete lrithout several anti-American numbers in it.9 President TrUlnan
was caricatured malevolently in tvlo spectacles wh:lch spurred a storm of
protest from our embassy in Moscow. In ~M1e~ Haberdasher, by Anatoliy
Surov, a haberdashery salesman from Kansas City who bore a striking
resemblance to Hitler was selected by the "Pendergast Machine" as its
candidate for president on the Nazi ticket. The politicians hit upon the
idea of proclaiming that he is indeed "Der Fuehrer," who had been secretly
saved from the Chancellory bunker in 1945.10 The Missouri Waltz purported
to expose the corruption of Kansas City politics; however, Soviet critics
insisted thatthe corrupt politicians were more human than the play's
"positive types," portraying American Communists!
Annabelle Bucar's book, Behind Embassy Windows was produced as a
play which showed the United States Embassy in Moscow as a nest of war-
mongers hatching plots aimed at undermining the Soviet state. Although
direct references were made only to "a capitalist power," the audience
could hardly mistake the intention of the playwright. Actors engaged in
trickery, deceit and blackmail, and the counsellor of the embassy is
revealed as having sold aluminum to Nazi aircraft factories during the
was "for use on the Eastern front." He states, "If only Hitler were on
the Oder, everyone could sleep quietly in his bed." The plot was based on
alleged American efforts to revive the Nazi Party and reorganize the
11Wehrmacht to fight with the Soviet Union.
The Roman Catholic Church was shown in league with the Americans
i C • f 12n onsplracy Q_ the Doomed. A capitalist states, "God has placed the
atom bomb in our hands to establish peace, as I understand it." Cardinal
Birnch answers, "Drop the bomb quickly, sir, while the Soviets still have
13not got it." This play appeared at the time of the Czechoslovakian
coup. Within six months of the start of the Marshall Plan, Ilya Ehrenburg
authored Lion in the Square, a clever production in which an American
adventurer arrived in a French provincial town with a scheme. He persuades
the mayor to let him take the town's lion monument in return for promises
of dollars and canned meat. When the hoax is discovered, the townspeople
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an illustrated series in
h' 1 141S pans.
15Ogony~k.
This play was also published inrise in wrath and thwart
Perhaps the greatest number of performances for any play in history
can be claimed by Constantin Simonov's The Russian Question,16 which first
appeared in Zvezda in serial form in December, 1946, and on the stage the
following March. It is known that the production was later adapted for
the screen, after having run continuously in at least 500 theatres in
17the Soviet Union.
The plot concerns Harry Smith, a correspondent who had written
favorable articles about the USSR during the war, and Charles MacPherson,
co-owner of a chain of newspapers, who asks Smith to write a series of
articles on l1whythe Russians want war.l1 Smith says he believes that the
Russians want peace, but MacPherson offers $30,000. if he will make a
trip to the Soviet Union and write the series. Smith is broke and in love
with Jessie, MacPherson's secretary. In a bar, he meets a foreign editor
on a MacPherson newspaper; this man apologizes for what he must do with
news about the USSR: if it is bad,it goes on page one; if it is good, it
is l1buriedl1on page sixteen. Jessie convinces Smith to accept the job.
Back from his trip and married to Jessie, Smith is busy working
on his manuscript; meanwhile, MacPherson is widely advertising the forth-
coming work, and is very curious. When Smith finally gives him the
completed series, he is infuriated because the articles declare Russia
does not want war! Smith is fired, and is blackballed as a l1Redl1in the
journalistic world.
In the final act, Smith's home is being dismantled by movers;
Jessie says she loves him but cannot face poverty, and leaves, too.
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Alone in the empty house, Smith vOvrsto make a nei-l start and find a place
for himself in the "other America" which he knows exists.
This play won Simonov the Stalin Prize. Its basic theme was that
there are two Americas in conflict vlith one another--one, that of Lincoln
and Roosevelt wh.i.ch is sympathetic .vith Soviet ideals and aims; the other,
that of Wall Street and reaction, wher-e the theory is that the dollar vrill
buy anything, even a man's soul.18
~ Voice of ~merica19 and For ~ Second front2~ooth appeared in the
'Ttnnter of 1950 and "exposed" United States militarists. The former showed
them in league with the capitalists to slander the USSR,wh.i.Le the latter
condemned their umrillingness to open a second front in the wor Ld war ,
American aggression in the Intervention proved a popular theme in the
early 1950's.21 In 1950, Aurora Borealis was eulogized by Pravda as an
accurate and penetrating portrayal of the "it®erialist" policies charac-
terizing Anglo-American intervention in Northern Russia.22 In the play, a
mother demands "that Colonel Larry severely punish the murderers of her
daughter, who had been a victim of American officers.,,23
By 1953, Intervention plays (mainly inspired by the Korean Har)
were less lurid or hysterical than previously. Hostile W~.ndsin that year
gave equal b i Ll.Lng to the British as "spies" and "imperialists. ,,24 Three
Years A:fter, a sequel to Conspiracy of the Doomed,warned that "British
and American intelligence agents • • • operate through blackmail and
bribery; they kill honest people; they penetrate the CommunistParty rallies
and recruit spies and traitors.,,25
After the death of Stalin, anti-Americanism in plays changed rapidly
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in keeping with the "new look" in Soviet propaganda. Much of the previous
raw hatred was watered down with subtlety now. In 1957, Sovetskaya Kultura
complained that too many American plays were being staged: Telephone Call
(Dial ~ for Murder), The Sixth~, etc. The newspaper lamented that
not enough good Soviet plays were being produced to take their place.26
Foreign plays are frequently seen on the Soviet stage. The
27Jackals (Estonian), a dramatic satire in four acts, later became the
venemous movie Silver Dust. li Routine Case2g (Polish) "tells how, under
the cover of 'justice,' a charge is concocted against a current police
victim, a Communist worker in America ••• with the aid of false witnes-
ses [he] is accused of murder. Acquittal is impossible; the FBI has seen
to this beforehand.,,29
30Colonel Foster Will Plead Guilty (French) "describes the war in
Korea by depicting the camp of the interventionists," who look like
31malicious criminals on stage. A Polish play, Julius and Ethel,
eulogized the Rosenbergs, who had been executed for espionage against
the United States in 1953, "in a work portraying with perfect truth and
honesty the figures of these good and inflexible people who, by their
deaths hurled a heavy and ineradicable accusation at the American way
of life.,,32
Children's Plays and Puppet Shows
As in the realm of books and magazines, the Soviet government pro-
vides considerable children's theatre entertainment. Basic anti-Americm
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tbe_ mes used are those which easily stimulate young imaginations, such as
ra· .c~al persecution, the plight of children in America, etc.
Snow'ball---....;;...'
wr-Ltten especially for the Children t s Theatre in Moscow
by V. Itvub Lrnova,y ~ , scored a big succes S In th its stOTlJ about the color bar
in an J\:m. •ern can school. There, racial prejudice is complicated by hatred
between the r~ch 33and the poor students.
Uncle Tom's Cabin was resurrected in the post'\vaTperiod in an
unrecog' .n~zable form. Its basically religiouS theme had been turned into
a political one, and by means of a prologue and epilogue the plot was
brought UTI~ to date. The curtain rises on a Newyork street scene at night.
The glow of neon signs illillrinatesa Negro mother clutching at her wounded
daughter. The audience learns that gffi~en had shot at the mother because
She dared to vote, and had hit the girl by mistake. Cars speed by, unheed-
ing. The mother comforts the daughter and begins to tell her the story
of'Uncle Tom. In the final moments of the play, the two are in the same
POSition, with~he evil :face of SimonJ'egree leering in the background.
The mother looks at the face and tells the child,
Yes, people like him are alive today. His planter's clothes
have been changed for the dinner jacket of the businessman, and
now he manages bawes, theatres, hotels and restaurants. It is a
person like him who has forbidden the Negroes to use the schools,
]1ark~, theatres, hocels and restaurants. ]!e does everything to
depr~ve them of a human existence.
j4
Puppet showsare still commonin the soviet union, particularly in
8.l"easwhere the language barrier remains a probleD1 ·,0 entertainers. The
figures of the ",,""rmongers,"~n, Acheson, etc., were easily adapted
to tho 1-'a.s ancient art, and visiting Oriental pwppet sh""S have beEllparo'c-
ularly successful in using contemporary themes.
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Lectures and Speeches
One of the first agitational methods used by the Soviets was
speeches at factories, public gatherings and before assembled troops. The
advantage of personal contact with large groups of people thus gained
has never given way entirely to other propaganda media. Great numbers of
public lectures and agitation speeches are organized by the government
each year.
Journalists and other official travelers who have visited the
United States are often asked, on their return to the Soviet Union, to
give lectures on their observations. That their subject matter has often
been colored or simply false is evident from the reports of several news-
men who have attended these lectures. The Soviets have been guilty also
of presenting supposedly discerning lectures on America by people who
have never been there.
Even at the time of the "Coalition War" in 1944, Doctor of Juridi-
cal Science Levin presented lectures on the State Organization of the
United States which, although generally factual and friendly, contained
t
35he usual attacks on isolationists in America. Soviet geographer N. N.
Baranski in Moscow the following year lectured on the thesis that the
capitalist machine civilization had molded the psychology of the American
36people.
Under Zhdanov's prodding in 1947, Soviet lecturers took American
intellectuals to task for their loss of motivation and spirit. Mendeson
asked, "What 'dry terror' has paralyzed the pens?,,37 The speeches of
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Party leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have received vade publication in the
press and over the comnunity loudspeakers. The increasing use of televi-
sion make s it clear that the graphic element in such speeches may be
emphasized in the fUture.
Demonstrations and Meetings
Closely allied vlith public speeches are the mass demonstrations
and parades wh.ich have a.Iways been a tool of dictatorships. The memories
of'HitIer at NUrnberg and Mussolini at Rome linger vivid_ly, but it has
been under the championship of'the Communists that the mass demonst.r-at.Ion
has gained its f'ullmaturity. From the very beginnings of Soviet power
--indeeo_, to bring the Soviets to pOvTer--the emotional effect created on
participants of mass meetings has been utilized to advantage. This propa-
ganda medium has an advantage over certain other propaganda vehicles, such
as radio, because under certain conditions it can lead directly to action,
whereas the radio only produces pre-action responses. Too, the agitator
at a meethlg can continually respond to his audience as it responds to
him; at this point communication leaves the field of propaganda and
:>8becomes more properly persuasion.J A mob spirit can be deliberately
manipulated by the agitator or by his claque whi.ch pretends to be a bona
f'idepart of the audience. The peculiar advantage of parades as an ideal
propaganda medium is that the parader, himself', actively participates in
the enterprise and thereby commits himself to its purpose.39
In the USSR today the demonstration may arise from a current issue
(the IIspontaneous event"), or it may be publicly planned for weeks ahead,
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such as the annual May Day and November 7th parades, or to celebrate a
festival or conference. The propaganda use to which such an event may be
put is described by a military attache of the late 1940's:
It is customary after a great ceremonial parade on the Red
Square for thousands of civilian "volunteers" • • • to file past
the Politburo on top of Lenin's tomb, accompanied by decorated
lorries representing topical events or pillorying notorious
foreigners.40
Attendance at such a parade will number in the hundreds of
thousands, particularly in view of the methods the Soviets use to ensure
a sizeable audience. Invariably the demonstrators carry huge banners
and placards, often massive photographs or paintings. Photographs taken
at parades showing slogans, "Ban the Bomb I" and "We are for Peacel" are
familiar sights in the Russian press. In this way, a parade can serve a
double purpose in graphic propaganda: the benefit of "visual participa-
t· "lon can be extended to the newspapers' readers, and thus increase the
effectiveness of the original propaganda.
A common feature of the Soviet press is publication of photographs
taken at mass demonstrations allover the world, purporting to show
sympathy with Communist ideology. Photographs taken in England showed
41
Londoners parading with miniature "H-bomb" masks, and women bearing a
42banner, "Stop H-bomb Tests!". Another from Japan showed a huge slogan
painted on the street: "Down with the Hydrogen Bomb!".43 Koreans in
Pyongyang demonstrated against "provocative maneuvers of the United States,
trying to disrupt the armistice.,,44
In recent years the effect of demonstrations has been enhanced by
the use of television. On May 1, 1956, the first temvision broadcast
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was made from Red Square, and parts of the May Day :parade wer e televised
that date.45
Meetings are often conducted by political advisors and their
assistants in the Soviet armed forces. An intrinsic part of every sol-
dier's training, political indoctrination is given higher priority by
the Party in the overall preparation of an individual. for the defense of
his country. The zampolit, unit officers or NCO's frequently meet and
di "scuss current event.s" vrith the troops. For example, in 1953 a Soviet
publication reported: "The library of the officers' club of the Lvov
:Military District recently held a conference on the theme, 'The American
A . ,)-16rmy 18 an army of pillage, murder and enslavement •
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CHAPrER XII
01'H:E.:RFO 1\1SOF PROPAGANDA
Art"
Art has gained mass appreciation, if not quality in the Soviet
Union since the Revolution. In 1927, the Soviets claimed to have 1~76
museums,l and in 1940 they gave 922 as the number.2 lIArtis for the
masses," declared Felix Kon, head of the Fine Arts Department of the
COmmissariat for Education in 1930. "Art organizes thought, and as it
formerly served the priesthood, the feudal classes and the bourgeoisie,
it must serve the proletariat of the Soviet Union.,,3 The very consider-
able talent of the Russians as artists must be taken into consideration
as great potential. Such famous cartoonists as "Kukr-yrrtksy" are also
noted as artists in their own right.
In several of the greatest art galleries--e.go, Tretyakovskaya--
and museums in the past, exhibits have been held of anti-American graphic
propaganda; these have included paintings, drawings, cartoons and post-
ers. It ~ras not uncormnon for a room to be devoted specifically to the
4theme. Generally speaking, oil painting seems not to have been used
frequently for such purposes; however, the MUseum of the Revolution in
Moscow does have a number of paintings rejoicing in the triumph of
Soviet armies over capitalist interventionists and White Guardists backed
by the "imperialistS." .An oil painting, !ill ~ ~,was shown at the
International Exhibition of pictorial and Applied Arts in Moscow in
August, 1957. This depicted a seething mass of white-cloaked figures
prepa . 5rlng to lynch a Negro.
Postwar orthodoxy in art was signalized by a drive begun by the
Party in August, 1946, to impose new and sharper discipline over the
ent. 6lre field of the arts. Zhdanov attacked the view that for artistic
express' tlon 0 be ideologically neutral was permiss
able•
He claimed that
to exist , art must serve a positive creative purpose in the scheme of
state development; it must advance Communist doctrine and attack all
bourgeois "slanders." On the other hand, ~rt must not give expression
to the weariness or discontent of the people with their leaders or their
lot.
Art in the United States has been attacked frequently as part of
the campaign to ridicule American culture, or the alleged lack of it.
~ovetskaya Kul'tura has devoted columns, cartoon and photographs to this
end on occasion. The tastelessness of American abstract sculpture is
taken to task in photographs under the captions, "And this is called
art I,7" and "Look until you don't see it8,.,.Krokodil published a picture
series , "Uncle Sam Draws Himself," which Vlas illustrated solely with fan-
tastic abstract draVlings gleaned from the American press. The purpose-
fUlness and solidity of Communist art is contrasted Vlith the absurdity
of American abs.ilractions in an article in KO",.01.ol'skaya Pravda.
9
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and Banners
A means of propaganda which was among the first to be used by the
Bolshevik s and which today is still liberally utilized, is poster art.
Large and small, black and white or color, single or group themes on
every ,conce~vable subject, these have been particularly adaptable to anti-
Amer'J.can propaganda. Early posters were poorly composed and printed,
ofte n stenciled, but in recent years soviet poster art has surpassed art
re:prod t'liC J.on in books and other publications, both in eye-appeal and in
general composition. particularly impressive is the excellent color
:processing used. soviet methods of propaganda and agitation render the
:Postel'useful and effective, and its ineXPensive production in quantity
:printing has made its use almost universal within the USSR. Few photo.
graphs of Sov.~et l~fe 1 t• ~ in cities, villages or kolkhoz
es fai to cap ure a
:poster in the background.
During the Intervention, a poster, "Capital and Co." showed Wilson
and others as the 10"inspirers of bloody intervention. It
One phase of
later Ru 'ss~an history under stalin vas a violent campaign to blacken the
United States with tbe biggest share of guilt in the Intervention of 1918-
1920. Entire series of posters shm·,ed Uncle sam as the ringleader in
ant''-Bolshevik activities. One such, "The second Attack of the Entente,"
showed leashed curs with Tsarist caps ("])enikiu," "Yudenich," "Kolchak")
held by Uncle Sam. John BUll and La Belle Francaise are there, too, but
in the shadow of prominent Uncle sam.ll ThiS same poster was used in an
exh" ,
'o,t in the Mlseunt of the Red ArmY, a photograph of wbich was published
in in February, 1952.12
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In the 191~O's, the play Uncle Tom's Cabin (see Plays) was advertised
vli th garish posters depicting a Negro tied to a tree, being flogged by
brutal Whites.13 Similarly, Silver Th~st (see Motion Pictures) in 1953
hinted of the horrors of germ warf'ar e with a poster depicting an evil-
looking man carrying a test-tube; behind him a painted backdrop represent-
ed skyscrapers at night and a tell-tale sign beaming, "Coca-Cola.,,14
During the period 1949-1953, great numbers of virulently anti-
American posters were disseminated. In 1950, one depicted a group of
figures (Truman, Acheson, Churchill) on a clifftop; a Soviet man vrrites
in his diary, "We do not want "var, but if they move ••••,,15Another por-
trays "Freedom--in the American Hay" (reminiscent of the Five Freedoms of
the Second ~rorld 'VJar),which included "freedom of person" in whf.ch the
YJ.uKlux Klan lynches a Negro, "freedom of speech" showing men jailed
for having spoken their minds, and so forth.16 A third poster shows
,forkers: "Under Socialism there is no place for unemployment," but under
Capitalism "there is much unemployment." A thin, worried man pleads,"r
will accept any kind of work.,,17
A poster reprinted in Fedin' s On Guard for Peace shows a Soviet----
woman who declares, "All the mothers of the world fight for peace." The
text adds: "•••against warmongers!,,18 The same incentive is posed in a
placard inciting workers to overfulfill the plan: "Every percent over the
plan is a blow to the warmongers."19 A 1952 poster, "In Answer," shows
an American militarist holding a germ bomb ("Cholera") in one hand, vlhile
he attempts to cover up his germ bombing ("Typhus, "Germs") with the
Uni ted Nations flag (stamped w·ith the seal "Wall Street II ) • Behind him a
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chemist wear-Ing an American uniform and Nazi swastika creates these bombs,
which are packed in crates labeled "To Korea,!! !!ToChina." "Villains
cannot hide from the wrat.h of the people," declares the caption.20
The State Department protested against Soviet Air Force Day posters,
I!Glory to the Stalinist Eagles standing guard over Peace and Security of
their Homeland,,,21 which depicted United States aircraft being shot down
by Sovi_et fighters. This called to mind the repeated Soviet announce-,
menta previously made of border violations allegedly made by American
aircraft.
Hu.gebanners are very commonlyused throughout the USSR, often
with portraits of leaders or crude caricatures of enemies who are shown
as being vanquished. Slogans are brief and simple C'Peace! If, !!Death to
the Warmongers!"), and no holiday is complete vn thout countless banners
for marchers to carry and to line the streets and public buildings. The
MOSC~T State Circus was long decorated with banners bearing the word,
lip II. 22eace In ten languages.
Exhibits and the Circus
Exhibits have been of several types: photographs and drawings,
cartoons, graphs and charts, objects and combinations of these. Sometimes
they have been accompanied by lectures or demonstrations. HugeAll-Union
art exhibitions, as well as local and Republic exhibitions are held. each
year in the USSR. These include all categories of art, the varieties of
anti-American propaganda which have been shown in the past ranging from
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photographs to wood-block prints (frequently used by Oriental artists).
Pravda reprinted material from a Peking exhibit in 1951 which
showed executed Nazi war criminals. An immense banner over all pro-
claimed, "Such is the fate of all warmongers 1,,23 In the same year, the
Leningrad Naval Museum held a graphic exhibit dealing with United States
intervention in 1918. Comparisons were made with the alleged American
,,- - 24 tlnvaslon" of Korea. At Houses of Culture pho o-exhibits have been
held which have contrasted life in the United States and the Soviet Union,
with the inevitable unfavorable contrast made. Common during the years
1949-1951 were "Intervention Huseums," set up temporarily throughout the
USSR.25 Izvestiya reported the opening in 1949 on Mudyung Island in the
l~ite Sea of an alleged site of a frightful concentration camp run by the
Interventionists. Public inspection of this "historical preserve" was
26encouraged.
At the 1950 Moscow Art Exhibition a series of watercolors, "Soldiers
of Truman," purported to show the terrors of American occupation. "Not to
be Restrained!" showed military policemen grappling with German youth,
who yearned for peace. "Horning Before the Elections in the American
Zone" showed a military policeman standing guard over a machine gun in a
quiet German city.27
In 1951, a documentary and photo-exhibit on crimes allegedly pre-
petra ted by United States interventionists in the Russian Far East was
opened in Khabarovsk.28 Exhibits with anti-American themes were common
in the "Lenin's Corner" reading rooms on military posts.29 A series of
drawings ("Capitalist Europe") depicted Americans in the Western Zone; an
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example, "The Yankee in Vienna," portrayed carousing drunken soldiers and
girls in a jeep, with a wall in the background covered with cheap "girlie-
bar" advertisements.30
When the Soviets accused the United States of waging germ warfare
in Korea in 1952, exhibits were held in many of the populated centers of
the USSR. These included photo-exhibits and some in which were displayed
"germ war canister bombs." The main themes in the Soviet Cartoon Exhibit
in 1952 were the struggle for peace and exposure of the imperialist-
31marauders. In 1956, Leonid Il'yichev, Foreign Press Chief, took over
the huge Spiridonovka Palace, where state receptions are usually held,
to display more than fifty balloon and instrument containers that he
charged the United States had sent over the Soviet Union. The equipment
was spaced out over the courtyard and illuminated by Army floodlights.32
Il'yichev also staged an exhibit of alleged American spies and their gear
t 1 .. . 33on e eVlSlon In February, 1957.
An Estonian artist displayed a political cartoon series at the
republic art exhibition in September, 1957, and designated it for similar
showing at the All-Union Jubilee Exhibition in Moscow. These caricatures
purport to show the fall of Estonia under bourgeois domination, with the
United States sharing the guilt of "imperialism." The dollar signs on
figures stand out clearly. Ten of the drawings were reproduced in
Sovetskaya Estoniya, dedicated "to the 40th anniversary of the Great
October. ,,34
At intervals until the end of the year, examples of exhibited
cartoons were reproduced in Soviet newspapers. One cartoon shows a Negro
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track star running vrith a jeep bearing tvlO Whites behind him, clocking
his speed. "Faster, Bla.k.e,faster! Imagine that they are after you to
lynch you! •,,35
At the All-Union exhibition, watercolor drawings for a book, Tanya,
were also displayed. The vri:feof a Soviet diplomat who is sent to ~'lash-
ingtan to work, Tonya returns to the Soviet Union completely disillusioned
about America. The dr'awi.ngsreflect her life in both lands.36
Even tile circus, the perennial chase~ of worldly worries, has been
taken over by the propagandists as a vehicle for their goods. Zaslavsky
declared, "The Soviet circus, developing as part of our people t s culture,
has created its own style ••• ,.r37which he claimed was fundamentally
opposed to that of the ~vest. In Moscow, for example, all performers are
graduates of the state Circus School and thus receive a standard educa-
tion along Party humor lines. The circus is subsidized by the Soviet
government, and is not required to mrute a profit. It also does not have
the competition whf.ch the circus has in the United States from television
and other forms of entertainment, and so enjoys relatively greater
populari ty •
Russian circuses play not in a tent, but indoors, in an auditorium-
type building. There is no three-ring circus performance to keep the
audience entertained every .moment; rather, the circus is a one-ring
affair and there are often pauses in the activity while equipment is rig-
ged for the next act. There are fe,'lerclowns and animals than in an
American circus, more acrobats and gymnasts, and no sideshow.
~fith a fevl notable exceptions such as "Karan 0. rash" of the Moscovl
164
State Circus, clowns have not been distinguished in the Soviet Union.
In 1953, a group of circus artists in Kalinin wrote to the editor of
Izvestiya: "The problem of the clown acts is a sore point with us. The
circus administration is afraid of laughter and afraid of clowning •
Satirists lack a good repertoire.".38 Zaslavsky also complained that
satire was neglected in the circus and regretted that clowns were not
being trained.39
Such circus skits as described below were typical of the late
1940's, when the "Hate America" campaign was gathering speed; at one per-
formance a clown dressed as Uncle Sam holds high a boomerang labeled "$."
"This is American aid to Europe," he shouts, and flings it into the air,
whereupon it splits into two dollars, which return to his hands. Another
clown drags a radio into the ring. "Hooray!," he shouts, "I've invented
a radio without an aerial." He then turns it on. The loud barking of
dogs vibrates throughout the circus building. "That's the Voice of
America," the inventor explains, then turns to the channel for BBC. This
time the grunting of swine is clearly audible.
Next, a huge papier-mache head with a red nose and watery eyes is
pulled into the ring. A clown opens the head and guides out for inspec-
tion some samples of "American culture." These include: for literature
--a masked bandit in evening clothes; the cinema--a western badman; the
theatre--three fat chorines; science--three dwarfs labeled "anti-Soviet
gossip," "Truman," and "the Marshall Plan." Then all characters re-enter
the skull, which is closed and the band strikes up American jazz. When
the clown again opens the head, all characters have vanished, and in the
empty skull is left "The Atlantic Pact.,,40
Other circuses have also furnished anti-American propaganda mater-
ial. At a Kharkov performance, two clowns entered the ring vTith a long
rubber co« labeled, !lU.S.A." They exp'Lad.ned, "This is the longest caw
in the wor-Ld; It :feeds in Western Europe and gives mi.Lkin the United
States.,,41 In October, 1957, after the successful launching o:f the :first
Russian earth satellite, the witty comedian Karan d'ash convulsed Muscovite
audiences by exploding a small balloon, then e:;q>laining, "that was the
.American sputnik! ,,42
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CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSIONS
The year 1957 serves as a logical end to this study, even were
space factors not a consideration. By then it was acknowledged that
Stalin was--in truth--dead, and "Stalinism" moribund. Khrushchev had
assumed full control of the Party and State, and chinks were showing in
the hitherto impenetrable wall erected by his predecessors.
As the first forty years of the Soviet state ended, it was evident
that propagandists remained as busy as ever influencing by dissemination
of ideas and slogans the "consciousness of the masses" in the USSR. Yet,
one cannot resist musing on the question: how effectively has this
measureless mass of propaganda guided minds? How is it possible to har-
monize this forty-year diet of anti-Americanism with the obvious friend-
liness which most American visitors have encountered among Russians in
the Soviet Union?
Anyone who studies Communist propaganda will soon be repelled by
its repetition, ad nauseum. This has been regularly interpreted as evi-
dence of the Soviet aim to propagandize to insensibility the masses of
people within its borders. Rostow claims that "propaganda carried to
surfei t helps to produce • • • political apathy which, w:l.ththis genera-
tion of Soviet rulers, may be judged as useful as, or more useful than
political enthusiasm."
In sif'ting through the foregoing material, the conclusion is ines-
capable to the reader that the Soviet government has calculatedly pursued
a sort of' !Icrusade of hat.red" against the United States for its own pur-
poses. Since its early beginnings nothing has changed except volume and
--temporarily--themes; even the w·ording remainds in many instances the
same as thirty years ago. Nevertheless, though a half' century of exper-
ience has improved the propaganda techniq_ues and sharpened their barbs,
it has perhaps dulled the senses of'the Soviet citizem~y at the same
time.
The continuing curiosity and interest in America by the Russian
wou.Ld seem to provide a clue that anti-American pr-opaganda has been at
best only a partial success. It is within the realm of possibility that
in the forty years under discussion, Soviet propaganda has failed in its
mission by trying too hard. If we determine that its desired end has
been creation of apathy, perhaps it can be said to have succeeded. On
the other hand, if active hatred of America has been the :purpose of it
all, the continuous crying of !lWolfll!appears to have reinforced the
natural skepticism of the Russian.
Perhaps ironic is evidence which would indicate that the Soviet
government dares not relax its anti-Americanism more than minimally.
Now that an additional decade has passed since 1957, it would be reward-
ing for other researchers to analyze more recent attitudes expressed by
the Soviets t.owar-dthe United States. This, especially in vi.ew of the
Cuba missile crisis, accelerated competition in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia, and generally increased sophistication within the Soviet
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government. Tantalizing to note has been the lessened use of once-
standard epithets ("bloodsucker," IIcannibal") for Americans, and their
adaptation almost wholly to lfaofs China. The significance of this and
similar changes remains to be explored in a systematic fashion.
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THE ENTENTE--UNDER THE MASK OF PEACE •
v. Deni
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Fig. 2. Political Cartoon, 1929.
CHAMBERIAIN DISCOVERS AMERICA. Under the cover
of the Kellogg Pact, America continues to arm.
Krokodil
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Fig. 3. Political Cartoon, 1932•
AME.RICANCAPITALISM'S CAMPAIGNPOSITION. (The
President): "America will flourish anew!".
M. Cheryonmykh, .!5,!okodil
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THE DREAM OF .AN AMERICAN BANDIT. "I've been dreaming
about this child for so long, and noW, at last, he is
bor-nl" !tcongratulations! II "Hold your congratulations;
I haven't kidnapped him yet!"
Fig. 4. Sociological cartoon, 1936•
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Fig. 5. Political cartoon, 1939.
PillIANTHROPIC UNCLESAM. !II f d be happY to sell yOU
ar=ents, but I beg you, please don't hUrt anybodywith
them." (Notice on table: "credit Spoils FriendshiP")
Krolwdg
203
{'
,
." ,,' _ ' . _"""1'..'I!!I<itlIIS!iltJ:!~L"_""",_,
<".,:,'~,., .-.~ '.,-
,j '.
.•. 1'
~~",
'~,.f:0,: .~..
.~." ~.,,, , :,:.
'I
"
Fig. 6. Political Cartoon, 1945.
THE SIiAVE. The Allied coalition fights the Axis.
B. Yefimov, Krokodil
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UJY100l OCTpOH H ,pa3Hoo6pa3Hoi1
pMTMHKOR M Heo6~'lai1Ho KonopMT-
Hb!MI1 MenOA ...·SlMH.
\113 np>14YAn><30" CMeCH 3neMeH-
TOS. BblHeceHHblX c aCPPHKaHCKOH
POAHHbl, nepepa50TaHMblX HHTOHa-
4HCH npOTeCToHTCK>lX T"'MHOS. npe-
Bpa-rHBW>1)(CSl B HerpH,SlHCK>1e AY-
XOBHble neCHOneH1-1S\, T.aK Ha3blsae-
Mble . «cnHpl1'IY3nC» (spiritual:::).
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HilTenei1 H KOJ1AYHOB, W1tMaHCK>1e
HilneBbl 11 TaH40BaJ1bHYIO MilrHIO
Ape8He~3bl'1eCK"'X KYJ1b,08. B C08-
peMCHHblX Herp",HHCK>lX rocYAap-
cra ex, ew,eeoXpaH>lSW01X TeHb He-
3aB>lC'1MOC;11 (J1,,6ep><51. rdH111),
nepClt<IHO'IHble 008TKI1 )H1X KyJ1b-
TOB. ,?M 411cne pen'1fl103Hble
.. .
Sociological Cartoon, 194d.
DECADENCE AND EMJ?TINESS IN AMERICAN CULTURE.
G. Valk, Ogony~k
207
Fig. 10. po1itica1 Illustration, sociolo-
gical cartoon and Photograph, 1949-1950.
(Tap) CAPITALISM BRINGS UNEMPIDYMENT, pOVERTY AND HUN·Gl'1lTO THE WORKERS (1950). (Bottom) CONSP]J1ACY of THE
DAMNED, advertiseJllentfor fi1Jn (1949).
Fig. 11. - Political Cartoon, 1949.
---
--------..
, I
.t
WALLSTREEI'CONFERENCE."TaJ'>:ethis down, gentlemen!
1'he Russians are arming their soldiers with a terribly
deadly weaponl " "What is it?1I "Bolshevism! f!
Bo Yefimov, Krokodil
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Fig. 12.
Political and Sociological cartoons, 1950's.
Back covers, Krokodil
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By, ::lTO KaK cKa'3aTh! Y r-na Topna eCTh
nee OCHOBaHHH AYMaTh >rHa'le. JIl 'Mhl paazre-r iK, KaJ{ I'OBOPHTC51, He YI'a-emb, a rAe ·nOTepHCIllh! Mxx. 3
Occn - oq,H"l!aJ1bHan ",;
Kpa1'HQecl<oi-i nap-ran ew?
ny6J1HKaHOl<oii .
' ....
t.,."
..
Fig. 13. Political Cartoon, 1952.
PRE-ELECTION DRESS RE}~RSAL. Both American
political parties react to the same stimulus. •
Kenevskiy, Krokodil
211
JJ.OIU.aATE.IIbCTBO TOMAC,\
- M ...... uu. _ ....,'••,,~ 'U.'.:;,:.~=.~~".:.l'ou •. _IO, ,
" .....,........,..,.,.,....._
~g;~~::-i.=£::::~:E
~:.~~:~~?:·:;~:~~~~.=1;;
:';;~~:;'" 1> .. ~!~.;~;,:.~,= 1':. ...·=..~:::-=••: ..................""'·.,...r·....~... _ ....... CII' ..:~:.·:!::~E~:~-::::::.14_ ....·_·.1_..{1!l .. _
-."'~.'."'''''_'''''''_ ..=-...::.".~~ ;~If>.4'::'::':":"';;
•
Political Cartoons, early 1950's.
Krokodil
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poljtica1 Poster, 1952.
Do1gorukov
213
~~[~-----------;---' ---------
r: i3-
'I,.-P-'::-
~J > 1)-
F·'-I
,,:'1-: [")-
1) ;,1 - I
.1'11:- I
_.~: .: jl
X 0-
CTI\:l
IIu
I~!rc-
B
1K~J\
nell-
y.tc-
n~!u,
'[:1-
\'~.!d-
!lOrD
,Yi;]1
.o.rn
r: po-
:::TEa
:IJ1I-
lny-
!\IKl-
[,1 if
IlID-
)fO-
,. _ rJ' • - .~ •• , '_." ,
i..: •. : epH ii'.Q. ]](; J\11 f~-rro
12,c.ll!
'.
,
T/I.r:.eT lICt,:aAO 1\!:i1Ald10!IOD
Flo YJ~fl38nJ::)Io pa31ihlx (AJ1ll;})
J-!a cO,!J,ep;~aHr're J.l1IT!:.'i:O!Ion
III OCH3r.u.CI-nfe y6JlJ1I~:
BaH,:.r!~T.LI n o .i;{C.I\(JIOT )~apo!.I
}Irr TJ"ge/l;)D8.'l'L~,~HJ1 y6J1Dar!'b.
110 BH (iJYE'I'.;u;r J.l HJ1 nO/:..A{lp3k!
I-IapO}l~Ib!X rIADI!OD ue COpB3Tb!
C. MI!X/\Jll(OB.
Fig. 16. Political Cartoon, 1953.
u.s. CONGRESS VOTES 100 MILLIONS TO SUPPORT
ESPIONAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS.
M. Abramov, Pravda
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Fig. 18. Political and Sociological Illustrations,
191.l8-1957, from Child:ren's Books and Periodicals.
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Fig. 190 Political Cartoons, 1956-19570
Newspaper cartoons refer to syrian crisis, atom bombers
over England, Little Rock racial incidents, communist
growth (graPh_illustration), and U.S. intelligenCe bal-
.Loons.
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F'Lg, 20. •Political Cartoons, 1957.
Cartoons from various newspapers in the days follow-
ing the successful launching of the first satellite.
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TRANSLITERATION TABLE FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
A a a. P P
IS 6 b C c
B B v T "l'
r r e y y
Jr. fJ.. d o>cp
E e Y6, 61 X x
1,\ >" zlJ U ~
3 3 z
q q
Vi l>1 i
m m
t1 til s Ullil
H M k 'b'b
11 11 1 hi H
MrJ III
b h
H H n a a
0 0 0
Wi)
r
s
t
u
t
ts
ch
sh
shcb
"
e
yu
n n p fl .fZ Y&
ly~ initially, af'~ar vowels, and aftor 'b, bj e glaowllere.
When written as e in Russian, transliterate as ye or e.
US~ of diacritical marks is preferred, b~t such marks
may be omitted when expedienoy diotates.
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